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CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA
-SOME PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
NEIL J. WILLIAMS*
This article examines the procedural device known as the class action
and assesses the prospects of utilizing the action to secure redress for Cana-
dian consumers injured by business misconduct.' It reaches the conclusion
that though the procedure can achieve this result in a few cases, the action is
burdened by restrictions that have prevented the development of its full poten-
tial. The courts are largely responsible for this situation as they have tended to
strictly interpret the language of the Practice Rule that governs the class
action and hence have confined the operation of the procedure within rather
narrow limits. Moreover, it is felt that the courts will not take a more liberal
view of the Rule in the foreseeable future. The article argues that easier
access to class relief would give Canadian consumers better protection against
market misconduct than is provided by existing court procedures and con-
cludes by setting out proposals for change to the class action remedy that
are designed to broaden its scope.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1 The article is based on a report prepared by the writer for the Consumers' Asso-
ciation of Canada in 1974, and funded partly by the Laidlaw Foundation. The draft
legislation and annotations at the end of the article are identical to what appeared in
the report, except that the proposed legislation now includes a provision for the fluid
recovery assessment and distribution of a damages award, and minor changes have been
made to some incidental features of the class action procedure proposed in the draft.
In revising the draft legislation, the writer is indebted to Professor Richard F. Dole, Jr.,
of the University of Iowa, College of Law, for his valuable comments and suggestions.
The text which precedes the legislation has been re-written, though with the exception
of fluid recovery the views expressed and conclusions reached are essentially the same.
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A class action2 brings together for a single determination the claims of a
number of persons against the same defendant that arise from a common
nucleus of fact. Without the class action, the claims would have to be ad-
judicated on individually, probably in separate proceedings. 3 The class action
procedure can thus achieve significant economies in expense and in time and
effort for the courts and the parties, and also avoid the embarrassment that
inconsistent findings in separate proceedings could cause.4 For consumer
groups, the appeal of the class action lies in the mass determination of
numerous claims that otherwise would not be adjudicated on at all. In many
situations involving consumers, separate actions will in fact not be brought
for the reason that proof is too difficult or the amount involved not large
enough to justify the expense and effort of suing. Consumers who have sus-
tained loss and damage from wrongdoing in the supply of goods and services
will therefore be left without compensation while the manufacturer or dis-
tributor responsible retains the improperly acquired profits. A class action
can prevent this result because one consumer is able to recover for all the
damages that each consumer would receive if he sued independently.
Consumer interest in the class action has grown considerably in this
country in recent years, and attention has focused on the United States where
a new class action provision was introduced for Federal courts in 1966.5
2 The terms class action and representative action are used interchangeably in the
article.
.a The alternatives to a class action are separate actions by individual claimants, a
single action brought by all claimants as co-plaintiffs, and a test action which, by agree-
ment, will be accepted by the parties as determining the outcome of all other actions
against the defendant. See further, infra, text at Cl.
4 Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1 at 14, per Lord Shand. "The object of
requiring all persons interested to be joined in the action is to prevent another action
where the same issues will be raised: the intention is, that all having identically the same
interest shall be bound in one action and one judgment" (May v. Wheaton (1917),
41 O.L.R. 369 at 371, per Riddell, J.)
G Canadian writing on class actions is not extensive. The leading articles on the
procedure generally are D. Sherbaniuk, Actions By and Against Trade Unions in Con-
tract and Tort (1958), 12 U. of T. LJ. 151; J. Kazanjian, Class Actions in Canada
(1973), I1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 397. The following articles deal with consumer class
actions: M. Trebilcock, Private Law Remedies for Misleading Advertising (1972), 22
U. of T. L.J 1; G. McFadyen, Consumer Class Actions (1973), 4 Queen's L". 50.
For a history and description of the class action under the Federal Rules in the
United States, see, e.g., C. Wright, Class Actions (1970), 47 F.R.D. 169; W. Simon,
Class Actions - Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction (1972), 55 F.R.D. 375;
E. Pollock, Class Actions Reconsidered: Theory and Practice Under Amended Rule 23,
1973 Bus. Lawyer 741; R. Dole, The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages (1971),
71 Colum. L. Rev. 971. For the history and scope of the class action in the consumer
sphere in the United States, see, e.g., Comment, The California Consumer Class Action
for Fraud: Crippled at Birth by the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (1972), 4 Sw. U.L.
Rev. 310; Comment, Class Actions For Consumer Protection (1972), 7 Harvard Civil
Rights - Civil Liberties L. Rev. 601; R. Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent
Consumer Credit Legislation (1969), 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 80; R. Eckhardt, Consumer
Class Actions (1970), 45 Notre Dame Law. 663; A. Travers & J. Landers, The Con-
sumer Class Action (1970), 18 U. of Ka. L. Rev. 811; Report of the National Institute
for Consumer Justice, Redress of Consumer Grievances (1973), 27-38; R. Mainland,
Class Actions in California: A First Look at Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971), 46 Los
Angeles Bar Bulletin 13; A. Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the
United States of America (1974), 23 Buff. L. Rev. 343.
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This produced class action litigation notable for both its variety and volume.
The new procedure improved the effectiveness of the class action in enforcing
securities, anti-trust and civil rights legislation and brought class relief for the
first time into areas affecting consumers generally. Class actions have now
been successfully launched to obtain relief for consumers in situations as
diverse as the violation of truth-in-lending legislation, rate overcharging by
public utility and telephone companies, fraudulent sales to consumers, and
sales following misleading advertising and other deceptive trade practices.
These developments, however, have not been matched in Canada, though
the types of business conduct at which the United States procedure has been
directed are no less prevalent in this country. Canadian consumer groups,
faced with court rulings that have kept the class action within fairly narrow
bounds, have been encouraged by the United States' achievement to press for
the introduction of similar procedures. But the enthusiasm of consumers is by
no means universal, and the opposition to an expanded class action procedure
by the Canadian business community is equally as spirited.6
The class action has won the attention of citizen groups who in the
face of government and business power are searching for a countervailing
instrument to secure a better response to their needs. What attracts them in
the procedure is the bringing together of a multitude of separate claims for
a single determination. A class action can demonstrate the truth of the adage
that unity is strength. No matter how just the claim, it is the exceptional
person who will embark on litigation against an intransigent business cor-
poration or government agency, particularly if the individual stake is only
small. However, a vindication of rights becomes a realizable prospect when
the citizen sues not just for himself but also for hundreds and possibly
thousands of others in an identical position. 7 The aggregation of numerous
separate claims effected by a class action will give the plaintiff a psychological
lift that the party to ordinary litigation will rarely experience. Though the
plaintiff cannot ordinarily expect any financial backing from the class, he
The objections of business were set out in an article by Mr. Anthony C. Abbott,
President of the Retail Council of Canada, in the Toronto Globe and Mail, September
11, 1972. They can be summarized as follows: United States experience shows that
consumer class actions are slow and cumbersome due largely to the problem of giving
adequate notice to the class; the action would place a heavy burden on Canadian courts
and add unduly to their present congestion; the procedure is unnecessary as most con-
sumer frauds are committed, not by legitimate business, but by fly-by-night or marginal
operators who would not fear the consequences of a class action since they are generallyjudgment-proof; class actions would normally be brought against legitimate enterprises
which could be forced to defend against exorbitant claims often involving insignificant
or isolated violations; class actions often prevent the settlement of consumer claims be-
cause the lawyer for the class has more to gain if the action is tried on the merits.
"Some, though certainly not all, class action suits in the United States have bordered
on the frivolous, yet nonetheless they have become a source of considerable expense
and harassment to the defendant", Toronto Globe & Mail, January 15, 1975, quoting
the Canadian Advertising Advisory Board.
7 "The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against
those who command the status quo. I would strengthen his hand with the view of creat-
ing a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as to those liberally
endowed with power and wealth" (Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1974), 94 S. Ct.
2140, per Douglas J.).
19751
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
will certainly have their moral support and encouragement, something that
will perhaps help sustain him for the struggle ahead. The combination of
separate claims is not without significance for defendants also. But for a
class action there might be no litigation at all since no individual would risk
suing himself. More important, however, the class action presents a far
greater threat to a defendant - in terms of both the adverse publicity the
action will generate and the magnitude of the potential liability - than any
separate action could pose. The action can hardly be ignored, and if the
claim has merit the defendant will need to seriously consider making an
effort to reach a compromise.
The changed conception of the role of the class action that has followed
its emergence from the relative obscurity of the eighteenth and nineteenth
century courts of equity has been clouded at times by misunderstandings as
to the objectives the device can be expected to achieve and the threat the
danger allegedly poses to those against whom it might be employed. The con-
temporary class action has proved to be a highly controversial phenomenon in
the consumer context. However, the opposing viewpoints are often overstated,
the expectations of protagonists for the procedure being matched in extra-
vagance by the disasters prophesied by its critics. This situation results largely
from ignorance as to the nature of the class action and of the larger litigation
process in which the action operates.
The mistake of many enthusiasts for the class action concept is to expect
too much of the remedy. The belief is that given a sufficiently large number
of aggrieved individuals, the mere invocation of the procedure will secure
relief for all. This perception of the class action function stems from a failure
to appreciate that the action is essentially a procedural device which brings
together a number of individual claims that otherwise would be triable
separately. A class action cannot succeed if the separate claims are not
soundly based in fact or in law. If an individual has no remedy under the
substantive law it does not help to draw on a class action mantle and sue
also on behalf of others in the same situation; the multiplication by a hundred
or even a thousandfold does not fortify an individual claim that lacks founda-
tion. The substantive law, whether in legislation or common law, is thus the
point from which consumers must launch the struggle to improve their situa-
tion. First subject business to legally enforceable standards for consumer
protection; then the class action becomes an instrument for securing mass
relief for all who are injured when a business enterprise fails to conform to
those standards.
Both supporters and opponents of the class action share another mis-
conception concerning the procedure. In relating United States experience to
Canadian conditions they overlook several differences in the procedural sys-
tems of the two countries that have important consequences for class actions,
and hence they do not appreciate that Canadian developments will never
exactly follow United States practice. For example, there is no counterpart
in Canadian jurisdictions of the United States' constitutional guarantee of
due process. This affects notice to members of the class. Canadian courts
are not obliged to ensure that the class members who can be identified be
sent notice of the proceedings. By contrast, in the United States, the need
[VOL. 13, NO. 1
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to give extensive notice in order to comply with due process requirements
has at times been a stumbling block to effective class litigation.
Again, Canadian courts apply procedural rules, particularly as to the
costs of litigation, that are not found in the United States. The distinctive
Canadian costs rules can deter class actions, especially when the sums claimed
are small, while costs do not appear to be so great an obstacle in the United
States. In most United States jurisdictions the plaintiff will not have to pay
the defendant's costs if the action is defeated. Also, the plaintiff's lawyer will
usually be remunerated on a contingency basis, receiving nothing if his client
loses and an agreed percentage of the award if he wins." Thus, in the United
States it is the plaintiff's lawyer rather than the plaintiff himself who is at
risk as regards the litigation costs. The total potential recovery in the typical
United States class action is usually quite large, and critics of the procedure
cite the contingent fee arrangement to support the charge that class action
litigation is often lawyer-instigated, the purpose being to earn substantial
fees for the lawyer rather than to get compensation for class members.9
Whatever the truth of the allegation in the United States, there is far less
danger of the procedure being abused in this fashion in Canadian jurisdictions
because in most provinces lawyers are prohibited from acting for a con-
tingent fee of the United States variety.10
The existing class action procedure in Canada has been demonstrated
to be wide enough to enable members of the public in certain circumstances
to check the abuse of power by government agencies which purport to act
under lawful authority. However, the courts have denied the procedure any
further reach. This restriction would largely disappear if the draft statute
which concludes this article were enacted. A broader procedure would en-
compass, for example, the claims of groups of consumers that arise from the
8 As to the costs immunity, see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maler Brewing Co.
(1967), 386 U.S. 714 at 714-19; A. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal
Rule (1971), 71 Colum. L. Rev. 609 at 647.
Ethical Consideration 5-7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Ame-
rican Bar Association provides as follows: 'The possibility of an adverse effect upon
the exercise of free judgment by a lawyer on behalf of his client during litigation
generally makes it undesirable for the lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the
cause of his client or otherwise to become financially interested in the outcome of the
litigation. Although a contingent fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest in
the outcome of litigation, a reasonable contingent fee is permissible in civil cases
because it may be the only means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer
of his choice. ... A lawyer.. .should enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in
those instances where the arrangement will be beneficial to the client." Ethical Con-
sideration 2-20 provides that contingent fee arrangements "in civil cases have long been
commonly accepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The historical
bases of their acceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety of circumstances,
provide the only practical means by which one having a claim against another can
economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute
his claim, and (2) a successful prosecution of a claim produces a res out of which
the fee can be paid." See further, A. Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest
in the United States of America (1974), 23 Buf. L. Rev. 343 at 373-5.
9 E.g., M. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-
trust Suits (1971), 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1 at 10; Report of Special Committee of American
Trial Lawyers, 20-21 (March, 1972).
1 0 W. W'illiston, The Contingent Fee in Canada (1968), 6 Alta. L. Rev. 184.
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purchase from a single supplier of goods that fail to conform to the conditions
and warranties implied by The Sale of Goods Act1 or to a promise concern-
ing their condition or quality made in substantially identical terms to each
purchaser. It would also extend to claims by consumers induced to purchase
defective goods by manufacturer's or distributor's representations or war-
ranties, whether made fraudulently or not. Tenants in an apartment block
could utilize the class action to secure redress for their landlord's failure to
observe a common covenant in the tenancy agreements of the class members
for example, an obligation to keep the common stairway in safe order and
condition or to maintain heat in the apartments in winter, or for the land-
lord's breach of statutory obligations imposed for the benefit of tenants under
such legislation as Part IV of The Landlord and Tenant Act in Ontario.' 2
The Ontario Consumer Protection Act is another example of legislation
enacted specifically to safeguard consumer interests. 13 However, the rights of
consumers under this statute would have much greater vitality if they could
be enforced on a class basis. For example, the Act requires a lender of money
to give to the borrower a statement in writing showing a number of details
of the credit transaction, including the sum for the cost of the borrowing
and the method of calculation of the cost. The statute states that the borrower
is not required to pay more as the cost of borrowing than the sum shown in
the statement.'4 If a lender subsequently adopts a method of calculating the
actual sum for the borrowing that the lender has to pay which does not con-
form to the statement, the borrower will be the loser. If a lender applies the
same formula to all his loan transactions, the additional profit could be
substantial when aggregated. Yet the extra burden for any borrower, assuming
the incorrect calculation is detected at all, will probably be so small that no
individual would take the trouble to sue. A class action would effectively
strike down the prohibited practice for subsequent borrowers and at the
same time secure a refund or credit allowance for those overcharged in
the past.
Legislative proposals presently under review in Ontario hold the promise
of strengthening the substantive rights of consumers. The Ontario Ministry
of Consumer and Commercial Relations has recommended that the war-
ranties incorporated by The Sale of Goods Act into a contract for the sale
of goods be extended to the relationship between the manufacturer of goods
and the buyer where the manufacturer is not the seller.15 This measure would
give consumers the same remedies against the manufacturer of a product as
exist now against the seller, thus increasing the number of persons who can
be held responsible for the marketing of defective goods.
Also, legislation prohibiting certain defined deceptive and unfair prac-
11 E.g., The Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 421, s. 15.
12 The Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 236.
13 The Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 82, as am. by S.O. 1971, c. 24,
1971, c. 50, s. 23.
14 Id., Part III.
15 Ontario Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, Green Paper on
Consumer Product Warranties, Ontario, section 5 (1973).
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tices in sales to consumers has recently been enacted in British Columbia'
and a Bill containing similar proposals is currently before the Ontario Legisla-
ture.17 Under both schemes consumers can recover any money or property
that has been acquired by reason of a prohibited practice. In addition, if the
Ontario legislation is enacted, the consumer will be able to recover any
damages incurred as a result of the practice.' The British Columbia enact-
ment specifically allows a recovery action to be brought on behalf of all
consumers in the Province or a class thereof.19 The Ontario proposals, how-
ever, lack any similar provision. This is a serious omission, given the limita-
tions on the existing class action remedy. Class relief would not presently be
available under the legislation for consumers who succumb to an identical
deceptive practice perpetrated by the same supplier of goods. The enactment
of the draft statute would help overcome this deficiency. The draft statute
would also serve the wider purpose of allowing a class action to be brought
not only for the unfair and deceptive practices the new legislation will
proscribe, but also to enforce any other legislation that creates consumer
rights.
A. CLASS ACTION DEFINED & A HISTORY OF THE PROCEDURE
This section commences with a definition of a class action and a brief
history of the procedure. Then follows an account of two class actions from
the law reports, one decided many years ago, and the other quite recently.
The cases are useful for three reasons. First, they give flesh to the class
action definition and provide examples of situations in which the procedure
is appropriate. Second, they show the conditions that have to be satisfied
before a class action can be brought. Finally, the cases suggest a number of
procedural problems inherent in the class action device which need to be
overcome if the action is to become a more effective remedy for securing the
redress of wide scale consumer grievances.
1. Class Action Defined
A class action is a court proceeding in which the plaintiff claims for
himself and also on behalf of other persons who are in the same situation
as regards the defendant. The persons for whom the plaintiff sues constitute
the class. What justifies the proceeding is the existence of questions of fact
or law that are common to the claim of the plaintiff and the claims of those
whom he represents, the class members. Judgment for the plaintiff on the
common questions is also judgment for the class members on their individual
16 Trade Practices Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 96.
17 Bill 55, 4th Session, 29th Legislature, 23 Elizabeth H, 1974. Also, the Federal
Parliament will soon be considering proposals for amending the Combines Investigation
Act, which will prohibit false advertising and other unethical trade practices. The
Minister for Consumer and Corporate Affairs has announced that the legislation will
allow consumers to bring class actions to enforce the provisions (Toronto, Globe and
Mail, January 28, 1975; Time (Canada), p. 13, February 10, 1975).
18 The court can also award exemplary or punitive damages (id.).
19 Trade Practices Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 96, s. 16(2).
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claims.20 The utility of the class action lies in the binding effect of the judg-
ment on the common questions. The action allows the claims of a large
number of people who have essentially the same complaint against the de-
fendant to be decided in a single adjudication where otherwise a multitude
of separate determinations would be necessary.
2. History of the Class Action
Contemporary class action procedure in the common law provinces of
Canada is regulated by a Rule of Court which is substantially identical in
each jurisdiction. The Rule first appeared in England as part of the pro-
cedural reforms that accompanied the introduction of the Judicature Act
system in that country one hundred years ago. The new system and the
substance of the procedural reforms, including a similar class action rule,
were adopted soon after in Canada. The rule, however, did not establish the
class action. The procedure had long existed in England, and its origin can
be traced to the Court of Chancery towards the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury.21 The class action developed as an offshoot of the rule in equity as to
the necessary parties to proceedings before the Chancellor. The general rule
was that all persons materially interested in the subject of the suit, either
as prospective plaintiffs or prospective defendants, ought to be made parties,
however numerous they might be, in order that a final end might be made
of the controversy and a multiplicity of suits avoided.2 2 Convenience was
the consideration on which the rule was founded. The same consideration of
convenience led to the rule being relaxed when to insist that all persons in-
terested be made parties would be impracticable or would produce hardship.
20 Brown v. Vermuden (1675), 1 Chan. Cas. 272; 22 E.R. 796; Meux v. Maltby(1818), 2 Swans. 277 at 285; 36 E.R. 621; Commissioner of Sewers v. Gellatly (1876),
3 Ch.D. 610 at 616; Wilson v. Church (1878), 9 Ch.D. 552 at 559; In re Calgary and
Medicine Hat Land Co., [1908] 2 Ch. 652 at 659; Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co.,[1910] 2 K.B. 1021 at 1040; Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. (1937), 276 N.Y.
890, 11 N.E. 2d 890; May v. Wheaton (1917), 41 D.L.R. 369; Bamber v. Bank of Nova
Scotia, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 526; Hansberry v. Lee (1949), 311 U.S. 32; Weaver v. Pasadena
Tournament of Roses Assoc. (1948), 32 Cal. 2d 833 at 842, 198 P. 2d 514; Chance v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1962), 23 Cal. Rptr. 761, 373 P. 2d 849; Daar
v. Yellow Cab Company (1967), 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P. 2d 732 at 739; cf. Smith v.
Doyle (1879), 4 O.A.R. 471 at 477; Macdonald v. Toronto (1897), 18 P.R. 17 at 19.
The judgment will not bind the class if it was obtained by fraud or collusion or if
the court was cheated into believing that the case was fairly fought or fairly represented
when in fact it was not (Commissioner of Sewers v. Gellatly, supra, 616; Brenner v.
Title Guarantee & Trust Co., supra, 891.)
Nor will the judgment preclude subsequent actions by those whose rights to recover
are based on different facts than those determined by the judgment (Daar v. Yellow
Cab Co. (1967), 63 Cal. Rptr. 724; 433 P. 2d 732 at 739). However, the court that
pronounces the judgment cannot predetermine its res judicata effect. This can only be
tested in a subsequent action (Restatement, Judgments, §86, comment (b), §116 (1942);
Advisory Committee Note (1966), 39 F.R.D. 69 at 106; C. Wright, Class Actions
(1970), 47 F.R.D. 169 at 181; Spencer-Bower and Turner, Res Judicata (1969), 373(2d); Notes, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments (1974),
87 Harv. L. Rev. 588.
21 See, e.g., Brown v. Vermuden (1676), 1 Ch. Cas. 272, 22 E.R. 796; Mayor of
York v. Pilkington (1737), 1 Atk. 282, 26 E.R. 180.
22Story, Equity (1820), 190-191; Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1.
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It was recognized that joinder might be difficult or impossible if the interested
persons were very numerous or were out of the jurisdiction or otherwise
could not be located.23 To prevent the suit being defeated by the failure of
the plaintiff to join all interested persons as parties, equity would sometimes
dispense with complete joinder if the actual parties had a common interest
with the absent individuals in the outcome of the suit and fairly represented
them in the conduct of the proceedings.
The rationale of the class suit as developed in the Court of Chancery
was that it avoided the harsh consequences of the practice the Court itself
had developed of refusing to entertain a controversy unless every person
who had a material interest in its outcome were made a party. The coin-
pulsory joinder requirement reflected the concern of the Court that there not
be a multitude of suits raising the same question. The essential characteristic
of the class suit was that the decree in the suit bound the representative
party and all those persons who, though not parties themselves, had the
same interest in the outcome as the representative. The class suit devieo
therefore ensured that the Court would not decline jurisdiction for want of
joinder of all interested persons, but would proceed to adjudicate on the
controversy. At the same time the device implemented the policy that there
should be but a single adjudication that put an entire end to the dispute and
bound all those who had an interest in the result.
The need to avoid the injustice caused by a strict application of the
compulsory joinder rule ceased to be a justification for the class suit with
the procedural changes that took place in England and in this country upon
the introduction of the Judicature Act system and the accompanying Rules
of Practice. The most significant change as regards the class suit was the
virtual abolition of the compulsory joinder rule itself.24 The new Rules gave
the plaintiff a much greater discretion in selecting the persons to be joined as
plaintiffs or defendants than existed previously. The Rules also provided
that an action would not be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-
joinder of parties and that the court could in every case deal with the matter
in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually
before it.25 There are now just a few situations in which the court will compel
2 3 Cockburn v. Thompson (1809), 16 Ves. Jun. 321, 33 E.R. 1005; Meux v. Maltby
(1818), 2 Swans. 277, 36 E.R. 621; Smith v. Swormstedt (1853), 57 U.S. (16 How.)
288 at 302-03; Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] AC. 1 at 8-11; Hansberry v. Lee (1940),
311 U.S. 32; Z. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity (1950), 200-213; G. Hazard, In-
dispensable Party: Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom (1961), 61 Colum. L.
Rev. 1254; 1. Kazanjian, Class Actions in Canada (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall LJ. 396
at 399.
24W. Holdsworth, History of English Law (1965), Vol. 15 at 107, 133; R. Millar,
Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective (1952), 105-07.
2 5 Rules of the Supreme Court (England), 0. 16, r. 11 (1883); Odgers on Pleading
and Practice, 14 (1952); Rules of Practice (Ont.), r. 136; Williston & Rolls, The Law
of Civil Procedure, 238 (1970).
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the plaintiff to add all interested persons as parties.26 Moreover, the court
will no longer act on its own initiative. The defendant must object if the
plaintiff has not joined a necessary party, and if he does not so object, the
court will decide the controversy between the parties actually before it.2r
Now that the rule requiring the joinder of all interested persons has been
abolished in all but a few cases, the plaintiff is no longer under any com-
pulsion to sue in a representative capacity in situations where, under the
previous Chancery practice, a class suit would have been necessary before
the court would accept jurisdiction. If a number of other persons share a
common interest in the plaintiffs claim against the defendant such as would
justify the maintenance of a class action, the plaintiff has a choice either
to sue simply on his own behalf or to bring the action as a class repre-
sentative. In the event the plaintiff elects to take the former course, the court
will not compel him to change the capacity in which he sues so as to claim
also on behalf of the individuals who are in the same situation as himself.
3. Two Illustrative Cases
Duke of Bedford v. Ellis,28 a decision of the House of Lords, and
Chastain v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority,29 a decision of
McIntyre, J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, were class actions.
The decision of Lord MacNaghten in Duke of Bedford sets out the
conditions necessary for a class action in language that has been accorded
the kind of weight and authority usually reserved for a statute. The explana-
tion lies in the Rule of Court that now regulates the class action procedure. 30
It is sparsely worded and gives only minimal guidance as to when it applies.
Canadian jurisdictions adopted the English Rule in substantially identical
terms and the courts have accepted Lord MacNaghten's pronouncement as
an authoritative definition of the scope of the class action remedy. The sub-
sequent history of the class action in this country demonstrates that though
Lord MacNaghten's words were spoken over 70 years ago, time has not
diminished their influence.31
The class action provision in Ontario is Rule 75 of the Rules of Prac-
tiee.82 The Rule reads:
Where there are numerous persons having the same interest, one or more may
sue or be sued or may be authorized by the court to defend on behalf of, or
for the benefit of, all.
Of the corresponding English provision, Lord MacNaghten in Duke of
Bedford said as follows:
In considering whether a representative action is maintainable you have to con-
sider what is common to the class, not what differentiates the cases of individual
members. . . . Given a common interest and a common grievance, a repre-
sentative suit was in order if the relief sought was in its nature beneficial to all
whom the plaintiff proposed to represent. 3
The words "common interest" in this passage are critical to the main-
26 The situations include claims to enforce a promise made by or to several persons
jointly (Williston and Rolls, The Law of Civil Procedure, 248 (1970)), and proceed-
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ings to determine the title to property where the defendant is confronted with con-
flicting claims by different persons and is embarrassed by the possibility that separate
proceedings will produce inconsistent findings (Looker v. Imperial Oil Co., [1944]
O.W.N. 167; A.-G. Eng. v. Royal Bank, [1948] O.W.N. 782; A.-G. Eng. v. Canadian
Bank of Commerce, [1948] O.W.N. 785; Union Gas Co. of Canada v. Brown, [1970]
1 O.R. 715).
27 Wilson, Sons & Co. v. Balcarres Brook Steamship Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 422; Cruise
v. Town of Riverside, [1935] O.R. 151.
28 [1901] A.C. 1.
29 (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 443.
30The Rule also allows an action to be brought against the members of a class
through the defendant as a representative. As this article is concerned only with the
class action as a means of remedying consumer grievances, proceedings against a
defendant class will not be dealt with except where relevant.
The procedure for suing a defendant class is employed most frequently for the
enforcement of claims in contract and tort against the members of a voluntary asso-
ciation such as a club or unincorporated society or trade union. For an examination of
the special problems that arise in proceedings against a voluntary association in contract
or tort, see H. Ford, Unincorporated Non-Profit Associations (Oxford: Claredon Press,
1959) at 92-112; S. Stoljar, The Representative Action: an Equitable Post-Mortem
(1956), 3 U. of W. Aust. Ann. L. Rev. 479; D. Lloyd, Actions By or Against Unin-
corporated Bodies (1949) 12 Mod. L. Rev. 409; D. Sherbaniuk, Actions By and Against
Trade Unions in Contract and Tort (1958), 12 U. of T. L. J. 151; A. Sheppard, Some
Aspects of the Law of Unincorporated Associations (1967), 3 U.B.C. L.J. 137; J.
Keeler, Contractual Actions for Damages Against Unincorporated Bodies (1971), 34
Mod. L. Rev. 615; R. Baxt, The Dilemma of the Unincorporated Association (1973),
47 Aust. L. J. 305. Membership of an unincorporated association creates rights and
obligations among the members themselves and between members and third parties that.
have no counterpart among the consumers who constitute a class when a representative
action is brought to enforce their separate claims against the same defendant. Member-
ship of a voluntary association implies a continuing commitment to the aims and ob-
jects that the members hold in common whereas in litigation on behalf of a consumer
class the class has no existence independently of the action. The class is created when
the action is commenced and dissolves once the proceedings come to an end.
31 See, e.g., Ontario: Barrett v. Harris (1921), 51 O.L.R. 484; A. E. Osler & Co.
v.Solman, [1926] 24 D.L.R. 345; Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society v. A.-G. for
Canada, [1945] O.W.N. 537; Farnham v. Fingold, [1972] 3 O.R. 688; British Columbia:
Walker v. Billingsley, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 490; Shaw v. Real Estate Board of Greater Van-
couver (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d) 774, aff'd (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 250; New Brunswick:
DeLong v. The New Brunswick Teachers' Fed. (1970), 3 N.B.R. (2d) 149; Saskatchewan:
Smart v. Livett, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 47.
32he class action provisions in the other common law provinces are: Alberta:
Alberta Rules of Court, 1969, r. 42; British Columbia: Supreme Court Rules, 1961,
0. 16, r.9 (M.R. 131); Manitoba: The Queen's Bench Rules, r. 58; New Brunswick:
Rules of Court, 1969. 0. 16, r.9: Newfoundland: Rules of the Supreme Court of New-
foundland, 0. 16, r. 9; Nova Scotia: Rules of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, 1971,
r. 5:09; Prince Edward Island: Supreme Court Rules of Prince Edward Island 1954,
0. 15, r. 9; Saskatchewan: Rules of Court of the Province of Saskatchewan, 1961, r. 45.
Quebec is the only province that does not have a similar class action provision.
Article 59 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires any person suing on behalf of others
to file with the court a power of attorney from those whom he represents. This effectively
precludes a class action.
As to the Federal Court of Canada, see Federal Court Rules, r. 1711. The class
action rule in England was replaced in 1965 with a more detailed provision (0. 15,
r. 12). However, as regards the circumstances for bringing a class action the new rule
retained without any elaboration the "same interest" formula contained in the original.
33 [1901] A.C. 1 at 7-8.
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tenance of a class action and the courts in Canada have interpreted them
rather narrowly. Unless the courts are prepared to take a wider view of the
common interest requirement it is not likely that the class action will ever
become a broad and flexible procedural tool for remedying abuses to con-
sumers which occur on a large scale. Failing a change in the attitude of the
courts a new provision will be needed - either an amended Rule of Court
or legislation - if the class action is to be made to serve this purpose.
The Duke of Bedford owned Covent Garden Market. An Act of Par-
liament fixed the fee which the Duke could charge a particular class of
growers of fruit and vegetables to sell their produce in the market. The Act
also gave the growers certain preferential rights over sellers in the market
who did not grow the produce themselves. A few members of the class of
growers brought an action against the Duke on their own behalf and also
for the other growers. The plaintiffs alleged that in breach of the statute, the
Duke had charged growers excessive tolls and had infringed their pre-
ferential rights. They claimed a declaration that they held the preferential
rights, and an injunction restraining the Duke from doing any act contrary
to the rights so declared and from charging tolls in excess of the statutory
amounts.3 4 The Duke objected that the claim ought not to be allowed as a
class but, on appeal, the House of Lords dismissed the objection and directed
the action to proceed to trial. The law reports do not disclose the subsequent
history of the action, but the effect of the House of Lords decision was to
ensure that any declaration or injunction which the plaintiffs succeeded in
obtaining at trial would stand also for the benefit of the class members on
whose behalf they sued.
Chastain35 raised the question of the validity of a billing procedure
adopted by the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority. For some
years, the Authority had followed the practice of requiring persons who
wanted gas or electric power to pay a security deposit. The practice, how-
ever, was discriminatory for the Authority only demanded the deposit from
individuals who were considered poor credit risks. The defendant claimed
that its practice was authorized under regulations purportedly made pursuant
to the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority Act, 1964.36 The
regulations allowed the Authority to obtain a security deposit and fixed the
amount. The Authority would return the deposit to the customer or credit
his account on the termination of the supply of power to his premises.
Three customers of the Authority brought the action. The plaintiffs had
either paid or been called on by the defendant to pay security deposits of
$75, $60, and $50, respectively. At the commencement of the action the
defendant held some 23,624 deposits totalling $1,041,443.00. The figures
covered commercial, industrial and residential accounts, and though the evi-
dence before the court did not disclose the number and value of the residential
34 Id. The plaintiffs also claimed an accounting of the tolls which individually they
had been overcharged, but the class was not included in this claim. This appears from
the speeches of Lord Shand (p. 17) and Lord Brampton (p. 22).
35 (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 443.30 Hydro and Power Authority Act, 1964 S.B.C., c. 7.
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deposits, it seems that they were substantialY7 The writ in the action de-
scribed the plaintiffs as suing "on behalf of themselves and all others in
residential premises being required to pay security deposits or who have
already paid such deposits to the defendant for the supply of gas and electric
power." The relief claimed by the plaintiffs included a declaration that the
defendant had no valid authority to require security deposits, an order, in
effect, for the return of the moneys deposited, and an injunction against
demanding security deposits in the future.
The defendant objected that the action did not come within the British
Columbia class action Rule of Practice.28 McIntyre, J. upheld the validity of
the proceedings, concluding that the plaintiffs and those whom they repre-
sented "form a group having the same interest in the cause." His Lordship
then proceeded to determine the question of substance and held that the
regulation under which the Authority purported to act in requiring security
deposits was not authorized by the statute. The court then made orders in
terms of the relief claimed by the plaintiffs in their statement of claim.
Chastain, apart from its value in illustrating the class action definition,
has a rather special significance in the consumer context. It is one of the few
class actions in Canada to reach the law reports where the class comprised
persons who can fairly be described as consumers. The reported class actions
in the past invariably concerned individuals who sought to recover money
from a common fund or to vindicate some other proprietary right.39
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTEMPORARY CLASS ACTION
1. Merits of the Class Action
The merit of the class action procedure lies in the res judicata effect of
the judgment that will be pronounced at its conclusion. 4 Judgment in a class
action binds not only the plaintiff and the defendant but also those whom the
plaintiff represents, the class members. It is this characteristic that makes the
class action such a convenient method of determining the claims of a large
number of individuals who are essentially in the same legal situation as
regards the defendant.
The procedure is convenient both for the court system and the parties
interested in the controversy (the class members and the defendant) as it
enables common questions between each class member and the defendant to
be determined in a single proceeding. The alternative to a single proceeding
37 As reported to the author by Mr. Ian Waddell of the British Columbia Bar,
counsel who represented the plaintiffs, the residential security deposits amounted to
approximately $400,000.
38 Supreme Court Rules, 1961, 0. 16, r. 9 (M.R. 131).
39 '"The proper domain of a representative action is where there are like rights
against a common fund, or where a class of people have a community of interest in
some subject matter," Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 at 1040,
per Fletcher Moulton, L.J. See also, Preston v. Hilton (1920), 48 O.L.R. 172 at 180;
A. E. Osler & Co. v. Solman, [1926] 4 D.L.R. 345.
40 Note 20, supra.
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is a multitude of separate proceedings brought against the defendant by in-
dividual members of the potential class with each proceeding raising the
same issue.41
The possibility of numerous proceedings follows from the rule that judg-
ment in an action other than a class action binds no one but the immediate
parties. 42 Thus, success for the defendant in one action will not prevent
another claimant in the same situation as the original plaintiff from bringing
another action that puts in issue the very question determined in the first,
provided the common question is one of fact. With a question of law, unless
the decision of the court is reversed on appeal, the doctrine of judicial
precedent will ensure that courts in subsequent proceedings will reach the
same conclusion. However, even with questions of fact, the prospect of further
41 In theory, two other alternatives are a single action brought by all claimants as
co-plaintiffs, and a test action. Neither alternative is really practicable when the number
of claimants is large. See text at Cl, infra.
42 A pair of patent law cases demonstrates how in two sets of litigation involving
a common party, different courts can make opposite findings on the same question of
fact. The common party was the plaintiff, the reverse of the potential class action
situation, but this does not weaken the value of the example. In Monsanto Co. v. Rohm
& Haas Co. (1970), 312 F. Supp. 778, a suit for patent infringement, the defendant
denied the infringement and pleaded (inter alia) anticipation of prior art. The question
was whether the patented invention was "described in printed publications" within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. §§102(a) and (b) before a certain date and was therefore anti-
cipated. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the
invention was so published and held that the patent was invalid. In an action heard
subsequently, the Monsanto Co. alleged a breach of the same patent by another de-
fendant, which pleaded the same defence of anticipation of prior art. The District Court
for the Southern District of Texas found for the plaintiff on the issue (Monsanto Co.
v. Dawson Chemical Co. (1970), 312 F. Supp. 452). Singleton, J. at 464-5, referred
to the Rohm & Haas Co. Case as follows:-
Before this opinion is concluded, it should be added that the possible effect of
the decision in [the case] upon the result here reached has been carefully con-
sidered. Even though there is an identity of subject matter between that case and
this one, the fact nevertheless remains that there is no identity between the parties
defendant, nor for that matter is there any privity between the parties defendant
in each respective action. Moreover, the defendants here have placed greater
emphasis on certain prior art items, namely, [describing them] than did the de-
fendants in [the Rohm & Haas Case], though it is not clear whether the court
in that case had exactly the same evidence before it as was offered here. The
result on the issues resolved in [the Rohm & Haas Case] does not therefore
relieve this Court of its judicial travail of reaching its own independent decision
on the merits of the case between these parties and on this record, even though
this brings about diametrically opposed decisions on the validity of the same
patent against the same attack. There is no res judicata or estoppel by judgment
flowing from the earlier decision precluding plaintiff from its day in court against
these defendants."
On appeal in Dawson, the Fifth Circuit held that when the district court con-
sidered the matter, it was obligated by Triplett v. Lowell (1936), 297 U.S. 638, to
make its own independent conclusion concerning the validity of the Monsanto patent.
Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court reversed its holding in Triplett, and ruled
that a patent owner is bound by the judgment of patent invalidity in a prior suit
against a different defendant unless the patent owner can show that for some reason
the prior judgment should not be given this estoppel effect. The circuit court therefore
remanded the case to the district court to allow the defendant to amend its pleading
to assert a plea of estoppel (Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co. (1971), 443
F.2d 1035.
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litigation following the failure of the first action is sometimes more theoretical
than real as the defeat could well deter others from suing.
The defendant is equally free to contest again a question of fact decided
against him in earlier proceedings brought by another claimant. An un-
favourable finding of fact in one action will not bind the defendant in any
other, though in practice the finding might persuade him to compromise the
claims still to be tried. However, while the satisfaction of all claims by com-
promise would achieve the same result as a class action, there can be no
assurance that a defendant to a judgment that technically only binds him as
regards the plaintiffs will nevertheless deal with other claimants on the foot-
ing that the judgment is also for their benefit.
A class action eliminates the possibility that different tribunals will
reach opposite conclusions on the same question of fact. If the defendant
succeeds on the common question, no class member can raise it again in
another action; if the plaintiff class succeeds on the question, no class mem-
ber need bring his own action.43
For members of the class, the class action procedure gives an advantage
that neither the representative plaintiff nor the defendant enjoys. Class mem-
bers are strictly not parties and so they are saved the burdens and anxieties
that usually trouble the actual participants in litigation; yet the res judicata
effect of a judgment gives them the benefit of the proceedings should they
succeed. In the event of victory, class members can emerge from the shelter
afforded by the representative plaintiff and share in the outcome just as if
they were named as parties.
The class members also have an advantage if the action brought on
their behalf is defeated. Since class members are not parties, they cannot be
ordered to pay the costs of the defendant.44 As a general rule the costs of
litigation follow the event.45 This means that the court will order the losing
party to pay the costs of his successful opponent. Only the class repre-
sentative, the plaintiff, can be ordered to pay the defendant's costs and the
class members are under no obligation to indemnify him for the costs unless
they had previously agreed to do so.46
As non-parties, the individuals represented in a class action clearly
enjoy several benefits. However, judgment in the action will bind them
whether it is favourable or not. If the action is defeated on a question com-
mon to the class, the class member cannot relitigate the question in a separate
43 Note 20, supra.
44
cott v. Pascall and Adams (1847), 15 Sim. 559, 60 E.R. 736; Markt & Co.
v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 at 1039; Price v. Rhondda Urban District
Council (1924), 130 L.T. 156; Moon v. Atherton, [1972] 3 All E.R. 145 at 146;
Farnham v. Fingold, [1973] 2 O.R. 132 at 136 (C.A.).
45Mitchell v. Vandusen (1887), 14 O.A.R. 517; Vipond v. Sisco (1913), 14
D.L.R. 129 at 131; M. Orkin, The Law of Costs (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1968)
at 16.
4 6 In McAllister v. O'Meara (1896), 17 P.R. 176, Boyd, C. suggested that class
members who contribute to the expenses of the action may be found liable to the
defendant for costs, upon a proper application.
1975]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
action brought against the same defendant. The status of class members as
non-parties bound nevertheless by the judgment is therefore not altogether
advantageous. There is a danger that the action will have prejudiced class
members who might have successfully sued the defendant themselves. In
order to fully appreciate the risk of prejudice to class members inherent in
the class action two further characteristics of the procedure need to be men-
tioned. These concern the appointment of the class representative and notice
to the class.
2. Appointment of Class Representative
Under present practice in Canada any member of a prospective class can
appoint himself plaintiff and, without giving notice to the class, bring an
action on their behalf.47 In practice, the representative plaintiff is sometimes
chosen from among a group of members, but this is not essential, and class
members have no right to be consulted in the selection. Furthermore, since
the members of the class are not parties, they have no standing in the action
which will entitle them to appear at the trial and be separately represented
by counsel. The court can add them as plaintiffs provided the original plain-
tiff consents but, once added, it is doubtful whether they will be allowed
separate representation as co-plaintiffs. 48 However, it seems that the court
has power to join a class member as defendant if he wishes to oppose the
claim of the plaintiff,49 though this hardly seems an advantage in the context
of consumer litigation. The court also has some power to intervene to
ensure that the representative will protect the interests of the class. The
limits of the power have not been clearly defined, but the court will at least
allow another member of the class to take over the conduct of the action if
the original plaintiff elects to discontinue, 50 and it seems that it would also
47 Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [19101 2 K.B. 1021 at 1039; Sykes v.
One Big Union (1936), 43 Man. R. 542, cf. Blackfoot Stock Assoc. v. Thor, [1925]
3 W.W.R. 544. The plaintiff can even prosecute the action contrary to the wishes of
class members. See Sykes v. McCallum, [1940] 4 D.L.R. 413 at 415.
48The court will not consolidate separate actions brought by different plaintiffs
against the same defendant where the plaintiffs are represented by different solicitors
(City of Toronto v. British North American Co., [1946] O.W.N. 398; Hall v. Wilson.
[1951] O.W.N. 228; Healey v. Waddington & Sons, [1954] 1 All E.R. 861; Annual
Practice, (1963) 1186; cf. Lewis v. Daily Telegraph (No. 2), [1964] Q.B. 601, per
Russell, LJ.; Todd v. Jones, [1969] V.R. 169; Hinchcliffe v. Carroll, [1969] V.R.
164). As a general rule, separate representation will not be allowed for co-plaintiffs
(Goold and Porter Pty. Ltd. v. Housing Commission, [1974] V.R. 102).
40 Wilson V. Church (1878), 9 Ch. D. 552; Watson v. Cave (No. 1) (1881), 17
Ch. D. 19; Fraser v. Cooper, Hall & Co. (1882), 21 Ch. D. 718; John v. Rees, [1970]
Ch. 345 at 371.
5 0 McPherson v. Gedge (1883), 4 O.R. 246 at 262; Re Ritz and New Hamburg
(1902), 4 O.L.R. 639; Moon v. Atherton, [1972] 3 All E.R. 145. See also, La Sala v.
American Savings & Loan Assoc. (1971), 489 P. (2d) 1113. A representative plain-
tiff is free to discontinue the action (In re Calgary and Medicine Hat Land Co., [1908]
2 Ch. 652; see also, C. Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants
(1934), 19 Cornell L.Q. 399 at 424). As an alternative to substitution as plaintiff on
discontinuance by the original plaintiff, a class member can bring an independent
action (McPherson v. Gedge, supra; Smith v. Doyle (1879), 4 O.A.R. 471 at 477;
Driffill v. Ough (1906), 13 O.L.R. 8).
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substitute a class member if the original plaintiff does not truly represent the
class interests. 51
There is a further limitation on the court's jurisdiction in the matter of
class representation; the power to remove the plaintiff will not be exercised
except on the initiative of a class member. Under present practice the plaintiff
is under no obligation to satisfy the court either at the commencement or at
any subsequent stage of the action that his interests are not in conflict with
those of the class members or that he is competent to properly present their
claims. Nor will the court inquire into these matters. The defendant will
hardly object if the plaintiff's ability to adequately represent the class is
questionable; the res judicata rule is not qualified by any requirement that
the judgment pleaded in answer to a subsequent action should have followed
a trial in which the defeated claim was expertly presented and argued. Both
class members and defendant have a real, yet contradictory, concern in the
trial competence of the representative plaintiff and his lawyer. If there is any
possibility that the trial presentation of the class claim will be so inept the
action will be defeated, the defendant will be just as anxious to secure a
judgment that binds the class as the class members are to avoid one. The
defendant will therefore have no incentive to take any steps that might lead
the court to substitute a more effective class representative.
Objection to the representative character of the plaintiff needs to be
distinguished from a challenge to his competence. It is to the advantage of
the defendant to show that the plaintiff and the class members do not share a
common interest as required by Rule 75. Where there is a danger of losing
the action on the merits, the defendant will be concerned to confine the bind-
ing effect of the judgment to the plaintiff and so exclude class members from
participating in the result. A class action defendant, therefore, has a sound
reason for objecting to the propriety of the proceedings if the argument is
reasonably open. If the court sustains the objection, it will strike out the
representative claim, leaving the plaintiff at liberty, if he so decides, to
carry on the action for his claim alone.52 The members of the former class
will technically be free to commence separate proceedings against the de-
fendant but for various reasons they may not do so. For instance, the expira-
tion of time under a relevant Statute of Limitations when the order excluding
the representative claim is made will bar further actions.53 Again, though a
limitation period has not intervened, litigation may not have been practicable
except on a class basis, the amounts involved being so small or the issues
of fact or law so complex that no individual would sue merely for himself.
Thus, though the defendant is ultimately found liable on the plaintiff's in-
51 Watson v. Cave (No. 1) (1881), 17 Ch. D. 19 at 21.
52 See e.g., Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 at 1032,
1042; Smith v. Cardiff Corp., [19541 1 Q.B. 210; Delong v. The New Brunswick
Teachers' Fed. (1970), 3 N.B.R. (2d) 149; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1973), 479
F. (2d) 1005.
5 3 Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 at 1042, 1043. In the
United States class members can apply for leave to intervene as parties if the court
determines at a time outside the limitation period that an action which has been
timely commenced as a class action is not suitable for class action treatment (Ameri-
can Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah (1974), 94 S. Ct. 756.)
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dividual claim, he might avoid a considerably heavier liability by his suc-
cessful challenge to the assertion of a representative capacity.
According to present practice, a class action plaintiff is not required to
satisfy the court that his claim is typical of the claims of the class members
whom he represents unless the question is raised by the defendant. This
contrasts with the procedure followed when the representative party is not
the plaintiff but the defendant. Rule 7554 applies to proceedings both by and
against "numerous persons having the same interest." In an action against
the members of a class the plaintiff must first select the member or members
to be made defendants and then attribute a representative capacity to them.5
Rule 75 provides that one or more of the numerous persons who have the
same interests may "be sued or may be authorized by the court to defend"
on behalf of all of them. For an action by numerous persons the Rule simply
states that one or more of them may sue, and there is no provision that they
be authorized by the court to represent the others. The passage in the Rule
dealing with actions against numerous persons suggests that the plaintiff can
elect whether or not to obtain an order authorizing the selected class members
to defend on behalf of all. The language, however, has been held to be
mandatory, with the result that judgment does not bind class members other
than the defendant unless the plaintiff has obtained an order, called a repre-
sentative order, authorizing the defendant to represent the class.56 In practice,
the plaintiff usually applies for the order shortly after the commencement of
the action, usually once the defendant has filed an appearance. 57 The plain-
tiff has to show that the defendant is the proper person to be sued on behalf
of all persons interested,58 and the order can be made though the defendant
objects to being sued as a representative. 59
The reasons for this divergence in the procedure to be followed accord-
ing to whether the plaintiff or the defendant is the representative party do
not appear to have been considered in any reported case. At first sight, the
way the courts have interpreted Rule 75 suggests that the rights of a de-
fendant class are better safeguarded than those of a plaintiff class as regards
an adverse judgment. However, it is submitted that this is not so. On a
judgment against a defendant class, execution will issue for the plaintiff
against a class member simply upon proof of membership, provided the
54 Rules of Practice (Ont.), r. 75.
t5 Commissioner of Sewers v. Gellatly (1876), 3 Ch.D. 610 at 615.
50 May v. Newton (1887), 34 Ch.D. 347 at 349; Ward v. Benson (1902), 3
O.L.R. 199; Barrett v. Harris (1921), 51 O.L.R. 484 at 488; Templeton v. Leviathan
Pty. Ltd. (1921), 30 C.L.R. 34.57 The defendant does not have to wait until the plaintiff applies for a representa-
tive order to contest the claim of the plaintiff that he is liable as a representative. He
can move after appearance to have the claim against him as a representative struck
out (A.-G. for Victoria v. City of Brighton, [1964] V.R. 59 at 63).
58 Walker v. Sur, [1914] 2 K.B. 930.
59 Wood v. McCarthy, [1893] 1 Q.B. 775; Australasian Performing Right Assoc.
v. Miles, [1962] N.S.W.R. 405.
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plaintiff has first obtained a representative order. 60 In resisting the execution
claim, the individual is thus confined to denying that he belonged to the
class. On the other hand, judgment against the plaintiff in a class action does
not necessarily preclude a class member from separately suing the defendant.
The binding effect of a judgment on non-parties is not a question which the
court pronouncing the judgment will decide, but one for the court before
which the judgment is subsequently pleaded as a defence.6' A class action
does not bind the class members except on questions that are common to the
class claims and the claims of the representative plaintiff. Thus, it is open to
a former class member to establish in a separate action that the matters of
fact on which he relies were not determined in the class action because they
were not common to the claim of the representative plaintiff, but were
different. 62
The procedure for obtaining a representative order when the defendant
is sued on behalf of a class is significant for it emphasizes the deficiencies
of the existing plaintiff class action procedure. It provides a persuasive
precedent for instituting judicial scrutiny of an action for a plaintiff class,
the appropriate time being at the commencement of the action when the
court can determine whether the conditions of Rule 75 are satisfied and
whether the plaintiff can adequately represent the interests of class members.
3. Notice to the Class
A second characteristic of the class action that needs to be noted in
considering the possible prejudicial impact of judgment in the action on the
individual claims of class members concerns notice to the class. At present
there is no requirement that class members be notified that an action has
been brought on their behalf. This can render futile what limited control class
members now have over the person who represents them.
Under the class action procedure of most, if not all, common law
jurisdictions outside the United States, the court itself will not notify the
class that a class action has been commenced nor will it direct the plaintiff
to give notice. There is thus a real likelihood that few members of the class,
perhaps none at all, will know of the action, even after judgment. If the class
is large, class members who learn of the action will only do so by accident,
for instance, from newspaper publicity. Judgment, however, will bind each
and every class member whatever the result and whether members have had
notice of the proceedings or not.
The absence of notice will hardly prejudice anyone if the action suc-
ceeds for then all class members will benefit. Members who had not planned
,
6
oIn the Federal Court of Canada, the plaintiff cannot issue execution against a
class member without leave (Federal Court Rules, r. 1711(4)). There is a similar
provision in England (Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, 0. 15, r. 12(3)), and South
Australia (Rules of the Supreme Court 1947, 0.48(A), r. 23).
01 Note 20, supra.
62 Note 20, supra. See also, Hansberry v. Lee (1940), 311 U.S. 32; Hunter v.
Southern Indemnity Underwriters Inc. (1942), 47 F. Supp. 242; Newberry Library v.
Chicago Board of Education (1944) 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E. 2d 147; Meyer v. Wichita
County Water Imp. Dists. Nos. 1 and 2 (1954), 265 S.W. 2d 660.
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to sue themselves will enjoy a windfall, and the victory will spare any mem-
bers who did intend to sue the trouble and expense of an action. A judgment
adverse to the class, however, presents different considerations. The judgment
will preclude individual class members from bringing actions that raise the
claim defeated in the class action. There is thus a distinct possibility that a
class member will be barred from bringing an action to enforce his claim by
an adjudication in proceedings that determined the existence of his right to
sue, but of which he had no notice.
A class action judgment constitutes an exception to the general rule
that a person is not bound by a judgment that determines his rights or
liabilities unless he had notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard.03 Joinder as a party will usually be sufficient for this purpose as
joinder imports notice and the right to be heard, but joinder is not essential
provided the individual is afforded these privileges. The justification for the
departure from the general rule in the case of a class action rests in the
representative capacity in which the plaintiff sues. As the representative
plaintiff has the same interest as class members in the outcome of the action
it can be assumed that he will present the claims of the class as effectively
as the members would themselves. 4 Hence, they need not be notified of the
action. In the words of the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Sworms-
tedt, "The legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all being before the
court by representation, and especially where the subject-matter of the suit is
common to all, there can be very little danger but that the interests of all
will be properly protected and maintained."0' 5
Nevertheless, the risk remains that class members who did not receive no-
tice of the action will be prejudiced by an adverse result, although the following
analysis will show that there are probably only a few situations in which
there has been actual prejudice. In assessing the danger of prejudice to class
members who get no notice of the proceedings, the members who never in-
tended to sue for themselves can be disregarded. It is safe to conclude that
notice advising these members of the commencement of the action would not
have evoked any response. The question of prejudice needs to be tested by
examining the position of a class member who had seriously considered bring-
ing an action himself. Of course, it must be assumed that a short limitation
period does not apply and that time has yet to expire when the class action
terminates. Timely notice of the class action to an individual in this position
would give him the opportunity to follow either of two alternative courses.
First, if he thought the plaintiff did not adequately represent the interests of
the class, he could apply to the court to have another class member (pos-
sibly himself) substituted. 0 Alternatively, the class member could apply to
O3May v. Newton (1887), 34 Ch.D. 347; Templeton v. Leviathan Pty. Ltd.
(1921), 30 C.L.R. 34; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U.S. 714; Hansberry v. Lee
(1940), 311 U.S. 32.
0 ISnith v. Swormstedt (1853), 16 How. (57 U.S.), 288.
(1 5d., at 303.
G0See Watson v. Cave (No. 1) (1881), 17 Ch.D. 19 at 21.
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have himself excluded from the class.67 It is not certain whether under
existing procedure the court would allow such an application, but the object
would be to avoid being bound by whatever judgment was given in the action.
Once he was removed from the class, the class member could bring a
separate action against the defendant. 68
However, to establish prejudice it is really not sufficient for a class
member to point to the courses he might have followed if he had received
notice. He must show that he would probably have achieved a successful
outcome if he had brought an action of his own, and two conditions have
to be satisfied before the probability of success is demonstrated.
First, the class action must have failed in consequence of the incom-
petence of the representative plaintiff or his lawyer in the presentation of
the claim, and for no other reason. No prejudice would be shown if the
action were defeated for reasons unrelated to the quality of the presentation
of the case because there would then be no basis for concluding that the
class member would probably have succeeded himself. Second, assuming the
action did fail by reason of the incompetence of the representative plaintiff
or his counsel, it must be reasonable to suppose that upon receiving timely
notice, the class member would have either replaced the class representatives
with others possessing the skill and ability necessary to win the action or
alternatively secured his exclusion from the class and then commenced his
own action. This second condition will not be satisfied if the class member
would not have procured an effective substitute as plaintiff because, for
instance, he was content to retain the original party believing, albeit mis-
takenly, that he was sufficiently skilled to win the action, or he could not
afford the legal costs of proceedings to secure alternative representation, or
the representative he proposed himself was actually no better qualified than
the first plaintiff.
Under present class action practice, notice to class members will only
be given in one situation. If a fund of money is recovered for a class to be
distributed among the members, notice will have to be given to members
who are not identifiable.69 The notice will allow persons who might wish to
claim that they belong to the class an opportunity to step forward and estab-
lish their right to participate in the judgment. In a case such as Chastain,
notice will not usually be necessary because the defendant can identify the
class members from its own records. However, if the class action procedure
67 A dissentient class member can apply to be made a defendant. See note 49,
supra. Whether he has to be made a defendant as a condition of exclusion from the
class does not appear to have been decided. In the United States under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure a class member can elect to be excluded from the class
and on such election he will not be bound by the judgment, whether for or against
the class (F.R.C.P. 23(c) (2)).
68For the dissentient class member to simply bring a separate action would
probably not achieve an exclusion from the class. It would almost certainly invite a
motion from the defendant either to stay the action or to have it consolidated with
the class action (Driflull v. Ough (1906), 13 O.L.R. 8 at 9). In the latter case it is
doubtful whether the plaintiff would be allowed separate representation by counsel.
See note 48, supra.
69 See, for instance, Shabihsky v. Horwitz (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 318.
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is ever utilized as a consumer remedy more extensively than it is at present,
there will be situations when neither the representative plaintiff nor the de-
fendant will have a complete record of class members. The court will then
have to deal with the problems of notifying the class of the judgment and of
informing members of their right to share in the result. If the United States'
experience provides any guide, the court will need to direct notices in news-
papers and on radio and television in order to reach the maximum number of
class members.
In all common law jurisdictions, including the United States, judgment
in a class action will conclusively determine the rights of the members of the
class on whose behalf the action was brought whether the members had
notice of the proceedings or not.70 The possibility that class members who
did not receive notice might be prejudiced if the action is defeated does not
seem to have been considered by Canadian courts or by the courts of other
common law jurisdictions outside the United States. In the United States
the question of the binding effect of a class action judgment on class mem-
bers is affected by the constitutional requirement of due process. The courts
in that country originally looked to the adequacy of the representation for
the class in determining whether due process had been observed, but since
the decision of the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and
Trust Co. 71 in 1950, the emphasis has shifted towards the opportunity to be
heard as a "fundamental requisite of due process. '7 2 However, the right to
be heard has little value unless preceded by notice and so the giving of notice
has assumed considerable importance in the class action procedure in the
United States. This is evident in the new procedural rule for class actions
introduced for Federal courts in 1966, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.73
Though the Rule gives quite specific directions for notice, experience with
the Rule in practice has disclosed considerable uncertainty in such matters
as the terms of the notice, the distribution of notice among class members,
70 Note 20, supra.
71 (1950), 339 U.S. 306; 70 S. Ct. 752.
72 See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F. 2d 555 at 565, aff'd (1974), 94
S. Ct. 2140; F. Maraist & T. P. Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due
Process and the Class Action (1970), 49 Tex. L. Rev. 1.
73 Rule 23 provides as follows:-
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen-
tatives parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the re-
presentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
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not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so main-
tained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered
or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under sub-
division (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judg-
ment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether
or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to
whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have
not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule
shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course
of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or com-
plication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the
protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or
all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or
otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative
parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action
proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders
may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended
as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise A class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the
court directs.
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the time at which notice is to be given, and whether the plaintiff or de-
fendant should pay the costs of notice.74 The cost of notice has proved to be
a major factor in much of the class action litigation in the United States.
The court's directions as to notice can determine the fate of an action for if
extensive notice is ordered and the class is large, the expense may deter the
plaintiff from continuing.7 5
The United States constitutional guarantee of due process has no
equivalent in this country and Canadian courts have not been troubled by
the absence of any notice direction of the kind made by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23. Nevertheless, the present class action practice is anomalous
in this respect. In other areas of the law, notably in proceedings for the
administration of the estate of a deceased person or for the interpretation
of a will or trust instrument, the courts have extended the binding effect
of the judgment beyond an immediate party to other persons whom the party
represents.7 6 In most cases, however, the representative party will be an
executor or administrator or a trustee, an individual chosen by the person
whose will or trust instrument is in question, and if there is no such repre-
sentative, the court will appoint one. There is thus some assurance that the
representative party will be both competent and sufficiently motivated to do
whatever is necessary to protect the interests of non-parties, and accordingly
less need for concern that non-parties have not received notice. The same
assurance should exist in every case where a judgment will bind non-parties
who have had no notice except through a representative. It is submitted that
under any new procedure that is devised for the class action the court should
be required to be satisfied that the representative plaintiff will properly pro-
tect the interests of class members before the action is allowed to proceed.
The competence of the representative plaintiff and notice to the class
are closely connected matters and one cannot realistically be considered
without the other. Notice to the class would help the court in determining
the competence question. Notice at the commencement of the action would
enable class members to scrutinize the plaintiff's claim of competence to
represent the class and, where appropriate, challenge the claim before the
court. Also, the court's decision on the question is likely to be better informed
if reached after any opposing points of view have been presented. Notice
would also give class members the opportunity to exclude themselves from
the class, assuming this right were to be given to them.
74 The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
(1974), 94 S. Ct. 2140 has probably removed the cost uncertainty. The Court upheld
an order of the Court of Appeals which directed the plaintiff at his own expense, at
least in the first instance, to give individual notice to all members of the class who
could be identified through reasonable effort. Class members in this category numbered
approximately two million.
75 This may be the fate of the Eisen claim (Time, June 10, 1974, 57). The costs
of giving individual notice to the class of two million, originally $225,000, would now
be $315,000 following a four-cent increase in postage (1974), 94 S. Ct. 2140. For a
more sanguine outlook, see Analysis, Eisen IV: Don't Believe The Headlines, 271 SRLR
B-1 (1974).
76 May v. Newton (1887), 34 Ch.D. 347; Templeton v. Leviathan Pty. Ltd. (1921),
30 C.L.R. 34. See also, Rules of Practice (Oat.), rr. 76, 77.
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The extent of the risk of prejudice to class members who do not receive
notice will vary according to the value of the individual claims and to the
likelihood of class members bringing separate actions. 77 Since the rationale
of the class action in the consumer context is that few, if any, class members
would sue individually, notice to the class would often be superfluous; the
action might fail, but this will not frustrate the plans of any class member
as the class action plaintiff is the only person prepared to sue. However,
where class members have substantial claims against the defendant, it can-
not be so readily assumed that an adverse judgment will cause no prejudice.78
C. CLASS ACTION CRITERIA
1. Ingredients of a Class Action
In assessing the potential of a class action in securing consumer redress
against widespread business misconduct it is necessary to understand that
the action is essentially a procedural mechanism. It does no more than bring
together for a single determination the claims of many people who seek the
same kind of relief from the defendant. By suing as a representative, the
plaintiff does not invoke any new kind of substantive legal right, one that
could not be enforced if a class member were to sue individually. The legal
rights of the class members which the plaintiff seeks to enforce are not created
by the procedure but exist independently. The plaintiff is asserting the same
rights of the class members that would be in question if each were to bring
his own action. Conceptually, therefore, the various claims are not united
or fused into one but remain separate and distinct, though from the per-
spective of the defendant they will have this unified appearance since he will
aggregate them in assessing his total potential liability.
A class action plaintiff sues in a dual capacity - both personally and
on behalf of a class. However, the representative capacity asserted by the
plaintiff is not really material when the court at trial considers the sub-
stantive liability of the defendant. The court will find the facts and apply
the law just as it would if the plaintiff sued simply for himself in the ordinary
way. Failure of the plaintiff on either the facts or the law means the defeat
77 The prejudicial effect of a class action judgment might extend beyond the im-
mediate claim for relief made in the class action. For instance, if a person suffers
both personal injury and property damage as a result of a tort he cannot "split his
cause of action" so as to claim damages for personal injury in one action and damages
for the loss to his property in a second. He has but a single cause of action for both
kinds of damage, and judgment in an action in which he has sought compensation for
only one kind of damage will extinguish his right to recover for the other (Cahoon v.
Franks, [1967] S.C.R. 455; Cox v. Robert Simpson Co. (1974), 1 O.R. (2d) 333).
Applied to the class action, this principle could lead to prejudice for class members
even though the action was successful. For instance, it could be argued that a class
judgment for damages for breach of a warranty or contractual promise on the sale
of a product would preclude a claim for damages for personal injury on the footing
that the product was dangerous.
78A class action against General Motors that is currently proceeding in Ontario
is an example. The action has been brought on behalf of some 5,000 purchasers in
Ontario of Firenza motor cars manufactured by General Motors and the amount
claimed for each owner is $1,000.
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of the action. The claims of class members will also fail because they are
necessarily identical with the plaintiff's claim, if not entirely, then at least on
the questions of fact or law decided against the plaintiff common to all the
claims. Thus, for example, if the court in Chastain had held that the de-
fendant Authority was authorized to require security deposits, it would have
dismissed the claim both for the plaintiff and the class, and a judgment for
the defendant would preclude any class member from raising the question
again in another action.79
The class action allows questions that are common to the claims of a
number ° of individuals to be determined in a single action. However, the
procedure is not the only means of achieving this result, though it is probably
the most convenient where the claimants are very numerous. One alternative
is a single action in which all claimants join as plaintiffs.81 But no one can
be made a plaintiff without his consent, s2 and where the prospective plaintiffs
are sufficiently numerous to constitute a class it will normally be quite im-
practicable to join them all as parties, even assuming they could all be
readily identified. Moreover, any class member who can be identified is not
likely to agree to become a plaintiff when he learns of his liability to con-
tribute to the defendant's costs should the action fail. The other alternative
to the class action for determining a number of disputes at one stroke is a
test action brought by a single member of a potential class. However, the
70 As the question was one of law, an adverse decision would also have bound a
class member as a precedent in any action subsequently brought. For an examination
of the practical consequences of the stare decisis - estoppel distinction in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin (1974), 94 S. Ct. 2140, see Analysis, Eisen IV. Don't Believe The
Headlines, 271 SRLR B-1 at B-8 (1974).80 Rule 75 requires that the persons constituting the class be "numerous"; it is
not sufficient that their claims raise a common question. The Rule does not define
"numerous", and the few reported decisions on the meaning of the term do not give
much guidance. See J. Kazanjian, Class Actions in Canada (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall
L. J. 396 at 409; Eighth Union Building Society v. Carnegie (1893), 19 V.L.R. 388;
Trustees Executors and Agency Co. v. Sparling (1894), 16 A.L.T. 34. For decisions in
the United States, see C. Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23(1969), 10 Boston College Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 527 at 530. The condition presents
no problem in the consumer context as the action will be brought for market mis-
conduct causing loss to many people. Nevertheless, the qualification has some sig-
nificance for it suggests that the makers of the Rule recognized that the class action
was somewhat anomalous by reason of the binding effect of the judgment on non-
parties, and therefore excluded disputes which affected only a few persons from the
procedure, it being reasonable to assume that these persons would become actual
parties to litigation either as co-plaintiffs in the one writ or as plaintiffs in actions
separately brought. Only when the persons interested were numerous could their direct
participation as parties not be expected. See In Re Braybrook, [1916] W.N. 74. This
situation justified the class action as an exception to the ordinary rule that judgment
in an action binds only the immediate parties. Thus, under the Rule as originally con-
ceived, the class action was proper if the number of persons represented was so large
there was no practical likelihood all of them would become parties in other litigation.
By contrast, the major rationale of the contemporary class action in the consumer
context is that without a class action there would be no recovery by any class member
since no one would become a party plaintiff in litigation separately brought.
81 Rules of Practice (Ont.), r. 66; Holmested and Gale, Ontario Practice Yearbook
1968 at 642-644.
82 Rules of Practice (Ont.), r. 136(1).
[VOL. 13, NO. I
Consumer Class Actions
efficacy of this procedure depends upon all of the claimants and the de-
fendant agreeing to abide by the result of the test action,8 3 and agreement
will be difficult to obtain if the number of claimants is large.
2. Common Interest
The various procedures for securing a single determination of numerous
claims, namely, the class action, the multiple joinder of plaintiffs in a single
action, and the test action, all share the same requirement. The action must
raise a question or questions of fact or law common to each claim against
the defendant. With the class action, the question must be common to the
claim of the plaintiff and to the claim of each person whom the plaintiff
represents. The plaintiff's claim must represent or typify the claims of class
members in the sense that the different claims raise the same question. A
finding for the plaintiff on the question will thus be a finding for the class also.
What constitutes a sufficient common interest to justify a class action
will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It depends on the language and
court interpretation of the procedural rule which governs the class action
in the particular system. The Duke of Bedford84 and Chastain85 cases demon-
strate the common interest element of the Rule that applies in Canadian
courts. In Duke of Bedford, the plaintiffs and the other growers whom they
represented were all in the same relationship with the defendant Duke as
lord of the market. All relied on "one and the same Act of Parliament as
their common charter, ' 86 and the conduct alleged against the Duke - his
denial of the preferential rights of the class and charging of excessive tolls -
affected them all in the same way. By disputing the existence of the pre-
ferential rights the Duke raised an issue common to the entire class. The
Chastain case was rather similar. The domestic consumers of power from
whom the defendant Authority had required security deposits were all in
the same relationship as regards the defendant and the question of the
validity of the regulation under which the defendant purported to act was
common to every claim.
Both in Duke of Bedford and Chastain the plaintiff sought for the class a
declaration that the defendant had acted in breach of the rights of class
members and an injunction to restrain the commission of further breaches.
The class in Chastain sought additional relief in the form of an accounting
by the defendant of the security deposits it had exacted without authority. A
similar claim was made in Duke of Bedford, but by the named plaintiff only
and not on behalf of the class. 87
There is a distinction between a declaratory judgment or injunction on
the one hand, and an order for an account on the other that has important
83Bennett v. Lord Bury (1880), 5 C.P.D. 339; The Supreme Court Practice
1970, 27.
84 [1901] A.C. 1.
85 (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 443.
86 [1901] A.C. 1 at 9, per Lord MacNaghten.
87 See note 34, supra.
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procedural consequences for class actions. A declaratory judgment con-
clusively determines the rights of a litigant. The rights determined will usually
be the pre-existing rights of the party, but this is not necessarily the case
and the court does have jurisdiction to declare rights upon a state of facts
which has not yet arisen. Also, the court may make a binding declaration of
right whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not.88 It is
usual, however, for the court to grant an injunction at the same time it makes
a declaration. The injunction is then given in aid of the rights that have been
declared. Thus, for example, in Chastain the court judgment first declared
that the defendant had no valid authority to require security deposits and
next ordered that the defendant be restrained from "demanding, or collect-
ing, or keeping security deposits as a condition precedent to the supply of
gas or electrical power to residential consumers, or as a condition of the
supply of gas and electrical power to any of the plaintiffs or any member of
the class represented" in the action.89
The making of a declaration90 or the granting of an injunction9' in a
class action will afford identical relief to the plaintiff and to each class mem-
ber. Chastain demonstrates this as the declaration of invalidity and the in-junction against requiring the payment of security deposits in the future
extended to each and every class member. A declaration, however, may also
be the foundation for the grant of individual relief for class members, the
extent of the relief varying from person to person. For example, in Chastain,
the defendant was in effect ordered to return the security deposits to class
members. As the customers had paid different amounts to the defendant
Authority, questions which affected only individual class members were intro-
duced into the proceedings for the first time. It was therefore possible that on
the question of amount there would be as many separate issues to be deter-
mined as there were members of the class. However, this did not prevent the
Chastain claim proceeding as a class action, though the court did not have to
decide the point as the defendant made no objection on this ground. But the
matter was raised by the defendant in another recent case in British Columbia,
Shaw v. Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver.92
Shaw was also an action to recover charges imposed by a statutory
88 The Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 228, s. 18.2; Halsbury's Laws of England,
3rd ed., vol. 22, 747.
89 (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 443 at 459.
00 Of the declaratory judgment it has been said ... the rule permitting one plain-
tiff to sue on behalf of others having a common interest with him is peculiarly ap-
plicable to cases where a declaration of a right common to the plaintiff and those
represented is sought" (Bamber v. Bank of Nova Scotia, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 526 at 532).
See also Edwards v. Halliwell, [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064; Orchard v. Tunny, [1957]
S.C.R. 436; Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. (1938), 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E. 2d
287; J. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions (1960), 9
Buff. L. Rev. 433 at 461; R. Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer
Credit Legislation (1969), 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 80 at 97.
91 If the defendant has caused class members financial loss, a declaration and an
injunction restraining his conduct in future will not provide adequate relief in most
cases. See A. Travers and J. Landers, The Consumer Class Action (1970), 18 U. of
Ka. L. Rev. 811 at 815.
02 (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d) 774, aff'd (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 250.
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authority. The plaintiff class consisted of real estate salesmen who claimed
that the defendant Real Estate Board had illegally exacted part of the com-
missions due to them on property sales. The plaintiff sought a declaration
and an order that the Board return the sums collected to the class members.
The defendant argued that as each member claimed a different amount the
class did not have the same or a common interest as required by the relevant
practice Rule.9 3 The trial judge dismissed the objection and his decision was
upheld by a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal. The appeal
court concluded that once an infringement of the rights of the class held in
common was established, it was no objection to the maintenance of a class
action for pecuniary relief that the extent of the relief might vary among
individuals. The court reached this conclusion despite what it acknowledged
would be "long, detailed and difficult accountings"9 4 in calculating the en-
titlement of each class member.
The Chastain and Shaw decisions and other cases95 show that in Can-
ada a class action can be brought to secure monetary relief for members of
a plaintiff class provided the issue of the defendant's liability raises a com-
mon question, and notwithstanding that the members claim amounts that
vary between individuals and possibly require separate assessments. In the
words of Orde, J.A. in A. E. Osler & Co. v. Solman, 6 by "the same in-
terest", Rule 75 "does not mean a like or similar interest. There must be a
common interest in the sense that the plaintiff and all those whom he claims
to represent will gain some relief by his success, though possibly in different
proportions and perhaps in different degrees." However, in all the Canadian
cases allowing a class action for pecuniary relief the class members sought
the return of money they had previously paid the defendant; damages were
never claimed for individual class members. Canadian courts have consistently
held that the common interest requirement is not satisfied if separate damages
are claimed.
The reasons the courts have given for not allowing class actions for
damages will be examined in the next section. It is sufficient at this point
to note that the utility of the procedure in the consumer field will be severely
restricted if damages claims are forever to be excluded. In both Chastain and
Shaw the defendant had purported to require payment under statutory
authority. However, the cases were hardly typical of consumer transactions.
Most consumer claims arise in the private sector based on a contract between
consumer and supplier. A damages award is the remedy the courts will nor-
mally give to a consumer when a supplier of goods or services has not per-
formed his part of the bargain or not complied with conditions implied into
the contract by law, as, for example, under The Sale of Goods Act,9 7 or when
the consumer in making the contract relied to his detriment on false repre-
sentations by the suppliers as to the quality of the product.
93 Supreme Court Rules, 1961, 0.16, r.9 (M.R. 131).
94 (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 250 at 255.
95 E.g., Preston v. Hilton (1920), 55 D.L.R. 647 at 653; Drohan v. Sangamo Co.,
[19721 3 O.R. 399.
96 [19261 4 D.L.R. 345 at 349.
9 7 E.g., The Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 421.
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3. Damages and Separate Contracts
The review of the reported decisions which follow will show that Cana-
dian courts have so far refused to allow a class action to be brought for
damages, at least where damages have to be individually assessed for each
class member. The courts have not been entirely unanimous in their reasons
for excluding damages claims, nor have their reasons always been clearly
articulated. Thus, in a few cases the damages objection was founded more
on the court's concern at the absence of procedural safeguards for the de-
fendant than on any view that damages claims were inherently unsuited for
class action presentation. The procedural concern arose from lack of any
provisions in the practice rules of the court giving the defendant the right to
discovery against class members or making individual class members liable
for the defendant's costs if their separate claims were defeated. The immunity
of class members in this respect reflected their status as non-parties, and it
was considered unfair that the defendant should not have the procedural
advantages normally available against an adversary. In the other class action
cases, the objection to damages claims was based on the substance of the
claim, and the procedural situation of the defendant was not a reason for the
decision. But it was not always made clear in these cases whether it was the
existence of separate contracts or transactions with the defendant or the
individualization of damages among class members, assuming a breach of
the common contractual term, which was the bar to a class action. However,
the distinction had no practical significance, for the presence of one char-
acteristic rather than the other was never considered decisive. Whether the
court stressed the separate contracts or the individual damages, the same
conclusion was reached, applying the test for the class action rule enunciated
by Lord MacNaghten in Duke of Bedford.98 The plaintiff and the class mem-
bers did not have the necessary common interest.
The 1910 decision of the English Court of Appeal in Markt & Co. Ltd.
v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd.,99 is a convenient starting point from which to
examine the prospects of bringing a class action for damages in Canada today
as a number of Canadian courts have accepted the decision as authority for
the proposition that the action cannot be maintained. In fact, however, only
one of the three members of the Court of Appeal in Markt, Fletcher Moulton,
Li., dismissed the plaintiff's representative claim on the ground that the
relief sought was damages.100 The action was brought on behalf of owners
of cargo which was on board a ship owned by the defendant and was lost
when the ship sank during the Russo-Japanese War. A Russian cruiser sank
the ship on the ground that she was carrying contraband of war. The plain-
tiff alleged that the contract of shipment between each owner and the de-
fendant contained an identical implied term to the effect that the defendant
0s Note 33, supra.
09 [1910] 2 K.B. 1021.
100 This was noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Farnham v. Fingold, [1973]
2 O.R. 132 at 136. Fletcher Moulton, L.J, said "Damages are personal only ... no
representative action can lie where the sole relief sought is damages, because they have
to be proved separately in the case of each plaintiff, and therefore the possibility of
representation ceases" ([1910] 2 K.B. at 1041).
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would not carry contraband. Vaughan Williams, L.J. held that the repre-
sentative claim should be dismissed on the ground that since the claims of
the plaintiff and the cargo owners arose out of separate contracts with the
defendant there was no common interest. He contrasted the situation of the
class members in Duke of Bedford, quoting Lord MacNaghten, "All growers
have the same rights. They rely on one and the same Act of Parliament as a
common charter." In Markt, however, "there is no common origin of the
claims of those who shipped goods upon the Knight Commander - the con-
tracts were constituted by the bills of lading which manifestly might differ
much in their form, and as to the exceptions, and probably would vary
somewhat according to the nature of the goods shipped."'' Fletcher Moulton,
L.J. also considered that there was no common interest when the class claimed
under separate contracts. He said ". . . each of these parties made a separate
contract of shipment in respect of different goods entitling him to its per-
formance by the defendants and to damages in case of non-performance ....
Defences may exist against some of the shippers which do not exist against
the others, such as estoppel, set-off, etc., so that no representative action can
settle the rights of the individual members of the class."'1 02 Fletcher Moulton,
L.J., thus dismissed the representative proceedings on two grounds - the
members of the class sought to recover damages which required separate
calculation and the claims arose under different contracts.
The question whether damages could be recovered in a class action
appears to have been considered by a Canadian court for the first time in
1920. In an Ontario case, Preston v. Hilton,10 3 the plaintiff owned a dwelling
house and she claimed damages for nuisance for herself and all other owners
of property in the vicinity that was similarly situated. But in the judgment of
Orde, I ".. . an action either for damages for a nuisance or for an injunction
to restrain a nuisance cannot be brought in a representative capacity .. it
is clear that the injury or threatened injury must be peculiar to each person
alone or to his property .... There is no . . . community of interest here.
In this case each person whom the plaintiff claims to represent has a distinct
and separate cause of action against the Hiltons for the special injury and
damage, if any, which that person may sustain by reason of the alleged
nuisance or threatened nuisance."' 04 In holding that the class had no com-
mon interest, Orde, I. referred to Johnston v. Consumers' Gas Co.'°  In
Johnston, a class action was brought on behalf of customers of the gas com-
pany to recover alleged overpayment. It was not necessary to finally decide
whether the representative action was in order as the plaintiff failed to estab-
lish his own claim on the merits. Nevertheless, the court considered the
propriety of the representative claim and concluded that it was not a proper
case for a class action as the claim of each class member arose out of a
separate contract with the defendant. The Appellate Division of the Ontario
101 [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 at 1029.
102 Id., at 1040.
103 (1920), 48 O.L.R. 172.
104 Id., at 179-80.
105 (1898), 23 O.A.R. 566.
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Supreme Court approved Preston v. Hilton in Turtle v. City of Toronto,10 6
another class action for damages for nuisance. Orde, J. considered the ques-
tion again in A. E. Osler & Co. v. Solman,0 7 and affirmed that the common
interest essential to a class action could not exist when damages had to be
individually proved.
The question of damages recovery in a class action has been examined
in three recent cases. In Shaw v. Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver,08
the plaintiff sought the return of moneys the defendant was alleged to have
taken from class members without authority. There was no claim for dam-
ages, something the British Columbia Court of Appeal emphasized in up-
holding the representative claim. The Court stated that otherwise it would
not have allowed the proceedings. 09 In Drohan v. Sangamo Co. Ltd.," 0
the plaintiff sued on behalf of retired employees of the defendant to enforce
an agreement to pay pensions, and in addition claimed damages for the em-
ployees. Grant, J. of the Ontario Supreme Court seemed prepared to accept
the argument of the defendant that damages could not be recovered because
they are personal and need to be proved separately. However, it was not
necessary for the court to finally determine the question, and it disposed of
the defendant's motion to strike out the proceedings on other grounds.
Farnham v. Fingold,"'l in the Ontario Court of Appeal, is the most
significant of the recent decisions. The action was brought on behalf of share-
holders of a corporation claiming the payment of a large sum from individuals
who formerly were shareholders holding a controlling interest in the cor-
poration. The sum represented a premium which the defendants earned when
they sold their shares. The plaintiff shareholder alleged that the defendants
improperly gained this profit by using information which had come exclusively
to them by virtue of their control position, and claimed that the defendants
were accountable to the plaintiff class for the profit. The court did not have
to resolve the question whether the claim was for damages, but on the as-
sumption that this was the proper characterization, the Court concluded that
a class action was in order because the individual entitlement of class mem-
bers was simply to a pro rata share of the premium and no separate calcula-
tion was needed. In support of this conclusion, the Court cited Bowen v.
MacMillan,112 a class action for "general damages to the class, arising out
of wrongs alleged to have been done to the class as a class," in which the
Judge in Chambers refused to strike out summarily the representative claim
as being entirely without substance. The Court of Appeal in Farnham stated
that if damages had to be individually established it would have disallowed
the representative claims on "the ground that it would be unjust to permit
100 (1924), 56 O.L.R. 252.
107 [1926] 4 D.L.R. 345.
108 (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d) 774, aff'd (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 250.
100 (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 250 at 254, 255.
110 [19721 3 O.R. 399 at 402.
Ill [1973] 2 O.R. 132.
112 (1921), 21 O.W.N. 23. As the law does not recognize a class as a separate
entity it is difficult to understand how a class as such could -get damages.
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[such damages] to be claimed in a class action because the defendant would
be deprived of individual discoveries and, in the event of success, would have
recourse for costs only against the named plaintiff although his costs were
increased by multiple separate claims."" 3
Farnham v. Fingold is a significant contemporary pronouncement on
the propriety of a class action for damages. Though the matter was not
directly in question, the case, at least in Ontario, is clearly strong persuasive
authority for the proposition that a class action cannot be brought for dam-
ages which have to be separately calculated. The other recent decisions in
Shaw and Drohan also support this position. Whether it is the necessity for
separate damages assessments or the absence of procedural safeguards for
the defendant of the kind mentioned in Farnham that creates the obstacle
is hardly material; the conclusion seems inescapable that Canadian courts
under existing class action procedure will not entertain a class action for
damages when the claim of each class member has to be individually
determined.
The cases examined in the preceding paragraphs indicate that the
necessity for individual damages calculations will bar a class action.' 14 The
same cases, and others to be mentioned, show that there is yet another
obstacle to bringing a class action of the consumer variety in Canada today.
These decisions established that the common interest requirement in Rule 75
is not satisfied when the claims of class members arise out of separate con-
tracts or transactions with the defendant. Thus, it does not matter that the
class does not claim individual damages; a representative claim for pecuniary
relief, whether for damages or not, will fail if each class member relies upon
a contract separately entered into with the defendant.
The Markt"5 decision is again a convenient start for an examination of
the authorities. The two majority members of the Court of Appeal dismissed
the representative claim made on behalf of the cargo owners on the grounds
that the claims arose out of separate bills of lading. The same conclusion
was earlier reached in Ontario in Johnston v. Consumers' Gas Co., where a
representative claim for the repayment of charges imposed on customers in
excess of a statutory rate was disallowed on the ground that ". . . every
consumer has a separate contract with the company, and the fact that the
provisions of the statute as to reduction of price is to be regarded as a term
of all such contracts, makes no difference in that respect, they are all separate
113 [1973] 2 O.R. 132 at 136.
114 This seems to have been recognized by the plaintiffs in the Firenza case. See
note 78, supra. They claim $1,000 damages for each member of the class, which num-
bers approximately 5,000. The sum allegedly represents the loss in market value of
all Firenza cars caused by the defects in the model for the years in question. The
plaintiff thus appears to have avoided the necessity for individual proof of loss. Moon
v. Atherton, [1972] 3 All E.R. 145, in the English Court of Appeal might be thought
to support the proposition that individual damages can be recovered in a class action.
The plaintiff class sued for damages and Lord Denning, M.R. said the action was
proper. However, the comment was really obiter as the only question the Court had
to decide was whether a class member could be substituted when the plaintiff discon-
tinued the action.
"15 Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021.
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contracts still. Again . . . the right to recover [the overpayment] back is not
a matter of course, but depends in each case on the circumstances under
which they were made and, therefore, each consumer has, if anything, a
separate cause of action."110 Johnston was not cited in the recent Chastain"17
decision in British Columbia. Chastain can be distinguished, if this is neces-
sary, on the grounds that British Columbia Hydro did not provide power to
customers under contracts separately entered into. The defendant was a
public utility and had a statutory duty to supply power to all who requested
it and would pay a reasonable price.
Shields v. Mayor 18 in the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1953 appears to
be the latest Canadian decision denying a class action on the ground that the
class claims arose out of separate contracts. The tenant of an apartment sued
the landlord to recover rents he had received during the preceding several
months in excess of the rent fixed by a war-time regulation. The plaintiff
sued for herself and ten other persons who were tenants of the apartment at
different times during the period. The Court, citing Markt, Johnston and
Preston v. Hilton in support, concluded, "Each of the . . . [occupants] . . .
having a separate contract with the landlord, and each paying her rent directly
to the landlord, the action cannot be maintained as a class action." The
separate contract question did not arise in Farnham v. Fingold, and so it has
not been examined by the Ontario Court of Appeal since Shields. Thus, if
Shields and the earlier cases cited in the decision still represent the law, in
Ontario, if not elsewhere, the necessity for proof of individual contracts by
class members is another ground on which the courts are likely to refuse to
extend the scope of the class action remedy.
The view that the class common interest breaks down once damages
have to be separately assessed is technically correct, yet the decisions leave
the impression that what really has moved the courts to deny class action
status to damages claims is the concern to save the court system from the
administrative burden that numerous individual damages calculations might
impose. Also, the judicial attitude to entertaining damages class actions is
not consistent with the practice of the court in allowing a class action to be
brought for liquidated sums of money notwithstanding that the entitlement
of each class member will require separate assessment, no matter how dif-
ficult this exercise might prove. The British Columbia Court of Appeal deci-
sion in Shaw demonstrates the point. Bull, J.A., with whose reasons Nemetz,
J.A. agreed, acknowledged that if at trial the defendant Real Estate Board
was found liable "there would have to be long, detailed and difficult account-
ings . . . regarding the sources, amounts, distributions, and specific entitle-
ments of individual members of the class." 119 However, the Court did not
view the complexity of the individual calculations as a bar to the maintenance
of the claim as a class action. On the contrary, Bull, J.A. considered that if
liability were established and so the accounting stage reached, "I cannot but
116 (1898), 23 O.A.R. 566 at 573-74.
117 (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 443.
118 [1953] O.W.N. 5.
110 (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 250 at 255.
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think that the representative action is the only fair and convenient way that
the remaining troublesome matters could be efficiently resolved."' 20 Regret-
tably, the majority went on to remark that the class action would have been
disallowed if the class had claimed individual damages, thus highlighting the
inconsistency in judicial approach.
The decision, nevertheless, is significant for two reasons. First, the de-
termination to allow the class action to continue despite the expected ac-
counting difficulties acknowledges that courts have a responsibility to promote
respect for substantive rights and that for this purpose they must take a
broad view of procedural rules. "Rules and forms of procedure are not ends
in themselves, but means to an end, which is the attainment of justice."' 2'3
Second, the decision rather weakens any argument that individual damages
assessments will impose intolerable administrative burdens on the court sys-
tem. If courts have the machinery for making calculations of the kind
required in Shaw, there ought to be no objection to individual damages cal-
culations for class members since the difference between the two types of
inquiry is essentially only one of form.122
4. Diversity of Common and Separate Questions
The foregoing examination of class actions for individual damages and
for claims arising out of separate contracts shows that a class claim situation
can involve both common questions and separate questions that concern
only individual class members. Indeed, there will rarely be a situation in
which a complete identity of interests exists among the representative plain-
tiff and members of the class on every issue going to liability, and, if
pecuniary relief is claimed, on the quantum of recovery. Even if class mem-
bers claim the same relief, whether a declaration, an injunction or the same
sum of money, and on identical causes of action, separate adjudications will
be necessary if the defendant challenges the assertion of particular individuals
to membership of the class. 12 3
Complete identity of interest on every issue represents the paradigm
situation for a class action and, in theory at least, the justification for the
procedure will weaken as the number of individual questions increases. Thus,
a point may be reached where questions common to the class are so sub-
ordinate to the separate questions affecting only individual members that the
class action ceases to be a viable alternative to independent proceedings.
3.2 0 1d., at 255.
121: Union Bank of Australia v. Harrison, Jones & Devlin Ltd. (1910), 11 C.L.R.
492 at 504, per Griffith, C.J
122 "As a practical matter, a requirement of common relief has no compelling
importance and its absence presents no insuperable difficulties. A determination of the
interest of each member of the class in any damages recovered does not seem to us
dissimilar to a determination of each member's interest in a common trust fund, such
determination sometimes being required after the common issues have been resolved
in a class action. Only at such final stage do the individual interests become critical
and does the community of interest requirement lose significance" (Daar v. Yellow
Cab Co. (1967), 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P. 2d 732 at 742).
123 Duke of Redford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1 at 11.
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The balance between common and separate questions will vary from
case to case. Cases such as Duke of Bedford, Chastain, and Shaw illustrate
one extreme. Each action raised a question of the legality of the conduct of
a defendant purporting to act pursuant to statutory authority. An Act of
Parliament (or regulation thereunder) of universal application was the
source of the respective rights and obligations of class members and the
defendant, not a contract made separately with class members, and so proof
by the plaintiff of illegality was proof for all the class. Consequential de-
claratory and injunctive relief would extend automatically to the class and
the personal intervention of individuals would not be necessary unless the
defendant claimed that they did not belong to the class. However, the addi-
tion of a claim for pecuniary relief could introduce separate questions be;-
cause if class members were not entitled to the same amount, the defendant
could require each member to separately establish his recovery.
However, the typical consumer confrontation is not so much with
statutory authorities as with business enterprises in the private sector. Con-
sumer claims stem not from an Act of Parliament or regulation of universal
application but from contracts separately made with the defendant. Contract
claims present a greater diversity of common and separate questions than
cases such as Chastain. Assuming a class action can be brought in a contract
situation, judgment for the plaintiff on the common questions will extend to
the entire class, but individual proof will be necessary on the separate ques-
tions before any one other than the plaintiff can obtain relief.124
Some examples will demonstrate the problem.
Suppose a dealer in new motor cars warrants that the gas consumption
of a particular new model for normal city driving will be approximately 30
miles per gallon. A motorist, relying on the warranty, buys one of the cars
from the dealer, and the warranty proves to be false. On the assumption
12 4 A number of courts in the United States have held that the community of
interest necessary to a class action is lacking where each class member must establish
his right to recover on the basis of facts peculiar to his own case. See for instance,
Cherry v. Howell (1931), 4 F. Supp. 597; Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses
(1948), 198 P. 2d 514; Barber v. California Employment Stabilization Commission
(1955), 278 P. 2d 762; Chance v. Superior Court (1962), 23 Cal. Rptr. 761, 373 P.
2d 849; Newberry Library v. Chicago Board of Education (1944), 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.
2d 147; Freeman v. State Wide Carpet Distributors Inc. (1961), 365 Mich. 313, 112
N.W. 2d 439; Hall v. Coburn Corporation of America (1970), 26 N.Y. 2d 396, 259
N.E. 2d 720. However, a class action involving individual proof has been allowed in
jurisdictions with rules such as F.R.C.P. 23, which authorizes a class action to be
brought if the questions common to the class predominate over those affecting only
individual members. See, Green v. Wolf Corporation (1968), 406 F. 2d 291 at 300;
Dolgow v. Anderson (1968), 43 F.R.D. 472 at 488; Berland v. Mack (1969), 48 F.R.D.
121 at 128; Herbst v. Able (1969), 47 F.R.D. 11; cf. Moscarelli v. Stamm (1968),
288 F. Supp. 453. In California the same position has now been reached by judicial
decision. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967), 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P. 2d 732;
Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (1971), 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 484
P. 2d 964.
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that the value of the car would be greater if the warranty were true, the
purchaser can recover the difference in value as damages for breach of war-
ranty. Suppose further that the same warranty were made to 99 other pur-
chasers. In a class action brought by one purchaser for himself and on behalf
of all the others, a finding that the gas consumption of the model car in
question could never be better than 15 miles per gallon given the most
favourable conditions would establish a vital element of the case of each
class member. However, a finding that the plaintiff was induced to purchase
the car by the defendant's warranty would not extend to the other purchasers.
Each class member would have to establish for himself the elements of war-
ranty and inducement. There will be no common interest for two essential
ingredients of the cause of action, apart altogether from the possibility that
damages will vary among the class members and require separate assessment.
Thus, a number of separate adjudications, each raising the issues of war,-
ranty, reliance and damages, would have to follow a favourable finding on
the common question as to the breach of warranty.
The balance between common and separate questions in the example
clearly rests with the latter, but, of course, it will change according to the
facts of the particular case. Thus, proof of the making of the warranty
would be less significant if the dealer had given the warranty by advertise-
ment in the newspaper or on radio or television rather than verbally at the
time of the sale to each customer. Once the advertisement was proved, all
class members could rely on the finding, and though they would still have to
show reliance, the defendant could hardly seriously contest their claim that
they had noted the advertisement before buying the product. Again, proof of
reliance would be unnecessary if the plaintiff alleged that the dealer's word
concerning gas consumption constituted a contractual promise rather than
a warranty.
Next, suppose the dealer in the motor car example made the statement
about gas consumption fraudulently. In an action alleging fraud, the state of
mind of the other party is material. 2 5 The cause of action in fraud thus
introduces an additional issue that must be established if the plaintiff and
the class are to recover. However, proof for one class member as to the
defendant's state of mind might constitute proof for the rest of the class
because once it was determined that the dealer was fraudulent in giving the
warranty for one sale it would be fair to assume, in the absence of contrary
evidence, that his state of mind was the same when he repeated the warranty
for subsequent sales. As fraud is usually a difficult charge to prove, a class
action obviously has merit if the question is common to the class. Indeed,
the advantage of a class action in securing a single determination on an
issue such as fraud might outweigh whatever administrative difficulties are
presented by the trial of the separate questions of the making of the repre-
12 5 The plaintiff has to show that the defendant made the representation on which
he relied knowing it was false, or recklessly, not caring whether it was true or false
(Derry v. Peek (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337 at 374.)
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sentation (assuming it was not made universally by advertisement in the
media), reliance and damages.12
One final example derived from the original hypothetical motor car
dealer situation will demonstrate again how the balance between common
and separate questions can vary. Suppose the buyer from a dealer alleged
that the model of the car in question was defective in design; for instance,
that its brake or steering system was unsafe. Apart from any express war-
ranty, the buyers could rely on the statutory warranties incorporated in every
contract for the sale of goods that the goods will be reasonably fit for the
purpose for which they are required and are of merchantable quality.' 27
Since the warranties are implied by law it is sufficient to prove that the war-
ranty was broken. Thus, in a class action brought for all buyers of the car
from the dealer claiming damages for breach of statutory warranties, the
plaintiff and class members will have the same interest in the two elements
that constitute the cause of action, the existence of the warranty and the
breach consisting of a defect in design. Assuming liability is established, only
the damages question will require separate proof once each claimant has
qualified for membership in the class by showing that he was a buyer from
the dealer.
5. Action Against Manufacturer or Seller
In all of the foregoing examples, the class members and defendant were
120 Courts in the United States have recognized that the class action can be a
more effective procedure for adjudicating numerous claims based on fraud than separate
proceedings brought by each victim (Advisory Committee on Rule 23, Proposed Amend-
ments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69 at 102-3; Green v. Wolf Corpora-
tion (1968), 406 F. 2d 291; Dolgow v. Anderson (1968), 43 F.R.D. 472; Berland v.
Mack (1969), 48 F.R.D. 121.) These were decisions under Federal Rule of Procedure
23. California has a class action rule that in substance is the same as Ontario Rule 75
(Code of Civil Procedure, s. 382). The courts have held that the common interest
requirement of section 382 is not satisfied if class members would have to litigate
numerous questions to determine their individual right to recover subsequent to the
rendering of any favourable judgment on questions common to the class. Thus, a class
action could not be maintained for fraud if individual proof of the representation and
reliance were necessary. However, in Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County
(1971), 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 484 P. 2d 964, on demurrer to a class action allegation in
a fraud claim, the California Supreme Court held that individual proof could be dis-
pensed with if at trial the plaintiff was able to establish facts from which inferences
could be drawn that the representations were made to each class member and that
each class member relied on the representation. As to reliance, the Court considered
that it is not necessary to show reliance upon false representations by direct evidence.
Quoting Williston (12 Williston on Contracts (3d ed. 1970), 480), the Court concluded
that reliance could be presumed from the fact that the representation was made as to
a material matter and action was taken. If Canadian courts would take the same
approach a class action based on fraudulent misrepresentations would be possible under
the existing procedure. For comment on Vasquez, see 1- Mainland, Class Actions in
California: A First Look at Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971), 47 Los Angeles
Bar Bulletin 13; Comment (1971), 18 UCLA L. Rev. 1041.
127 The Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 421. The statutory warranties cannot
be excluded. The Consumers Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 82, s. 44A(2), makes
void any written term or acknowledgement that purports to negative or vary any of
the implied conditions and warranties under the Sale of Goods Act that apply to
goods sold by a sale that is a consumer sale as defined by section 44A(1).
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in the direct relationship of buyer and seller. In other situations, buyers may
have a remedy against the manufacturer, though there is no contractual
relationship with the manufacturer. If a manufacturer gives a warranty as
to its product on which the buyer relies in contracting with the distributor
and the warranty is broken, the buyer can recover damages from the manu-
facturer for the breach, whether or not he also has a cause of action against
the distributor founded on a warranty given by the distributor in the same
terms.12s The manufacturer's warranty is said to be a warranty collateral to
the contract between buyer and seller.
Assuming a buyer has a warranty claim against both manufacturer and
seller, the buyer can sue one or both of them at his option, and if he sues
both, the two can be joined in the same writ. If the buyer sues in a repre-
sentative capacity (on the assumption that a damages claim presents no bar),
the class action will ordinarily benefit more consumers if the manufacturer
is the defendant, either alone or with the seller, than if the action were
brought against just the seller. With the manufacturer as defendant, every
consumer who purchased the product in question in reliance upon the manu-
facturer's warranty can be represented irrespective of the identity of the
seller of the product. On the other hand, a class action against the seller
alone would not benefit buyers generally but only those who had bought the
product from the defendant. However, there is one complication in bringing
a class action against the manufacturer rather than the seller, namely, the
element of reliance. As there is no contract between manufacturer and con-
sumer the warranties created by The Sale of Goods Act cannot be imported
into the relationship. 2s 9 The manufacturer will have given the warranty by
advertisement in the media, a matter common to the class that is easily
proved. Reliance, however, is a separate question, and individual proof will
be necessary.
6. Superiority as Criterion for Class Action
The superiority of the class action to other available methods for de-
termining the controversy should be the factor which determines whether a
class action is to be allowed in the particular case. The courts ought not to
decide the question on any a priori basis but rather should take the approach
that the procedure is a flexible tool for securing economies of time, expense
and judicial effort that can be adapted to a variety of situations. The neces-
sity for individual proof on one or even a number of the issues on which
liability depends should not bar a class action if the advantage gained by class
128See Ford Motor Co. of Canada v. Haley (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 15, aff'd
(1967), 60 W.W.R. 497 (S.C.C.); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors (1960), 32 NJ.
358, 161 A. 2d 69 (N.J.); Randy Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co. (1962),
11 N.Y. 2d 5, 181 N.E. 2d 399 (N.Y.C.A.); M. Trebilcock, Private Law Remedies for
Misleading Advertising (1972), 22 U. of T. L.J. 1 at 6-11; Ontario Law Reform Com-
mission, Report on Consumer Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods, Ch.
5 (1972).129 The Ontario government has proposed legislation to alter this situation by in-
corporating into the relationship of manufacturer and buyer warranties similar to those
that apply as between seller and buyer (Ontario Ministry of Consumer and Commer-
cial Relations, Green Paper on Consumer Product Warranties, 17 (1973)).
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members in securing a finding on the common question outweighs any ad-
ministrative problems the separate issues present. In assessing the benefit
which a class action will bring to class members the court ought to consider
what difficulties the separate proof of common issues will present and how
this will affect the likelihood of individual actions being brought. The burden
of proving common questions may well be so onerous that no individual will
make the attempt if only he stands to benefit. This will particularly be so
if the sum at stake is too small to justify the effort. However, the aggregation
of multiple claims by a class action may make litigation worthwhile; what
was impractical and unrealistic for an individual to prove just for himself
becomes a legitimate exercise when the rights of hundreds and possibly
thousands of people depend on the result. It is unlikely, for instance, that
the Chastain plaintiffs would have challenged the defendant Authority in the
British Columbia Supreme Court on what was a complex and difficult ques-
tion of statutory interpretation if they had been limited to recovering only
the deposits they had paid themselves. Again, suppose a class of consumers
have claims against a car manufacturer on a collateral warranty, defective
design being the breach alleged. Any more complex question for a layman
litigant to establish is difficult to imagine. Denied the opportunity to combine
their claims in a class action, few buyers will have the courage and resources
to engage the car manufacturer single-handed. Further, even if there are
some buyers determined to tackle the manufacturer individually, unless they
sue as co-plaintiffs or their actions separately brought are consolidated, a
finding of defective design for a buyer in one action will not bind the de-
fendant in any other action. A class action would avoid this situation.
The class action rule for Federal courts in the United States recognizes
that the claims of class members may raise questions that are not common
to the class as a whole. The Advisory Committee responsible for drafting
the Rule (F.R.C.P. 23) supported the class action as a means of securing
economies of time, effort and expense, but concluded that these economies
could only be achieved where the common questions predominate over any
questions affecting individual members.'30 A requirement that the common
questions must so predominate before a class action will be allowed was
therefore incorporated in the Rule. The draft class action legislation proposed
for Canadian jurisdictions which concludes this article adopts the same test.
D. DISCOVERY AND COSTS IN CLASS ACTIONS
1. Discovery and Costs Against Class Members
Under current Canadian practice the members of a plaintiff class are,
by reason of their non-party status, immune from some of the obligations
that affect ordinary litigants. In particular, class members are not liable to
give discovery nor will they be ordered to pay the defendant's costs if the
130 Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69 at 102-3.
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action fails.' 3 ' In some cases, the court held that the existence of these
privileges rendered the class action an unsuitable procedure for determining
damages claims which required individual assessments. The court stressed
that by allowing the action the defendant would lose procedural rights en-
joyed by parties in ordinary litigation, rights which he would have if class
members had sued separately. The class action defendant, faced with
numerous separate claims for damages, assuming a favourable finding on the
common liability issue, would be denied discovery from each claimant,
whether by production of documents or on oral examination, and could not
recover costs from individual class members if he defeated their claim to
participate in the judgment for the plaintiff.
2. Discovery
There is some merit in the objection that the present practice could
produce procedural hardship for the defendant. The representative plaintiff
is liable to give discovery, but this will not always be adequate to protect
the defendant against the class claims, and the restriction is rather difficult
to justify when class members, through the plaintiff, can compel the de-
fendant to give discovery. In fairness, the defendant should have the same
procedural opportunities as those enjoyed by the plaintiff and members of
the class. However, the deficiencies in the existing procedure hardly support
the court's refusal to allow a class action for damages. The defendant can be
similarly prejudiced in a class action for liquidated amounts, yet no class
action has been denied for this reason. The solution is to amend the pro-
cedure to give the defendant discovery rights against class members whenever
pecuniary relief is claimed, whether the amount sought is liquidated or not.
Discovery against class members under any new procedure should not
be allowed until after judgment is pronounced for the plaintiff on the ques-
tions common to the class, assuming the action is successful.' 32 There are
two reasons for this proposed limitation. First, only the common questions
are in issue prior to judgment and discovery against the plaintiff should be
1s1 For the proposition that class members are not liable for costs or to give dis-
covery, see Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 at 1039; John v.
Rees, [1970] Ch. 345 at 372; Moon v. Atherton, [1972] 3 All E.R. 145; Farnham v.
Fingold, [1973] 2 O.R. 132. In McAllister v. O'Meara (1896), 17 P.R. 176, Boyd, C.
suggested that class members who contribute to the expenses of the action may be
found liable to costs, upon a proper application.
One of the Rules of Practice in Ontario relating to examination for discovery, rule
331(c), provides "Where an action is prosecuted or defended for the immediate benefit
of a person or corporation, such person or any officer or servant of such corporation
may without order be examined for discovery." Whether the rule applies to a class
action does not appear to have been decided.
132 The defendant can obtain discovery of class members before judgment under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the United States and the penalty for non-
compliance is dismissal of the member's claim (Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co. (1968), 286 F. Supp. 702, affd (1969), 417 F. 2d 147). See, Absentee Class
Members Subjected to Discovery and Claims Dismissed for Failure to Respond (1971),
Duke L.J 1007; Note (1971), 40 Fordham L. Rev. 969; Note (1971), 40 U. of Cin.
L. Rev. 842.
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sufficient to enable the defendant to meet the claim.138 Until judgment the
class members are unidentified though identifiable, 134 but the number rather
than the identity of the members is significant for the defendant as the size
of the class will determine the total liability. Only after judgment, when class
members come forward to participate in the recovery, does the defendant
need the protection of discovery to fully test individual claims. Second, there
is a danger that the defendant could exploit discovery as a weapon of delay
if class members were liable to give discovery before judgment.13 5 The de-
fendant could stall proceedings almost indefinitely by serving discovery
notices on a large number of class members and then insisting on full
compliance before agreeing that the action was ready for trial.
3. Costs against the class
The absence of any right in the defendant to recover costs from class
members who fail in their claim to participate in the judgment is another
reason the courts have given for refusing to allow a class action for damages.
The immunity of class members from liability for costs is a departure from
the ordinary rule that the costs of litigation follow the event, and follows
from the position that the class representative is technically the only party
adversary of the defendant.
The defendant will be concerned with his costs recovery in two distinct
situations; the first, if he wins the action, and the second, if he fails on the
common questions. If the plaintiff loses the action, and thus the claim for
the class as well, the defendant will be awarded costs from the plaintiff in
the ordinary way. By suing for a class, the plaintiff threatens the defendant
with a potential liability of far greater magnitude than the claim any in-
dividual class member would present. This consideration can properly be
reflected in the quantum of the defendant's costs, but it has never been held
to justify a costs recovery against class members. 36 The costs liability of
the representative plaintiff is deemed sufficient to protect the defendant.
However, the situation is different if the plaintiff recovers judgment, thereby
succeeding on the questions common to the class. If separate questions need
to be determined before individual class members can recover, for instance,
the assessment of damages, assuming damages claims are allowed, class
members will have to intervene. At this point, the defendant in fairness
should have the safeguard of the costs sanction in meeting the class claims
on the separate questions. The questions would require a trial within the
principal action, a kind of mini-trial, and they could be determined by a
judge or master of the court. Class claimants and defendant would, in effect,
be party adversaries on the separate questions, and by analogy with ordinary
proceedings, the usual costs rule ought to apply.
Under present class action practice, a class claim can be brought for
13 3 See R. Jones, Discovery Available Against Absent Plaintiffs to Class Action
(1972), 21 J. Public Law 189 at 197.
134 See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967), 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P. 2d 732 at 740.
13 5 See Southern California Edison Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (1972),
103 Cal. Rptr. 709, 500 P. 2d 621; Note (1973), 61 Cal. L. Rev. 289 at 322; A. Travers
& J. Landers, The Consumer Class Action (1970), 18 U. of Ka. L. Rev. 811 at 831.
130 But see note 46, supra.
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liquidated amounts, notwithstanding that no costs recovery is allowed against
individual claimants. The proposed statute would change this practice and
place liquidated claims and damages on the same footing as regards costs
recovery from class members. Also, by extending the normal costs rule to
the determination of the separate questions, the statute would give the de-
fendant the same opportunity of utilizing the payment into court procedure
as exists in ordinary proceedings. 137
4. Costs for the class
Apart from the special position of class members, the ordinary rule
for costs developed in Anglo-Canadian jurisdictions applies to class actions.
Though costs are in the discretion of the court, the court will normally order
that they follow the event. The rationale of the practice is twofold. First,
the threat of liability for the costs of the other party in the event of defeat
serves to deter the bringing or raising of unmeritorious claims or defences.
These costs are in addition to those the unsuccessful party will have to pay
his own lawyer. Second, the costs awarded the winner will compensate for
the expenditure of time and money needed to secure success, an expenditure
which the outcome of the action has justified. However, in all but a few
situations, 38 the costs which the losing party is ordered to pay, party and
party costs, will be less than the costs the successful party will be charged
by his lawyer. For convenience, and to distinguish them from party and party
costs, the latter costs are called solicitor and own client costs. 38sA
To give the winning party a complete costs indemnity is thought to
impose too heavy a penalty on the loser. Hence the discrepancy between
party and party costs on the one hand and solicitor and own client costs
on the other. The practice represents a compromise by the legal system be-
tween not allowing costs at all, which is the practice in most American
jurisdictions, 3 9 and requiring the losing party to pay the entire costs of his
opponent. The gap between the two sets of costs does not normally present
any difficulties in ordinary litigation in the County Court and the Supreme
3 7 The procedure in Ontario is contained in Rules 306 to 318 of the Rules of
Practice.
138 A full costs indemnity will be allowed, for example, in proceedings for the
administration of an estate or the determination of a question of construction arising
under a will or trust settlement, the costs of the parties being paid out of the fund the
subject of the proceedings (see e.g., Re Butler (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 210; Re Mc-
Kinnnon (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 20; Re Stillman (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 601). Also,
costs can be used as a punitive measure, and the court has power to order a party to
pay all the costs of his opponent as a penalty for misconduct in the litigation itself.
See, e.g., Niznick v. Johnson (1961), 34 W.W.R. 101; Prager v. Kobayashi, [1968]
1 O.R. 694; Vanderclay Development Co. v. Inducon Engineering Ltd., [1969] 1 O.R. 41.
138AThese costs are also sometimes called "solicitor and his client costs". In
either case, the reference is to costs on an indemnity basis. See M. Orkin, The Law of
Costs (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1968) at 2.
139 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. (1967), 386 U.S. 714 at
717-19. For a discussion of the American position, see A. Homburger, State Class
Actions and the Federal Rule (1971), 71 Colum. L. Rev. 609 at 647-651; A. Hom-
burger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of America (1974),
23 Buff. L. Rev. 343 at 373-75. For a comparison between the English and American
systems, see A. Goodhart, Current Judicial Reform in England (1952), 27 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 395 at 405-6.
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Court. Most actions are brought for money claims, and judgment for the
plaintiff in these jurisdictions will usually be for a substantial sum. The
amount not covered by party and party costs is normally but a fraction of
the judgment and the plaintiff will receive the balance of the judgment after
his lawyer has deducted the excess. 14°
The costs rules as they apply to class actions, particularly in the con-
sumer area, are significant in a number of respects. First, the rule that costs
follow the event is especially valuable given the potential for abuse in the
aggregation of numerous claims effected by the procedure. Though in-
dividually the claims might be small, in combination they could threaten the
defendant with a massive liability. Without the check on unmeritorious pro-
ceedings which the costs sanction provides, there is a danger that class
actions of dubious merit will be brought with the object of coercing the
defendant into making a substantial monetary settlement. Notwithstanding
that the claim is questionable, the defendant could have a strong incentive
for reaching such a compromise. A business of modest size might simply
not be able to run the risk of defeat in face of a claim which, if established,
is large enough to destroy the enterprise. Also, adverse publicity surround-
ing the action could prove almost as damaging. An isolated claim will nor-
mally go unnoticed, but a class action with the novel features of multiple
claimants and large potential liability could easily attract considerable atten-
tion, particularly if consumers constitute the class and the defendant or its
product is well known. If there is no media interest in the action initially,
it does not require very much ingenuity for a handful of enterprising class
members to generate their own publicity for the cause. They clearly do not
intend to influence the court when it finally comes to determine the claims
on the merits or even to solicit support from class members who previously
had been unaware of the proceedings. Rather, their object is to put pressure
on the defendant to reach a satisfactory settlement, the implicit promise
being that the injurious activities will stop once he does so.141
140 Strictly, party and party costs belong to the party to whom they are awarded,
though the solicitor will be entitled to have them charged with payment of the costs
due to him (Campbell v. Campbell and Lewis, [1941] 1 All E.R. 274; Re Fuld, [1967)
2 All E.R. 649).
141 The danger of abuse appears to be recognized in the Ontario Rules of Prac-
tice. Rule 373 provides that "Security for costs may be ordered, . . . (f) where the
action is brought by a nominal plaintiff; ... (h) where an action is brought on behalf
of a class and the plaintiff is not possessed of sufficient property to answer the costs
of the action, and it appears that the plaintiff is put forward or instigated to sue by
others." However, the plaintiff is not a nominal plaintiff within sub-rule (f) if he has
an actual interest in the subject of the dispute (McAllister v. O'Meara (1896), 17 P.R.
176). Also, for the purpose of sub-rule (h), the court will not infer that the plaintiff
was put forward or instigated to sue by others from the fact that members of the
class will share in a successful outcome, and direct evidence on the issue is required
(Ostrander v. Niagara Helicopters Ltd. (1975), 4 O.R. (2d) 388.) See also, Rickert v.
B3ritton (1912), 3 O.W.N. 1008. The impact of adverse publicity as a deterrent to dis-
honest business conduct has been noted. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson (1968), 43
F.R.D. 472; J. Tydings, Fair Play for Consumers, Trial, February 1970, 37; R. Dole,
Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1968),
Duke L.I. 1101 at 1103; A. Travers & J. Landers, The Consumer Class Action (1970),
18 U. of Ka. L. Rev. 811 at 814.
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5. Inadequacy of Class Costs Recovery
The next aspect of costs in the class action context concerns the gap
between party and party costs and solicitor and own client costs. As noted
already, the discrepancy is not significant in most actions in the County Court
and the Supreme Court because the typical judgment on a money claim is
for a substantial sum, and the costs deficiency represents only a small pro-
portion. By contrast, the individual claims of class members in a class action,
including the claim of the plaintiff himself, are often quite small, particularly
in an action for a consumer class. Indeed, the claims of individual members
may well be so small that were it not for the class action there would be no
litigation at all since separate actions could scarcely be justified. When the
claim of the representative plaintiff is not large enough to warrant the trouble
and expense of a separate action, the recovery for a class action plaintiff
will in most cases be quite inadequate to meet the costs of his own lawyer
after taking into account the costs the defendant will pay. The plight of the
plaintiff is even worse if the class claims nothing but declaratory or
injunctive relief.
The problem of the inadequacy of the plaintiff's cost recovery in a
class action is aggravated by the fact that the proceeding is usually much
more expensive to conduct than the ordinary action. Despite the long history
of the procedure, many aspects are still rather unsettled, and in a claim of
any magnitude, the defendant will almost certainly challenge the propriety
of the proceedings. Apart from having to anticipate and answer the pro-
cedural objections of the defendant, the unusually large dimensions of the
dispute will create administrative problems for the plaintiff's lawyer quite
different from anything encountered in ordinary litigation. The taxing officer
will recognize those complexities on the taxation of the lawyer's bill for party
and party costs,142 but no matter how generous the allowance, while the
present practice of denying a complete indemnity remains, the plaintiff who
claims only a small sum will inevitably finish out of pocket.
In actions for pecuniary relief, the sum recovered from the defendant
for distribution among the class is an obvious fund for meeting whatever
costs are not paid by the defendant. The excess costs could be made a first
charge on the judgment amount, with the class receiving the balance. How-
ever, it is not entirely clear whether the court can order that the plaintiff's
14 2 In Ontario the amount of costs the taxing officer can allow for preparation for
trial is fixed by a tariff. However, where the preparation for trial was unusually difficult
the officer can compensate the party by allowing a greater fee for counsel at trial.
The amount of the counsel fee is within the taxing officer's discretion. (McCrone v.
Brown, [1960] O.W.N. 287; Clarke v. A.-G. for Ont. (No. 2), E1967] 2 O.R. 393).
See also, Re Solicitor (1920), 17 O.L.R. 452, aff'd 48 O.L.R. 363.
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costs be paid out of the class recovery.143 Even if the practice were author-
ized, it would not help a class plaintiff who sought merely declaratory or
injunctive relief.
Costs are a real impediment to bringing a class action if whatever
amount the plaintiff recovers will not be sufficient to meet his own costs,
even after taking the costs paid by the defendant into account.144 A practice
that virtually assures the plaintiff that, though successful, he will finish out
of pocket hardly provides an incentive to sue. The joinder of several class
members as plaintiffs does not necessarily provide a solution for if their
separate claims are small, the combined recoveries will still be inadequate
to meet the costs deficiency. Few people can afford to set principles so high
that they will embark on litigation in the face of certain economic loss. This
is especially so among low and middle income earners, those affected most
by the types of business misconduct for which the class action is often the
only practicable remedy. The economically disadvantaged simply cannot
afford to litigate. A separate action is quite beyond reach, and the prospects
of recovery are not really enhanced if one brings a class action for all,
because those represented will equally lack the ability and incentive to make
any contribution to the cost.145
6. Legal Aid
Legal aid could bridge the costs gap by meeting the entire costs liability
143 No plaintiff suing on behalf of a class could safely expect that in the event
of success the court would allow him to take from the amount recovered for the class
the difference between his solicitor and client costs and party and party costs. In the
United States, where as a rule the losing party will not be ordered to pay costs, the
lawyer for a representative plaintiff has been allowed his costs out of the recovery
for the class (Buell v. Kanawha Lumber Corp. (1912), 201 F. 762; Gamboni v.
County of Otoe (1954), 159 Neb. 417, 67 N.W. 2d 489; A. Homburger, State Class
Actions and the Federal Rule (1971), 71 Colum. L. Rev. 609 at 649). The situation in
Canada is not so clear. In Shabinsky v. Horwitz (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 318 (Ont.
H.C.), the plaintiff recovered a trust fund on behalf of a class and was allowed the
difference between solicitor and client costs and party and party costs from the fund.
This is a sensible approach but it is of questionable validity. The court did not mention
and appears to have overlooked a number of authorities that establish that solicitor
and client costs will only be awarded from a fund where the fund is not sufficient to
meet the claims of class members in full. See Thomas v. Jones (1860), 1 Dr. & Sm.
134, 62 E.R. 329; in Re New Zealand Midland Rlwy. Co., [1901] 2 Ch. 357 at 367;
In re W.C. Home & Sons Ltd., [1906] 1 Ch. 271. The rule was developed for creditors'
actions. In Montreal Trust Co. v. Abitibi Power and Paper Co., [1943] O.W.N. 468,
a bondholders' action, Kellock, J.A. acknowledged that it was somewhat illogical that
the amount of recoverable costs should depend on whether or not the fund received
from the defendant was sufficient to satisfy the claims of class members in full, but
felt bound nevertheless to apply the rule.
144 The plaintiffs in Chastain were fortunate to be represented by a public interest
lawyer who was prepared to accept for his fee whatever costs could be recovered from
the defendant. (As reported to the author by Mr. Ian Waddell of the British Columbia
Bar, counsel for the plaintiffs in Chastain.)
145 T. Eovaldi and J. Gestrin, Justice For Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress
(1971), 66 N.W. U.L. Rev. 281 at 284; T. Eovaldi, Private Consumer Substantive
and Procedural Remedies Under State Law (1970), 15 Antitrust Bull. 255 at 270;
Comments, Class Actions For Consumer Protection (1972), 7 Harvard Civil Rights -
Civil Liberties Rev. 601 at 602.
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of the representative plaintiff to his own lawyer. Schemes for legal aid exist
in the various provinces,'46 but in Ontario, if not in other provinces, class
action funding will not be granted.147 This restriction is hard to justify, espe-
cially since the class action will often be the only procedure that can bring
relief to the very persons whom legal aid is intended to benefit. Lacking the
resources to meet the certain cost burden of a class action, and disqualified
nevertheless from legal aid, the prospective class action litigant will have no
avenue for redress unless he can enlist the support of a lawyer who is pre-
pared to accept whatever is recovered from the defendant for costs, assuming
the action succeeds, and who will forego his fee altogether, and possibly
his expenses, if the action fails. Understandably, few lawyers may be pre-
pared to act on these terms, and in one jurisdiction at least the arrangement
might not even be valid and enforceable.148
7. Costs Recommendations
The inadequacy of costs recovery from the defendant constitutes a
deterrent to a class action which cannot be justified when set against the
public advantage to be gained from the mass adjudication of numerous
claims which the procedure can achieve. The problem is particularly acute
when the claim is for declaratory or injunctive relief, or when the action is
for pecuniary relief, but the individual claims are small. Three solutions to
the problem are suggested, and any one or more of them could be appro-
priate in the particular case, depending on the circumstances. First, class
actions should be brought within the legal aid scheme so that the class action
plaintiff is placed in the same position as a plaintiff in ordinary litigation as
regards eligibility for aid. Second, the courts should be given a discretion
to award the plaintiff a complete indemnity against the defendant for all
costs and expenses reasonably incurred in bringing the action. This will
require a practice amendment since it is doubtful whether the court now has
power to make such an order unless the defendant has misconducted himself
in the proceedings. 49 The justification for special costs rules in consumer
class litigation will be examined at the conclusion of this section of the
article. Third, when a fund of money is recovered from the defendant, the
court should have power to order that the fund bear the plaintiff's costs
146 E.g., in Ontario. See The Legal Aid Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 239. Legal aid is
not necessarily entirely free as the client may be required to contribute to the costs,
depending on his financial situation (s. 16(3)).
14'Regulation 39(b)(i) of The Legal Aid Regulations, R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 557,
provides that legal aid may be refused if the applicant is one of a number of persons
having the same interests under such circumstances that one or more may sue or
defend on behalf of or for the benefit of all. A Task Force on legal aid in Ontario
has concluded that with few exceptions the practice has been to refuse leave under
regulation 39, and has recommended that legal aid funding be provided in appropriate
cases for group proceedings, including class actions (The Report of the Task Force
on Legal Aid, Chapter 11 (1974)).
148In Ontario (The Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 441, s. 30). See W. Williston,
The Contingent Fee in Canada (1968), 6 Alta. L. Rev. 184.
14 9 See note 138, supra.
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insofar as they are not covered by the costs paid by the defendant, and
before the fund is distributed among the class.
The final aspect of costs that has special significance for class actions,
particularly the consumer variety, is the rule that costs follow the event.
Costs for the victor in litigation compensate for his trouble and expense in
vindicating his position, though not always completely. As well, the threat
of costs liability is supposed to deter the bringing or raising of unmeritorious
claims or defenses. The threat, however, may well discourage litigation by a
party who has a sound and valid claim or defence (though ex hypothesi its
strength must be problematical) because he simply cannot afford to run the
risk of defeat. The outcome of litigation can never be entirely certain, and
no matter how strong the case might appear, no prudent lawyer will assure
success for his client in a serious contest. The costs of a party's own lawyer
intensifies the dilemma as the loser will have to pay these costs in addition
to those of his opponent.
Persons of limited means are therefore likely to be discouraged from
litigating altogether when faced with an adversary determined not to
capitulate, and the possibility of liability for two sets of costs should the
action fail. Legal aid will not entirely allay the costs fear for the scheme
provides just the costs the litigant would otherwise have to pay his own
lawyer. It does not pay the costs that will be awarded against the party
should he be unsuccessful. 50
For claims of small amount the proper forum is a small claims court,
the jurisdiction of which is normally limited to $400.00.151 These tribunals
are intended to provide an expeditious, inexpensive and informal machinery
for adjudicating disputes involving small sums of money. 52 To preserve these
characteristics, lawyer participation in the proceedings has been discouraged
by allowing only minimal recoverable costs, the assumption being that the
litigants can conduct proceedings themselves, aided where necessary by the
court and its officials. Legal aid does not usually extend to small claims
courts, 5 3 and the summary nature of the jurisdiction probably explains the
exclusion from the scheme.
The existence of small claims courts might suggest that a broader class
action remedy for consumers is not really necessary. Why, it might be argued,
can no significant recoveries be expected unless a class action can be brought
when courts are available that have been created for the specific purpose of
150 The regulations provide for payment out of the Legal Aid Fund of the costs
awarded against a legally aided party (The Legal Aid Refulations, R.S.O. 1970, Reg.
557, ss. 129 to 131), but only one application for payment has been successful (Ontario
Law Reform Commission, Report on Administration of Ontario Courts, Part MI at
156 (1973))X
151 The Small Claims Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 439, ss. 54, 196.
16 2 McRuer Commission Report, Report No. 1, Vol. 2, 621 (1968); Ontario Law
Reform Commission, Report on Administration of Ontario Courts, Part M at 343
(1973).
153 The grant of assistance is discretionary (The Legal Aid Act, R.S.O., c.239,
s.13(b)(ii), and in practice is rarely made. The Task Force on Legal Aid has recom-
mended that duty counsel should be assigned to Small Claims Courts to provide
litigants with preliminary advice and assist in presenting a case (The Report of the
Task Force on Legal Aid, 67 (1974)).
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adjudicating on small claims? Are these tribunals not sufficient to secure
redress for small claimants? The argument, however, is not sound, and for
two reasons. It exaggerates the efficacy of small claims courts in the con-
sumer context, and it does not answer entirely the several grounds advanced
for the class action by consumer advocates.
Small claims courts in theory offer the litigant with a small claim an
informal, expeditious and inexpensive adjudication of his dispute. In prac-
tice, however, the tribunals fall rather short of this ideal. The deficiencies
of the jurisdiction are well described elsewhere, 54 and it is sufficient to note
some of them. For example, the place and times of sitting of the courts often
effectively restrict their accessibility for persons who find it difficult to travel
long distances or who cannot afford to leave their job to attend. Also, the
tribunals do not advertise their existence and so many prospective litigants
will never consider taldng proceedings, even supposing they understood their
rights had been infringed.
Despite the summary character of small claims tribunals, the consumer
claimant who does decide to sue faces some obstacles. The first is costs. The
rule that costs usually follow the event is applied in small claims courts, and
though recoverable costs are quite low, they can still be substantial enough
to deter the claimant with a just claim from litigating. Also, legal aid is not
available in small claims courts. Finally, the courts are equipped to deal
only with the straightforward case. They simply do not have the procedural
machinery for properly deciding technical and complex factual questions
of the type that can arise in consumer litigation, nor do the judges have the
legal skills required for determining novel and difficult points of law. The
County Court or the Supreme Court is the appropriate arena for such disputes.
But even if the existing hindrances to suing in small claims courts
were abolished altogether, of the consumers injured by the misconduct of a
particular business enterprise, there would probably still be comparatively
few who would trouble to bring proceedings themselves, particularly if the
individual claims were quite small. This is a significant consideration given
the potential of a consumer class action as a deterrent to business wrongdoing.
In the realm of private litigation as opposed to remedial action initiated
by some specially constituted governmental agency, 55 the class action is by
far the most effective method for securing relief for consumers who have
been damaged by an identical deceptive practice perpetrated by the same
154 See, for example, G. Adams, The Small Claims Court and the Adversary
Process (1973), 51 Can. Bar Rev. 583; T. Ison, Small Claims (1972), 35 Mod. L.
Rev. 18; P. Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation (1969),
44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 115; P. Schrag, On Her Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the
Consumer in New York City (1971), 80 Yale L.L 1529; National Institute for Con-
sumer Justice, Redress of Consumer Grievances, 13-25 (1973).
15 Citizen disillusionment with the ineffectiveness of governmental agencies in
enforcing business standards has been widely noted. See, e.g., H. Kalven and M. Rosen-
field, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit (1941), 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684
at 714; A. Travers and J. Landers, The Consumer Class Action (1970), 18 U. of Ka.
L. Rev. 811; M. Trebilcock, Private Law Remedies for Misleading Advertising (1972),
21 U. of T. L.i. 1. But compare, Note, New York City's Alternatives to the Consumer
Class Action: The Government as Robin Hood (1972), 9 Harv. J. Legislation 301, a
commentary on the work of the Department of Consumer Affairs in New York City
in enforcing the City's Consumer Protection Law of 1969.
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manufacturer or distributor. 5 6 First, the action will be brought in a higher
court, where the quality of judicial decision-making both on questions of
fact and law will be superior to that normally encountered in small claims
tribunals. The aggregation of claims will raise the amount in controversy
above the jurisdictional limit of the lowest courts, and necessitate an action
at a higher level, almost certainly in the Supreme Court. The common ques-
tion, however, is the same in whatever court the claim is determined. But an
action that was not practicable in the small claims jurisdiction in view of
the complexity of the issues raised becomes a worthwhile exercise in the
Supreme Court when the rights of hundreds and perhaps thousands of per-
sons depend on the outcome. Second, where individual claims are small, a
successful class action will bring compensation to more consumers than
would be the case if the action were not brought, notwithstanding that dis-
tribution of the judgment amount may present problems if the class is large
and the members cannot readily be identified. Where individual claims are small,
few, if any, class members would have brought an action for themselves.
In the consumer area, the class action, by aggregating numerous separate
claims, performs three valuable functions. First, as noted above, the action
will secure a wider spread of compensation for the consumers affected than
would be recovered if they had to sue separately. Second, the action compels
the dishonest businessman to disgorge the profits he has received from his
improper practices. Left to their own initiative, few consumers will sue at
all, and so without a class action, the combined recovery will represent just
a fraction of the total profit gained by the defendant from his activities.
Indeed, the prospect of having to meet individual claims, save perhaps for
a few insubstantial amounts, is usually so slight that the threat of litigation
is simply no deterrent to the unscrupulous manufacturer or supplier who is
prepared to employ any strategem, no matter how unethical, to sell his
product.157 The collective remedy provided by the class action could prove
to be the deterrent that is needed. Indeed, deterrence is the third justification
for the class action. A dishonest trader might not be overly sensitive about
adverse publicity surrounding litigation against him, but an action that poses
a potential liability towards a class possibly numbering hundreds or even
thousands is another matter. A threat of this magnitude may well provide
the check that will stop the businessman with fraudulent inclinations from
carrying out his plans.158
The class action for damages, when employed to obtain the redress of
consumer grievances, is a procedure of considerable social importance. It is
perhaps the most effective private remedy that has been created to combat
large-scale business malpractice. At a single stroke a class action can secure
compensation for hundreds and possibly thousands of consumers damaged
by the improper conduct of the same business enterprise. In addition, ju'dg-
ment in the action will warn both the particular defendant and others in
business that any repetition of the behaviour will likely bring the same conse-
quence. A successful consumer class action will thus yield benefits that extend
far beyond the particular class members who were represented. However,
the full potential of a damages class action, both in securing mass compensa-
tion for consumers and in deterring business misconduct, will never be
realized with the existing costs situation. On the assumption that in future a
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class action for damages will be allowed, the costs rules hardly offer any
encouragement to consumers to invoke the procedure against the business
malefactor. Two aspects of the costs rules will discourage consumers from
utilizing the class action, particularly when the individual claims are small.
First, the combined judgment amount and costs recovery from the defendant
will not meet the plaintiff's costs liability to his own lawyer. Second, the
plaintiff will have to pay the defendant's costs if the action fails. Though a
consumer claim may have merit, success cannot be assured, and so faced
with the possibility of a double costs burden the individual willing to sue for
a class will be rare indeed.
Recommendations on the first costs problem were made earlier.'"9 The
recommendation for the second is rather more radical. It is proposed that
the usual rule that costs follow the event be modified to the extent that the
court would have no power to award costs to the defendant. Thus, if a
plaintiff won the action for the class, the defendant would have to pay costs
in the normal way. However, if the plaintiff lost the action, the court would
make no order for costs at all, leaving the defendant to pay his own costs
of the litigation. This recommendation is certainly a departure from the
traditional costs rule, but it is felt to be justified by the special social sig-
nificance of the class action procedure in the consumer context. 59A In con-
15, 'The Rule 23 class action 'as a way of redressing group wrongs is a semi-
public remedy administered by the lawyer in private practice' - a cross between ad-
ministrative action and private litigation" (Dolgow v. Anderson (1968), 43 F.R.D.
472 at 481, per Weinstein, J.).
157 A consumer research study conducted by the University of Pennsylvania Law
School concluded: "In many instances fraudulent operators are careful to avoid
cheating individuals out of large sums of money because they realize that 'no one
billed only fifty dollars is going to pay a lawyer to get his money back.' Thus the
only cases lawyers are willing to handle are those brought either by the unusual in-
dividual who will pay more than the amount of his claim in order to see justice done,
or those defrauded out of amounts large enough to justify the expenditure of legal
fees. The number of consumers having no redress because the amount lost is not com-
mensurate with the attorney's fee constitutes the vast majority" (Comment, Translating
Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection (1966), 114
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 395 at 409).
158 National Institute For Consumer Justice, Redress of Consumer Grievances,
29 (1973); Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, Class Action Study, 30
(1974); A. Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of
America (1974), 23 Buff. L. Rev. 343 at 379. Note, Managing the Large Class Action:
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1973), 87 Harv. L. Rev. 426 at 455.
159 Supra, note text at D7.
159A The point has been acknowledged by the Ontario Task Force on Legal Aid.
Of the costs of group proceedings, including class actions, the Task Force states:-
" . . we are emboldened to suggest at this point that it is no longer self evident that
costs should follow the event. So much of today's litigation involves contests between
private individuals and either the state or some public authority or large corporation
that the threat of having costs awarded against a losing party operates unequally as a
deterrent. The threat of costs undoubtedly works heavily against groups who seek to
take public or litigious initiatives in the enforcement of statutory or common law
rights when the members of the group have no particular or individual private interest
at stake. We would therefore propose an amendment to The Legal Aid Act casting
upon a successful respondent in any such proceedings the burden of satisfying the
court or tribunal before costs are awarded in his favour that no public issue of
substance was involved in the litigation or that the proceedings were frivolous or
vexations" (Report of The Task Force on Legal Aid, 100 (1974)).
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sumer litigation the defendant is invariably a business enterprise with far
superior financial resources than those of the plaintiff. A corporate defendant
can absorb litigation costs that would ruin an individual. The one-way costs
rule proposed will help redress this imbalance between plaintiff individual
and corporate defendant by removing the fear of the disastrous financial
consequences of defeat. Admittedly, there is a danger that with the abolition
of the costs sanction the class action procedure will be abused, and actions
without substantial merit will be brought for the sole purpose of forcing the
defendant to settle. To reduce, if not to eliminate, this danger, it is pro-
posed that the plaintiff will not qualify for the costs immunity unless the
court first certifies that the action is brought in good faith and the claim
appears to have merit. The court will be required to determine this question
within a short time after the commencement of the action.
There is some precedent for the costs proposal in United States practice.
In most American jurisdictions the parties in ordinary litigation normally
bear their own costs but, under the Clayton Antitrust Act, 60 the court may
award costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, to a plaintiff who succeeds
in a suit brought to recover damages for a violation of the anti-trust laws.
There is no costs recovery for the defendant if the action fails.' 61
E. UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE
The class action procedure has been developed furthest in the United
States, particularly since the introduction of a new class action rule for
Federal courts in 1966.162 In that short period there has been a large increase
in the volume of class action litigation,16 3 with proceedings being brought
on behalf of such diverse groups as "all subscribers of business telephones
in New York County, all Master Charge credit card holders similarly situated,
all consumers of gasoline in a 'given' state or states, all homeowners in the
United States, and even all people in the United States.' 6 4 Experience with
100 Clayton Act §4, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970).
101 Other federal statutes in the United States that direct the allowance of at-
torneys' fees to a successful plaintiff without corresponding rights to a prevailing
defendant are referred to by A. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule(1971), 71 Colum. L. Rev. 609 at 654.
162Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. A number of states have adopted class
action provisions substantially the same as the Federal rule, eg., Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Washington. See A. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule
(1971), 71 Colum. L. Rev. 609 at 631. Massachusetts has since joined the list.
10sThe extent of the increase is hard to determine as complete records of class
actions have not always been kept, and some reports seem to be exaggerated. For
instance, according to the American College of Trial Lawyers, in one Federal district
alone, the Southern District of New York, more than .1,300 class actions had been
commenced to the end of 1971 (Report of Special Committee, 13 (1972). But it has
been pointed out that this number was less than 5% of all actions brought in the
Southern District during the period (A. Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest
in the United States of America (1974), 23 Buff. L. Rev. 343 at 366). On the other
hand, the Commerce Committee of the United States Senate has reported that in the
District Court for the District of Columbia the increase in class action filings is far
greater than the rate for all civil actions (Class Action Study, 5 (1974)).
164 Report of Special Committee of American Trial Lawyers, 6 (March 1972)
(with supporting citations).
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the new procedure has proved extremely controversial, and has spawned a
vast outpouring of professional writing from both enthusiasts and de-
tractors1 65 Supporters maintain that the procedure is the most effective
weapon yet devised by which the private citizen can attack business abuse,1 6
while opponents condemn it with such labels as "legalized blackmail, ' 71 '
a potential "engine of destruction"' 68 and a "Frankenstein monster."'0 9
The critics admit the necessity for checking business misconduct but claim
this objective can be accomplished by methods that produce less distortion
to the adjudicative process and to the roles traditionally assigned judges and
lawyers than is caused by the class action. They contend that in endeavouring
to attain the goals set for the new procedure by its creators, the courts are
being compelled to depart from conventional judicial techniques and to
sacrifice substantive principle in ways that Congress has not authorized. 70
According to the critics, the essential vice of the modem class action
is the attempt to use the procedure to recover damages. There is less ob-
1 5 Hence this observation of the Court of Appeals in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
(1973), 479 F. 2d 1005 at 1018:- ". . . there has followed such a quantity of com-
ment pro and con on the questions of law we are to decide in this case, by law pro-
fessors, by judges, and especially by lawyers specializing in class actions, expressed
in numerous articles, opinions and published speeches that the task of even attempting
to enumerate all of these for purposes of documentation is too much for us." For
bibliographies of class actions, see (1971), 26 The Record of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York 412; Los Angeles County Law Library, Class Actions: A
Selective Bibliography (1974).
166 See, e.g., J. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions
(1960), 9 Buff. L. Rev. 433; A. Travers and J. Landers, The Consumer Class Action
(1970), 18 U. of Ka. L. Rev. 811; R. Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under the Uni-
form Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1968) Duke L. J. 1101 at 1102-3; 3. Starrs, The
Consumer Class Action (1969), 49 B.U.L. Rev. 211; A. Pomerantz, New Develop-
ments in Class Actions - Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded? (1970), 25 Bus.
Lawyer 1259; NA. Patrick and M. Cherner, Rule 23 and the Class Action for Damages:
A Reply to the Report of the American College of Trial Lawyers, (1973), 29 Bus. Lawyer
1097; Dolgow v. Anderson (1966), 43 F.R.D. 472 at 487; Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.
(1967), 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P. 2d 732 at 746; Vasquez v. Superior Court of San
Joaquin County (1971), 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 484 P. 2d 964 at 968; Miles v. N. J. Motors
(1972), 32 Ohio App. 2d 350, 291 N.E. 2d 758 at 766. The Ad Hoc Committee on
Consumer Class Actions of the American Bar Association has recommended the
adoption of this resolution, "That no restrictive changes should be made at this time
in the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or in similar state
rules, and any consumer class action legislation adopted by a state in the immediate
future should be patterned after Rule 23" (1974).
1 67 M. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits (1971), 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1 at 9.
168 Smith v. Beneficial Finance Co. (D.NJ. filed June 28, 1971) (oral opinion),
quoted in Report of Special Committee of American College of Trial Lawyers 4 (March,
1972).
169 In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1968), 391 F. 2d 555 at 572, Judge Lumbard,
dissenting, gave this label to the controversy, which the majority of the court had
sanctioned for class action treatment
17OEisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1973), 479 F. 2d 1005 at 1013, 1018. W. Simon,
Class Actions - Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction (1972), 55 F.R.D. 375 at 386
(a shift from "compensation to confiscation").
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jection when the object is declaratory and injunctive relief for the class. 171
By contrast, damages claims are said to impose tremendous administrative
burdens on an already overwhelmed court system. 7 2 Administrative prob-
lems aside, opponents of the procedure argue that in many cases a damages
award constitutes a penalty quite out of proportion to the gravity of the
defendant's business misconduct and the benefits gained by individual class
members. With an aggregation of a multitude of separate claims, liability
under a class action judgment can be quite massive, yet the claims are often
for such small amounts that many class members never receive any payment.
The damages distribution is incomplete because class members are not
readily identifiable, and the individual claims are not large enough to war-
rant doing anything but publish notices in an attempt to bring the judgment
to their attention. For instance, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, an anti-trust
treble damages action, the class as originally constituted consisted of some
6,000,000 odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange, of whom only
about 2,000,000 could be readily identified. The average damages a class
member would recover if the action succeeded would be a mere $3.90. 3
Even though class members are identified, and are sent individual notices,
comparatively few will respond in many cases.'1 4
1. Fluid Class Recovery
In quantifying damages against a class action defendant, a number of
American courts have calculated the total loss inflicted by the defendant,
the damages to the class as a whole, and have purposely disregarded the
fact that a large part if the award will never be distributed to class members.
This approach has been called the fluid class theory of recovery. 175 It is at
variance with the traditional view that damages are intended to compensate
the victims of wrongful conduct for their injury and loss. By contrast, the
fluid recovery theory acknowledges that many of the persons whom the
award is supposed to benefit will not get compensation, the liability of the
defendant being fixed by reference to the estimated number of members of
171 Report of Special Committee of American College of Trial Lawyers, 2 at 29
(March, 1972); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin ((1973), 479 F. 2d 1005 at 1019.
172W. Burger, The State of the Judiciary - 1970 (1970), 56 A.B.A.J. 929 at
933; Hackett v. General Host Corp. (1972), 455 F. 2d 618 at 626.
173 (1974), 94 S.Ct. 2140. The Supreme Court's ruling in Eisen on the requirement
of notice to the class means that if the action is to continue, the class as originally
constituted will need to be redefined so as to substantially reduce its size. See notes
74, 75, supra.
174 E.g., in Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp. (1962), 201 F. Supp. 934, a
securities action that resulted in a 5.3 million dollars settlement fund, some 150,000
claims were mailed to class members, Transitron stockholders who purchased stock
before February 20, 1962. 50,000 claims were returned, and 33,000 were ultimately
approved.
175 For a history of the development of this theory, see M. Rosenfeld, The Impact
of Class Actions on Corporate and Securities Law (1972), Duke LJ. 1167 at 1179.
See also, News and Comment, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report, No. 559, A-22
(1972); A. Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions Under
Rule 23(b)(3) (1972), 54 F.R.D. 501 at 507.
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the class rather than to the members who will establish their claim. In the
words of the Circuit Court in Eisen:176
All the difficulties of management are supposed to disappear once the 'fluid
recovery' procedure is adopted. The claims of the individual members of the
class become of little consequence. If the damages to be paid were only the
aggregate of the sums found due to individual members of the class, after their
claims had been processed, it is fairly obvious that in cases like Eisen the ex-
penses of giving the notices required by amended Rule 23 and the general costs
of administration of the action would exceed the amount due to the few members
of the class who filed claims and the individual members of the class would get
nothing.
But if the 'class as a whole' is or can be substituted for the individual members
of the class as claimants, then the number of claims filed is of no consequence
and the amount found to be due wil be enormous, affording, we are told, plenty
of money to pay all expenses, including counsel fees, and a residue so large as
to justify reduction of the odd-lot differential for years in the future, for the
benefit of all traders, past, present and future, who are to be considered to be
members of 'the class as a whole.'
The theory of fluid class recovery is premised on the expectation that a
large number of class members will not claim the damages assessed for the
class as a whole,177 thus leaving a substantial part of the award undisposed
of. In dealing with this residue, courts in the United States have worked by
analogy with the cy pros doctrine applied to charitable gifts in the law of
trusts. If a donor has clearly expressed an intention to benefit charity, the
gift will not be allowed to fail because the mode, if specified, cannot be
executed, but the law will substitute another mode as near as possible to the
mode specified.17 8 The following comment from an advocate of the fluid
class recovery theory explains the application of the cy pros approach to
damage distribution:- - 7
In many class actions the wrongdoing is clear. Defendants have exacted huge
sums through wrongs perpetrated on millions of people. However, the usual
smallness of each individual claim presents a problem. Either inertia (especially
in our affluent society), or the often difficult task of gathering up proofs of
claim, tends to make the injured class member unwilling or unable to pick up
his share of the recovery effected by the volunteer plaintiff. In such situations,
should the class action be dismissed, at least as to those who do not seek
recovery?
Two schools of judicial thought are contending for opposite answers. The tradi-
tionalist view is for dismissing class action in such cases on the principle that
where members of the class do not claim their damages, the action should be
dismissed. This would seem to be the inevitable consequence of the classic
principle that the class member is really a plaintiff, albeit not individually named,
and if he cannot or does not bother to present his claim, then the defendant
should not be compelled to pay.
'
7 6 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1973), 479 F. 2d 1005 at 1017.
177 In Eisen, the problem of determining total damages was minimal because an
accurate evaluation of individual damages could be made without individual proof of
injury from the defendant's records and from the repetitious nature of the transactions
kNote, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin - Fluid Recovery, Minihearings and Notice in
Class Actions (1974), 54 B.U.L. Rev. 111 at 117).
178 Halsbury's, Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 4, 317.
179 A. Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions - Has Their Death Knell
Been Sounded? (1970), 25 Bus. Lawyer 1259 at 1260.
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But another emerging school of judicial philosophy takes a less orthodox and
more dynamic view of the animating spirit of the class action and its embodiment,
Rule 23. The adherents of this school hold that more important than precise
restitution to the particular persons aggrieved is the prophylactic purpose of
Rule 23. Proceeding on this premise, they hold that where wrongs are done to
masses of people who for one or another reason are unable or unwilling to
present their claims, nonetheless the wrongdoer must be made to disgorge. Per-
mitting the wrongdoer, they say, to retain the fruits of their wrong would
qncourage preying on the public. How then compel a defendant to pay in spite
of the fact that there is no one to claim the payment?
The genius of the law in fashioning remedies to cope with problems has long
been one of its proudest boasts. In approaching this dilemma, it once again
exhibits its ingenuity.
If precise restitution to the victims is impracticable or impossible, the judges
reason, then the recovery should go to some broad category which, by and large,
includes the aggrieved members of the class. In this fashion, even if the injured
person is not avenged, at least the wrongdoer is deterred. Thus they implement
the declared purpose of Rule 23: to discourage wrongdoing.
The trial court in Eisen cited three cases as "respectable precedent"
for fluid class recovery.' 80 Though the cases were distinguished on appeal,
the Second Circuit holding that they provided no precedent for fluid class
assessment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, they do demonstrate
the concept in the operation. The first case, Bebchick v. Public Utilities Com-
mission,'8' was not technically a class action and Rule 23 was not in question,
but nevertheless the fluid class principle was applied. The transit company
of the District of Columbia was found to have increased bus fares without
authority. The fares could not be refunded as those who paid the fares
could not be identified. The court therefore directed that the amount of the
illegally charged fares be set up in the books of the transit company to be
used "to benefit bus-riders as a class in pending or future rate proceedings."
In State of West Virginia v. Pfizer Co., 82 a consolidation of some 60 actions
known as the Drug Cases, various states and municipalities recovered $100
million from a number of pharmaceutical companies for violations of the
anti-trust laws relating to price-fixing. Of the recovery, $37 million was
made available to meet claims of some estimated 150 million consumers,
plus attorney's fees and costs, and the balance paid to the states and
municipalities represented to be used on public health facilities. However, as
noted by the appeal court in Eisen, the court fixed the damages on a fluid
class basis following a compromise of the proceedings and not by determina-
tion at a trial of the action. Finally, in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 88 the class
alleged overcharges in taxi fares. On demurrer, the California Supreme
Court upheld the class action. The court evidently anticipated that in-
dividuals who had been damaged by the alleged overcharge would ultimately
have to prove their separate claim, but this did not become necessary as the
action was later settled, the defendant agreeing to reduce future taxi fares
until the past overcharges were repaid to the riding public. The Second
180 52 F.R.D. 253 at 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
181 (1963), 318 F. 2d 187 (D.C. Circ.), cert. denied (1963), 373 U.S. 913.
182 (1970), 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd (1971), 440 F. 2d 1079 (2d Circ.),
cert. denied (1971), 404 U.S. 871.
183 (1967), 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P. 2d 732.
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Circuit in Eisen distinguished Daar on several grounds, one being that the
state class action statute in Daar was in very different terms from Federal
Rule 23.184
The Second Circuit in Eisen held against fluid class recovery in the
strongest language: ". . . even if amended Rule 23 could be read so as to
permit any such fantastic procedure, the courts would have to reject it as
an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of due process of law. But
as it now reads, amended Rule 23 contemplates and provides for no such
procedure. Nor can amended Rule 23 be construed or interpreted in such
fashion as to permit such procedure. We hold the fluid recovery concept
and practice to be illegal, inadmissible as a solution of the manageability
problems of class actions and wholly improper."' 8 5 The Second Circuit dis-
missed the action without prejudice to its continuance insofar as the plaintiff
asserted an individual claim against the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme
Court did not rule on the fluid class theory. The Court agreed with the
Second Circuit that the action could not be brought for the class as originally
constituted, and upheld the dismissal. However, the Supreme Court noted
that the dismissal was without prejudice to the plaintiff redefining the class.
It therefore vacated the Second Circuit's judgment of dismissal and remanded
the cause for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.' 80
The Supreme Court's disposition in Eisen did not carry an endorsement
of the Second Circuit's holding on fluid recovery, and the question of the
validity of the concept still awaits the judgment of the Court. If the Court
eventually rules the theory invalid, a legislative solution to the problem of
calculating and distributing damages for a large class may be attempted. 87
What lesson does United States' experience with fluid class recovery
provide for Canadian jurisdictions at this juncture? The issue cannot be
avoided if there is to be any serious endeavour to expand the range of the
class action remedy. Once damages recovery for a class is allowed, problems
of assessment and distribution of the award are inevitable, especially when
the class is large and individual claims are comparatively small. The prob-
lems encountered in the United States were probably to a large degree
unanticipated by the draftsmen of amended Rule 23, and it would be helpful
if United States courts were closer to an answer than they appear to be at
the moment. Nonetheless, United States experiments with large class damages
awards are valuable pointers for developments in this country. They high-
light the administrative complexities that will have to be dealt with, and
the controversy they have provoked has put the conventional concepts of
damages assessments under searching scrutiny. Though the task will be dif-
184 (1973), 479 F. 2d 1005 at 1012. For a criticism of the Second Circuit's treat-
ment of the three cases relied on by the district court as precedent for fluid class re-
covery, see Note, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin - Fluid Recovery, Minihearings and
Notice in Class Actions (1974), 54 B.U.L. Rev. 111 at 118, 120.
185 (1973), 479 F. 2d 1005 at 1018.
186 (1974), 94 S. Ct. 2140.
187 Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, Class Action Study, 30 (1974);
Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1974), 87 Harv.
L. Rev. 426 at 453.
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ficult, Canadian endeavours to find a solution at least will not be complicated
by the due process considerations that confront American innovators. 88
Damage assessment and distribution is the critical issue to emerge fol-
lowing the expansion of the class action procedure to embrace damages
claims. There is no problem when the individual claims are substantial, the
class is not large and the members are readily identifiable. Virtual total
individual participation in the recovery can then be expected and damages
calculation on a "class as a whole" basis need not be considered. The
dilemma occurs when for such reasons as the small amount of the separate
claims, the large size of the class and the difficulties of identifying and
notifying the members, class involvement following judgment will be only
minimal, and the totality of damages inflicted by the defendant can be deter-
mined fairly readily and with reasonable accuracy. 89 In this situation, the
fluid class solution calls for a total damages assessment and a court direction
for the distribution of the unclaimed residue. Critics of this approach cor-
rectly point out that it conflicts with the traditional damages theory in two
respects. First, it is premised on the expectation that most of the victims of
the defendant's illegality will not get compensation, at least not directly.
Second, a distribution of the damages residue by the kind of cy pros analogy
applied in cases such as Bebchick and Daar will benefit individuals who were
not injured by the defendant's wrongdoing and did not belong to the
plaintiff class.
The traditionalist criticism of fluid class assessment, by focusing on the
beneficiaries, ignores the position of the defendant, and also the deterrent
potential of the class action device. Fluid class recovery certainly does imply
the conferring of benefits on individuals who were not injured by the de-
fendant's misconduct, and possibly to the exclusion of class members who
were. However, the award does not affect the substantive obligations of the
defendant. It is not a penalty because the measure of the recovery is the
total amount of the damage inflicted by the defendant's wrongdoing or of
the defendant's unjust enrichment, as the case may be. The award is identical
to what the defendant would pay if each class member came forward and
proved his loss. It hardly seems open to the defendant to plead that he
ought to be relieved of all financial responsibility towards the victims of hisjudicially determined wrongdoing merely because they have not made a
claim. As to the objection that the beneficiaries of the unclaimed residue
will include individuals who did not belong to the class, one American com-
188 The Second Circuit in Eisen struck down fluid recovery as "an unconstitu-
tional violation of due process of law" (Note 185, supra). Though the court did not
elaborate, the objection appears to be that "the device may illegally abridge the sub-
stantive rights of the members of the plaintiff class or of the defendant under the
fifth amendment. The criticism can be made that requiring the defendant to pay dam-
ages all of which will not ultimately be received by those persons actually injured
amounts to a deprivation of his property without due process of law... : The argument
. . . is . . . of greater merit with respect to the substantive rights of class members.
Those members of the class who do not receive notice and consequently fail to file
claims for damages have arguably been deprived of their property without due pro-
cess", (Note Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin - Fluid Recovery, Minihearing and Notice
in Class Actions (1974), 54 B.U.L. Rev. 111 at 123-24.)
'
89 For example, as in Eisen. See note 177, supra.
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mentator has rather acutely observed, "The windfall that does occur should
be viewed as an unavoidable byproduct of the basic relief; it should no more
make such relief improper than does the fact the third parties may benefit
from injunctions make that relief improper. More generally, so long as de-
fendants' rights are not abridged, it is unclear what policy is served by
striking down a remedy which may be the only effective way to vindicate the
rights of plaintiff class members, simply because it also benefits third
parties." 9 0
Furthermore, to restrict the defendant's liability just to class members
who establish their claims following notice of the judgment would seriously
impair the deterrent value of the class action remedy in situations where
few class members could be expected to come forward. The rejection of
fluid recovery would allow the defendant to keep the bulk of the proceeds
acquired from his unlawful conduct. While this consequence does not quite
amount to an intimation that the defendant is free to resume his activities,
it is hardly a warning that he will be the loser if he does.
This author favours the fluid recovery assessment of damages for a
class in the appropriate case. A successful class action for consumers can
bring compensation to the people injured by business malpractice. To compel
the defendant to part with the improperly gained fruits of his endeavours
and to deter a repetition of the wrongdoing are two no less important class
action functions. However, where full-scale participation by class members
in a damages recovery is not practicable, an assessment of damages in gross
is essential if the latter objectives are to be achieved, assuming, of course,
the damages can be so calculated. The problem is to ensure that fluid re-
covery is applied in practice.
Legislation will help achieve the desired class action objectives, and
Section F of the article contains a draft set of recommendations. The pro-
posed statute will first allow an action to be brought where class members
claim individual damages, and next give the court a discretion to order
190 Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1974),
87 Harv. L. Rev. 426 at 453.
"The reluctance of the courts which have approved "fluid class recoveries" to
allow wrongdoers to escape the consequences of illegal conduct because of technical
difficulties in proving or allocating damages is by no means a new development in
American jurisprudence. Two well-established doctrines of the law of torts demonstrate
this. First, uncertainty of the precise amount of damage suffered by a plaintiff is not a
sufficient reason to refuse an award of damages as long as there is proof showing some
damage and affording a basis upon which the amount can be reasonably calculated.
Second, where plaintiff's damages could have been caused by only one of two or more
negligent defendants and plaintiff is unable to show which one of them caused the
damages, he will recover from all of the defendants and the burden of proof on the
issue is shifted to the defendants. It will be noted that under the first doctrine, the
defendant is in danger of being required to pay more than his share of compensation
and under the second, he may be required to pay for damages which he had not
caused at all. A defendant in a case where a "fluid class recovery" is granted is under
neither of these dangers; for it is the plaintiff who must show both the total amount of
damages and the fact that the defendant was the cause thereof' (A. Homburger,
Private Suits In The Public Interest In The United States of America (1974), 23 Buff.
L. Rev. 343 at 372-3 (citations omitted)).
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the defendant to pay damages in a total sum. To legislate the removal of
existing restraints on damages class actions is reasonably straightforward.19
Fluid recovery assessment, however, is a more difficult subject. The rules
for measuring damages are almost entirely a development of the common
law, and legislative regulation has been infrequent. 192 Certainly, no legislative
model exists for the type of damage assessment and distribution which con-
stitutes fluid class recovery. Nor do the common law rules assist very much.
Their evolution has been haphazard and unsystematic, and it is difficult to
discern from them any broad statements of principle of universal applica-
tion. 0 3 Compensation, the prevention of unjust enrichment and deterrence
of wrongdoing are undoubtedly themes that underlie the law of damages,
but the emphasis upon them varies according to the particular rule in ques-
tion. What makes fluid recovery unique is the attempt to achieve all three
objectives by the one process. Compensation for every person who has
suffered at the hands of the defendant is the primary goal, but if this is not
practicable, at least the defendant will be made to part with the proceeds
of his wrongdoing, and his experience should provide an example for others.
The proposed legislation deals separately with the two steps involved
in fluid class assessment:- the fixing of the total liability and the distribu-
tion of the residue after individual claims have been met. Section 10(1) of
the draft authorizes the court to determine the total amount of the pecuniary
liability of the defendant to all members of the class, provided the amount
can be calculated with reasonable accuracy without individual proof by the
members, and to order the defendant to pay the amount into court. The
expression "pecuniary liability" in the section applies the fluid recovery
assessment technique to claims for liquidated sums as well as to damages.
So far the discussion of fluid recovery in this article has emphasized damages,
but the calculation of liability in gross is no less essential for an effective
class action for liquidated amounts than for a class action for damages.
Fixing the liability of the defendant to the class as a whole serves to prevent
unjust enrichment and to deter wrongdoing no matter how the pecuniary
liability is characterized, and while the payment of a debt due to a class
member is strictly not compensation for loss, the distinction for the bene-
ficiary is hardly significant.
Once the defendant has paid into the court the amount fixed as the total
liability to the class, the procedure for processing the claims of individual
101 Section 3(4) of the draft legislation is designed to do this.
192 Some examples of legislative intervention are The Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 164, s. 3(3) (insurance policy proceeds or premiums not to be counted in
assessing damages in respect of death); The Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 470, s. 38(1)
(in action for injuries resulting in death no damages allowed for the death or for
loss of expectation of life); The Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 243, s. 5(2)
(damages limited to actual damages in libel action against newspaper or broadcaster).
The causes of action in the first two examples are themselves statute created.
103 . . . [Tihe law as to damages still awaits a scientific statement ... [it is] a
branch of the law on which one is less guided by authority laying down definite prin-
ciples than on almost any other matter that one can consider." (The Susquehanna,
[1925] P. 196 at 210, per Atkin, LJ.). See also, Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S.
Chekiang, [1926] A.C. 637 at 642-43, per Lord Sumner (quoted in H. Street, Principles
of the Law of Damages, 1 (1962)).
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class members is regulated by section 9. Section 10(3) empowers the court
to dispose of the residue of the amount left in court after the claims of
members and the costs and expenses of the action have been paid.
The fluid recovery procedure set up by the legislation leaves two im-
portant questions to the discretion of the court. Section 10(1) cuts the knot
that limits the defendanf's liabilityto what will be recovered by class mem-
bers, and as an alternative, the court is now free to measure liability by
reference to either the total loss inflicted by the defendant or the total sum
by which the defendant was enriched, according to whether the class mem-
bers claim damages or liquidated sums. Also, the provision which authorizes
the court to dispose of the residue of money paid into court (s.10(3)),
makes no direction as to what the court is to do.
The situations in which the question will arise as to whether or not
to fix liability on the basis of the class as a whole, or as to how to dispose
of a surplus, are much too diverse to cover in advance by legislative pre-
scription, and a court will have to exercise its own judgment according to
the circumstances of the particular case. For instance, if a successful plain-
tiff class includes members who are in a continuing business relationship
with the defendant, say as department store charge account customers, the
court could direct the defendant to credit the accounts with the amount due
to each customer and order him to pay into court a sum sufficient to meet
the claims of members who were not customers.
The larger question is whether liability should be calculated as a lump
sum at all. The rationale of the proposed legislation is that by fixing the
defendant's total liability the court can prevent unjust enrichment and deter
future wrongdoing. Essentially, the question is one of discretion, and in
exercising the discretion the court must, after assessing the gravity of the
defendant's dereliction, determine whether the public interest in securing
the class action objectives would fairly be advanced by fixing liability in
gross. At this point, the comment of an American writer on the procedure
under the Federal Rules for granting or withholding certification of a class
is pertinent:- "Compare a class action instituted to vindicate the rights of
members of the Playboy Club to receive bar chits, or a class action threaten-
ing the opponent of the class with 'a horrendous, possibly annihilating
punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any
benefit to defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable violation
of The Truth in Lending Act' with a class action that forces a taxicab com-
pany to disgorge unjustified charges collected from thousands of unsuspecting
customers through improper setting of taxi meters. Is it not self-evident that
these actions are not on the same level of social significance and do not
deserve the same treatment?"'' 9
4
With regard to the disposal of any residue of money paid into court by
the defendant for the class as a whole, United States experience suggests
that in most cases the parties will settle the question themselves by agree-
194 A. Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of
America (1974), 23 Buff. L. Rev. 343 at 367-68 (citations omitted).
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ment, leaving the court with only the function of deciding whether the
arrangement is feasible and can be enforced if it is not carried out. In the
rare situation where the parties do not agree, the exercise of devising a
scheme for applying the residue for the benefit of consumers of similar in-
terests to those of the original consumer class ought not to be beyond the
imagination of the court.
The very existence of a power in the court to order a defendant to pay
on a total class basis should enhance the deterrent value of class litigation.
The dishonest trader will then no longer be able to count on having to pay
only the class members who come forward to claim; he faces the possibility
of being ordered to pay the entire sum lost by the class whatever the response
of individual members. Also, the existence of the power should encourage
the compromise of class actions once they are commenced. So long as the
defendant's liability is limited just to class members who make a claim, a
defendant will be inclined to make no more than a token offer of compromise
if he feels that only a few individuals will seek to participate in the judgment.
The situation changes once the court is free to ignore member participation
in quantifying liability. With a risk of liability to the whole class, the de-
fendant is likely to be more realistic and make a settlement offer that the
class representative finds attractive and is prepared to accept.
Whether fluid recovery will work in practice is not easy to predict.
Indeed, the same query can be made of most of the innovations introduced
in the draft legislation. In implementing the proposal, the legal profession,
both bench and bar, obviously has a critical role. The prospects are good
if the judges and lawyers who will have the responsibility of administering
the new procedure understand and are sympathetic to its underlying ob-
jectives, and if in resolving the problems that undoubtedly will arise, they
display the same resourcefulness and ingenuity they have demonstrated in
other fields.
F. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
1. Scope and Form of Proposals
This final section of the article contains recommendations for changes
to the existing class action procedure that are intended to overcome the
shortcomings that have been described. The recommendations are in the
form of a draft enactment and are accompanied by explanatory notes. How-
ever, a few general remarks are necessary before proceeding to the draft.
The scope of the class action procedure which the legislation would
create is restricted in two respects. The procedure can be invoked only by
consumers, as defined by section 1, and it does not apply to actions against
a class. The class action rules now in force in all jurisdictions are not con-
fined to any particular subject matter of claim, and they allow an action to
be brought both by and against a class representative. There are two reasons
for limiting the proposed procedure to actions on behalf of a consumer
class. First, the entire thrust of the article has been to show that in many
situations the class action is the only effective private remedy that exists for
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consumers who have been damaged by the same business practice, especially
where individual losses are small. Without the class action, consumers will
be denied compensation, and perhaps equally as important, the merchant
responsible for their loss will be permitted to keep profits gained from
activities which, at the very least, do not conform to accepted standards of
business behaviour. There is a special justification for arming consumers
with a weapon to establish and enforce business standards as every member
of society is a consumer and all will stand to benefit from the exercise. A
vital and potent class action procedure in the hands of the public would help
influence the forces that control the marketplace to be more responsive to
the need to act fairly and not exploit their position.
The second reason for not extending the new procedure to all claims
relates to the treatment of costs in the draft legislation. Section 11 contains
a special costs provision to the effect that only the plaintiff can be awarded
costs at the trial of the action. Furthermore, the court can award costs to
the plaintiff on a solicitor and client basis. On the other hand, the defendant
will not get any costs at all if he wins the action. The orthodox costs rules
can unnecessarily deter litigation and the special need for an effective class
action remedy in the consumer area is felt to justify these departures from
the ordinary position. On the other hand, a plaintiff representating class
members who cannot fairly be described as consumers ought not to be given
the same favoured treatment.
The enactment of the proposed statute would not affect the existing
Rule of Practice, which would continue to govern representative actions by
individuals not coming within the consumer definition and actions against a
representative defendant.
Another aspect of the new class action procedure that needs to be
noted is the form in which it is proposed to be introduced. The intention
is that the procedure should be enacted in legislation rather than made a
Rule of Court. In Ontario, for instance, and the situation is typical of other
Canadian jurisdictions, a Rules Committee normally has the responsibility of
implementing changes in court procedure. 95 However, the authority of the
Committee is limited to matters of practice and procedure, and the sub-
stantive law is beyond its competence.1 96 In at least two respects, the draft
changes rules that arguably are not practice and procedure in nature. These
are the provisions that limit the res judicata effect of a class action judg-
ment and that allow fluid recovery assessment of the defendant's pecuniary
liability. If these provisions were embodied in a Rule of Practice rather than
a statute, there is a risk they would be struck down as ultra vires the Rules
Committee.
Finally, the use of American precedent and experience that will be
evident from the draft statute and annotations calls for some comment. Some
195 The Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 228, s. 114(10) (b).
196 Circosta v. Lilly, [1967] 1 O.R. 398; The Zamora, [1916] 2 A.C. 77 at 96;
In re Grosvenor Hotel, London (No. 2), [1965] Ch. 1210 at 1243; Murine Eye Remedy
Co. v. Eldred, [1926] V.L.R. 425, at 426; Naughton v. Colonial Provident Life &
General Assurance Co. and Waghorne, [1928] V.L.R. 533.
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may reject the draft simply for this reason, disregarding whatever merit the
proposals might have. Others may accept the underlying intent of the scheme
yet condemn the mode of presentation, perhaps arguing that in sheer volume
of detail the draft surpasses even American endeavours to legislate in ad-
vance for every foreseeable contingency that might arise in the progress of a
class action. On this latter view, the better course would have been to have
left the task of steering the procedure in new directions to the wisdom and
good sense of the judges. If the proposals are to be condemned for these
reasons, there are several grounds for rebuttal.
First of all, the pace of change from the bench in responding to the
need to extend the class action remedy to consumer transactions in the
marketplace is governed by the judicial method, which demands a case-by-
case approach. And there is really not much cause for optimism if it is
hoped that the courts will move along the desired course. The recent
Chastain0 7 and Shaw'0 8 decisions in British Columbia were notable victories
for consumers, but they are signicant more for the readiness of the courts
to accept the burden of calculating the entitlements of very large numbers
of class members than for any new formulation of principle. Indeed, though
strictly it was not necessary for its decision, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal in Shaw quoted with approval the majority view in Markt 99 that
the existence of separate contracts was a bar to a class action, and stated
that the procedure could not be used to recover "personal" damages. The
Ontario Court of Appeal reiterated the individualized damages proscription
in Farnham v. Fingold.200
Only by legislation can the outmoded restrictions that have burdened
the class actions for so long be stripped away and the procedure permitted
to develop as a consumer remedy in a wider context. To achieve this goal
it is necessary to specify with some degree of particularity the obstacles
that bar class claims at present, and expressly abolish them. For the future,
however, the critical characteristic for the class action will be the pre-
dominance of common questions over those affecting only individual mem-
bers. In this feature lies the justification for incorporating United States
precedent. The verbal formulae adopted in the Federal courts in 1966 with
F.R.C.P. 23, have successfully destroyed the restrictions that surrounded the
original procedure and have presented consumers with a remedy that can be
employed in a wide variety of situations. In exploring and defining the
boundaries of the new process United States courts have developed a con-
siderable body of jurisprudence. By contrast, the experience of Canadian
courts and lawyers with the class action is very limited and the knowledge
and expertise that has now accumulated in the United States is really too
valuable to be ignored. The adoption of the Federal terminology should help
ensure that it is not.
197 Note 29, supra.
108 Note 92, supra.
109 Note 99, supra.
200 Note 111, supra.
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Second, though the United States influence on the draft has been strong,
the reliance has not been undiscriminating and it is by no means complete.
It is most visible in the provisions that define the scope of the class action
remedy, and for the reasons already given. By comparison, a number of
aspects of the procedure are quite new. For example, the costs provisions
are entirely original and reflect the different role that costs have in litigation
in Canadian jurisdictions as compared with the United States. The provisions
for disposing of the individual claims of class members once the common
questions have been decided against the defendant are yet another innovation.
The section dealing with notice to the class is something of a hybrid. A
notice provision is a new class action feature for Canadian jurisdictions and
is certainly inspired by the American precedent. However, unlike the United
States rule, which reflects due process considerations, notice is not niade
mandatory. The draft stresses the adequacy of class representation and the
expectation is that once this requirement is satisfied only minimal notice
will be directed in most cases. Finally, the concept of fluid class recovery,
though developed in American jurisprudence, is expressed in legislative form
for the first time in the draft proposal.
2. Draft Legislation
MODEL CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS ACT
An Act to allow the enforcement in one action of the claims of
numerous persons similarly situated as regards the purchase or lease of
goods or services from or the grant or provision of credit by the same
person.
1. Interpretation-In this Act:-
"Consumer" means an individual who seeks or acquires
(a) by purchase or lease any goods or services,
(b) the grant or provision of credit,
for personal, family or household purposes.
"Class" means a class of consumers.
"Class action" means an action maintained as a class action pur-
suant to an order made under this Act.
"Court" means the Supreme Court.
"Goods" means tangible chattels bought for use primarily for per-
sonal, family or household purposes, including goods which, at the time
of sale or subsequently, are to be so affixed to real property as to become
a part of such real property, whether or not severable therefrom.
"Services" means work, labour and services for other than a com-
mercial or business use, and includes services furnished in connection
with the sale or repair of goods or with the occupation of premises.
The statute allows an action to be brought on behalf of a class of con-
sumers as defined in section 1. The Supreme Court of the province in which
the statute is in force is the tribunal that has jurisdiction.
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The definitions of the terms "consumer", "goods" and "services" in
section 1 are adapted from section 1761 of the California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act (Stats. 1970, c.1550, p.3 157, §1). However, the terms
"consumer" and "services" are given a wider operation than in the California
provision. A consumer includes an individual who seeks or acquires credit
for personal, family or household purposes, and services furnished in con-
nection with the occupation of premises are covered by the "services"
definition. The inclusion of credit transactions will allow a consumer class
to enforce legislation enacted for the protection of borrowers, for instance,
legislation fixing maximum interest rates or requiring truth in lending. By
including services furnished in connection with the occupation of premises
the statute will make the class action procedure available to tenant groups
holding premises from the one landlord who are prejudiced in the same way
by the conduct of the landlord in relation to services he is required to provide
for the premises whether by statute or under tenancy agreements.
The terms "consumer" and "services" are defined so as to restrict the
procedure to transactions of a domestic nature. Business transactions are
excluded because it is felt that there is a greater need for a vital class action
procedure in the area of personal and household consumption of goods and
services. Domestic consumers are probably more vulnerable to deceptive
commercial practices than men of business, and as they will usually have
only a small stake in the dispute and fewer resources there will not be the
same incentive for them to bring an individual action.
2. When class action allowed-One or more members of a class may
sue in the court as representative party on behalf of all provided:-
(1) the class is numerous;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims of the representative party are typical of the claims
of the class;
(4) the representative party will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
This section sets out the minimum requirements for a class action under
the statute. An action cannot proceed as a class action unless the four
enumerated conditions are satisfied. Section 3(3) contains some additional
requirements which the court will consider when the plaintiff applies for
leave to maintain the action as a class action.
Section 2 is adapted from Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (called hereafter "F.R.C.P.") in the United States. The Federal
Rule, however, applies to claims both by and against a class while the draft
statute is limited to the former situation.
The first three sub-sections are essentially an elaboration of the pre-
requisites for maintaining a class action that are stipulated in the existing
Rule of Practice (Rule 75 in Ontario). Sub-section (1) follows Rule 75 in
requiring that the class be numerous. This reflects the original rationale of
the class action. The procedure was developed in order to avoid the harsh
consequences of the rule in equity that all persons interested in a controversy
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must be joined as parties. When the persons interested were so numerous
that joinder could not reasonably be expected equity would allow one of such
persons to represent all the others. The factor of the class size was ini
corporated in the present Rule of Practice when it came into operation with
the introduction of the Judicature Act system. A class action in effect denies
class members their day in court. The requirement that the class be numerous
ensures that this privilege will not be lost if the potential class is so small
that the members would probably litigate the dispute as parties, whether by
joinder as co-plaintiff in the original action or in separate proceedings.
The part of F.R.C.P. 23(a) that is equivalent to sub-section (1) stipu-
lates that the class is to be "so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable." The provision for joinder of parties in the Federal Rules
explains this requirement. Though not nearly so strict as the former equity
practice, the Rules emphasize the joinder as parties of all persons interested
in a controversy and, as a general rule, joinder is compulsory (Rule 19). The
class action is an exception to this rule (Rule 19(d)). A class action can be
brought if joinder of the persons interested, the class members, is not prac-
ticable (C. Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23
(1969), 10 Boston College Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 527 at 529-31). See also
Moscarelli v. Stamm, (1968) 288 F. Supp. 453. In Canada, it is not neces-
sary to place the same stress on the impracticability of joinder as parties
since joinder is not usually compulsory. As a rule, the defendant cannot
insist that a plaintiff join other persons who have the same interest as him-
self in the controversy as co-plaintiffs. The class action in Canadian
jurisprudence does not represent such a significant departure from the
traditional party joinder situation as in the United States, and it is felt that
the requirement that the class be numerous sufficiently indicates when a
class action is appropriate. The action should not be allowed where the
numbers affected are so small there is a reasonable likelihood they will
participate directly in the controversy as parties.
Sub-sections (2) and (3) state more fully the "same interest" element
of the present Rule of Practice. They follow F.R.C.P. 23(a) and are the
raison d'6tre of the class action procedure: the existence of questions of
fact or law that are common to the claim of the plaintiff and to the claims
of the class members whom he represents. Sub-section (2) deals with the
claims of the class, and sub-section (3) looks to the position of the repre-
sentative plaintiff. The reason for this separate treatment of the two aspects
of the common interest requirement lies in the provisions of the statute
which follow. Sub-section (2) must be read with section 3(3), which pro-
vides that the questions that are common to the class must also predominate
over questions affecting only individual class members. The third sub-section
"emphasizes that the representative ought to be squarely aligned in interest
with the represented group" (B. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Com-
mittee: 1966 Admendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1967),
81 Harv. L. Rev. 356 at 387 n. 120). It needs to be read in conjunction with
sub-section (4), which requires that the plaintiff will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. The condition that the plaintiff's claim is
typical of the claims of the class is intended to preclude actions that are
inimical to the interests of class members. (Donelan, supra, 534 '
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Sub-section (4) is taken from F.R.C.P. 23(a) and is entirely new for
Canadian jurisdictions. It would impose on Canadian courts for the first time
a positive obligation to inquire into and determine the adequacy of the
representation provided by the plaintiff who sues on behalf of the class. One
of the matters the court will be expected to consider is the calibre of the
lawyer who acts for the plaintiff (s.4(1) (b)).
Sub-section (2) is examined more fully in the commentary to section
3 (3), and sub-section. (4) is dealt with under section 4.
3. Order that action be maintained as class action
(1) After the commencement of an action brought under section 2,
the plaintiff shall apply to the court for an order that the action
is to be maintained as a class action.
(2) The plaintiff shall apply to the court under sub-section (1):-
(a) if the defendant has filed an appearance, on notice to the
defendant within one month after the date of the appear-
ance or within such further time as the court may allow,
(b) if the defendant has not filed an appearance within the
time limited by the rules of procedure of the court, within
one month after the date of the default or within such
further time as the court may allow,
and in default of such application by the plaintiff the court may
upon motion by the defendant make all such amendments to
the proceedings as will eliminate therefrom all reference to
representation of absent persons.
(3) The court shall order that the action is to be maintained as a
class action if the conditions set out in section 2 are satisfied
and the court finds that:--
(a) the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members;
(b) a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy; and
(c) the action is brought in good faith and appears to have
merit.
(4) The court shall not refuse to order that the action is to be
maintained as a class action only on the ground that:-
(a) the relief claimed in the action on behalf of the members
of the class or of some of them is or includes a claim
for damages;
(b) the relief claimed in the action on behalf of the members
of the class arises out of or relates to separate contracts
or transactions made with or entered into between mem-
bers of the class and the defendant;
(c) any damages claimed for members of the class will require
individual calculation.
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(5) If on application by the plaintiff as provided by sub-section (2),
the court determines that the action is not to be maintained
as a class action, the court shall make all such amendments to
the proceedings as will eliminate therefrom all reference to
representation of absent persons.
(6) An order that an action is to be maintained as a class action
shall:-
(a) define the class on whose behalf the action is brought;
(b) describe briefly the nature of the claim made on behalf
of members of the class and specify the relief claimed;
(c) define the questions of law or fact common to the class;
(d) specify a date before which members of the class may
exclude themselves from the class.
(7) The relief claimed for members of the class shall not include
damages for the death of or bodily injury to any person.
(8) An order that the action is to be maintained as a class action
may be altered or amended before judgment in the action.
This section introduces another new feature for class action procedure.
Following the scheme of F.R.C.P. 23, it provides that an action commenced
as a class action cannot be continued as such without the leave of the court.
If leave is refused, the court is required by sub-section (5) to amend the
proceedings so as to eliminate any reference to the representative character
of the action. This practice is normally followed under the present class
action Rule when it is held that the plaintiff has not satisfied the common
interest condition. See text at B2, supra. The elimination of the representative
claim will ensure that any judgment subsequently pronounced in the action
will bind only the immediate parties, a result which is reinforced by section 6.
The making of an order under section 3 has important consequences.
Not only will the action proceed as a class action, but also the special costs
rules in section 11 will apply to the proceedings.
The plaintiff has the burden of obtaining an order that the action is
to be maintained as a class action. Sub-section (2) fixes the time within
which the application is to be made, though further time may be granted by
the court. If the court is to be authorized to extend the time for applying,
the power has to be conferred by statute for the reason that the Rule of
Practice that allows the court to extend time (Rule 178 in Ontario) applies
only to a time prescribed "by the rules, or by an order", and not to one fixed
by statute (McCarron v. Metro Life Ins. Co. (1899), 35 C.LJ. 421; Atkin-
son v. Dominion of Canada Guarantee Co. (1908), 16 O.L.R. 619 at 632).
If the plaintiff fails to apply for an order that the action be maintained as a
class action, the court must make the same amendments to the proceedings
that are required when the court has refused to make an order (sub-
section (2)).
Sub-section (3) is a key provision in the new procedure. It contains
additional requirements to those of section 2 that must be satisfied before
the court can allow an action to be maintained as a class action. Parts (a)
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and (b) of sub-section (3) are imported from F.R.C.P. 23(b) (3) and part
(c) is new. Part (a) must also be read with sub-section (4).
Part (a) of sub-section (3), the predominance of common questions
provision, applies whenever an action raises both questions of law or fact
common to the plaintiff and the class and questions that affect only in-
dividuals. There will invariably be such a combination of common and
individual questions, even in the most straightforward case. Thus, for in-
stance, if declaratory or injunctive relief is granted in a class action, indi-
viduals who claim the benefit of the judgment will have to step forward and
prove membership of the class (Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1,
11). Again, in a situation such as Chastain v. British Columbia Hydro and
Power Authority (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 443, after the court has declared
that the defendant obtained money without lawful authority from the class,
the members of which have yet to be identified, individuals who seek to
recover must establish both that they belong to the class and the amount
of their entitlement.
In situations of the kind raised by Duke of Bedford and Chastain,
Canadian courts have held that the common interest requirement of the
present Rule is satisfied, though in truth the claims involve individual
questions in the sense described. Individual questions have only assumed
significance for the courts when the right of each class member to relief
derived from separate contracts with the defendant rather than from a single
source such as a statute, or when the remedy sought was damages which
had to be individually assessed. In either case the courts have not allowed a
class action. In consequence of this refusal Canadian courts have never
reached the point of considering whether a class action would be appropriate
for damages claims for breach of a warranty made in identical terms to a
group of consumers or for claims based on a fraudulent misrepresentation
that has induced consumers to act to their detriment.
The object of part (a) of sub-section (3), in conjunction with sub-
section (4), is to abolish the restriction that does not allow a class action
when the members of the class seek damages that require individual calcula-
tion or the claims arise out of separate contracts or transactions with the
defendant. Sub-section (4) will ensure that the courts do not in future dis-
miss a class action on the ground only that the action presents one or both
of these characteristics. Under the new procedure the predominance of the
common questions is the critical test.
To understand the expanded scope of the class action remedy that could
be expected with the criteria contained in part (a) of sub-section (3), and
sub-section (4), it is helpful to refer to some of the writing in the United
States on F.R.C.P. 23(b) (3), on which provision the sections are modelled.
The Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rule in 1966 wrote an
explanatory note which accompanied its proposals (39 F.R.D. 69, 95). With
regard to Rule 23(b)(3) the Committee said: "Subdivision (b)(3) en-
compasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about
other undesirable results.
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The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class
action may be maintained under this subdivision, that the questions common
to the class predominate over the questions affecting individual members. It
is only where this predominance exists that economies can be achieved by
means of the class-action device. In this view, a fraud perpetrated on
numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an
appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so despite the need,
if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by
individuals within the class. On the other hand, although having some com-
mon core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if
there was material variation in the representations made or in the kinds or
degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed. A 'mass
accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appro-
priate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions,
not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances
an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice
into multiple lawsuits separately tried. Private damage claims by numerous
individuals arising out of concerted antitrust violations may or may not
involve predominating common questions." (The citations have been omit-
ted.) To this statement can be added the remarks of Judge Weinstein in
Dolgow v. Anderson (1968), 43 F.R.D. 472 at 490. He said: "The com-
mon issues need not be dispositive of the entire litigation. The fact that
questions peculiar to each individual member of the class may remain after
the common questions have been resolved does not dictate the conclusion
that a class action is not permissible." Finally, "Under the flexibility of
the new Rule 23, it is not likely that the administrative difficulties will out-
weigh the advantage of handling in one action the similar claims of hundreds
of purchasers based upon essentially similar or identical circumstances."
(Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co. (1966), 259 F. Supp. 673
at 684.
The new provisions will allow a class action to be brought in a case
such as Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021. In
Markt the shippers who comprised the plaintiff class claimed damages under
contracts separately made with the defendant but which contained an
identical term to the effect that the defendant would not carry contraband
of war. It was in the existence of this identical term that Buckley, L.J., the
dissenting member of the Court of Appeal, found a sufficient common in-
terest to sustain a class action. Similarly, facts such as those in Shields v.
Mayor, [1953] O.W.N. 5, should produce a different result. In Shields, the
plaintiff on behalf of a class of tenants claimed the repayment of rent the
defendant landlord had charged in excess of the rate fixed by a war-time
regulation. The Court of Appeal dismissed the representative claim on the
ground that the tenants held the premises under separate contracts with the
defendant.
In the United States it has been held that under F.R.C.P. 23 or its
state equivalent, the existence of separate issues concerning the damages
sustained by class members, their claims also being based on individual
contracts with the defendant, do not prevent the common issue of liability
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from being adjudicated on a class basis (A. Miller, Problems in Administer-
ing Judicial Relief in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23 (b) (3) (1972),
54 F.R.D. 501 at 504; Green v. Wolf Corporation (1968), 406 F. 2d 291;
Berland v. Mack (1969), 48 F.R.D. 121; Siegel v. Chicken Delight Inc.
(1966), 271 F. Supp. 722; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1973), 479 F.
2d 1005; Miles v. N. J. Motors (1972), 32 Ohio App. 2d 350; 291 N.E.
2d 758).
In fraud cases, United States courts have followed the suggestion of
the Advisory Committee and found that the predominance of the common
issues test is satisfied notwithstanding that individual proof of reliance on the
fraudulent representation will be necessary. "We can see no reason why the
trial court, if it determines individual reliance is an essential element of the
proof, cannot order separate trials on that particular issue, as on the question
of damages, if necessary." (Green v. Wolf Corporation (1968), 406 F. 2d 291
301). See, also, Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton Inc. (1966), 41
F.R.D. 42 at 45; Weisman v. M.C.A. Inc. (1968), 45 F.R.D. 258 at 263;
Berland v. Mack (1969), 47 F.R.D. 11. The Advisory Committee, in the
note quoted earlier, mentioned the possibility of material variations in the
representations made to each individual and thus potential variations in the
issue of misrepresentation for members of the class. However, there would
not be this complication if the representation was made in identical terms
to each class member, being communicated to them in writing, in a news-
paper advertisement, or broadcast on the radio or television. It is hoped
that the new procedure will encourage Canadian courts to follow the United
States example and hold that in actions based on fraud common questions
such as the making of the representation and its falsity would sufficiently
predominate over individual questions of reliance and damages as to justify a
class adjudication on the common questions.
Part (b) of sub-section (3) is the next provision that needs to be
examined. Even if common questions of law or fact do predominate, the
court, by virtue of part (b) must still find that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy. This "superiority" criterion serves as a reminder that a class action
is only one of a number of procedural devices for handling multiple litigation
(B. Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to "The Class Action - A Symposium'"
(1968), 10 Boston College Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 497 at 498.) Among
the alternatives are a single action agreed to by the parties as a test action
or a consolidation of separate actions already commenced, and these may
have greater practical advantages than a class action (Advisory Note, 39
F.R.D. 69, 103). On the other hand, the fact that individual claims are too
small to justify separate actions would justify the conclusion that a class
action was the superior method for determining the controversy. As the
Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, said in relation to the former F.R.C.P. 23
"[It] . . . should be construed to permit a class suit where several persons
jointly act to the injury of many persons so numerous that their voluntarily,
unanimously joining in a suit is concededly improbable and impracticable.
• . . To permit the defendants to contest liability with each claimant in a
single, separate suit, would, in many cases give an advantage which would
be almost equivalent to closing the door of justice to all small claimants.
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This is what we think the class suit practice was to prevent." (Weeks v.
Bareco Oil Co. (1941), 125 F. 2d 84 at 88, 90.) See also, Hohman v.
Packard Instrument Co. (1968), 399 F. 2d 711; Berland v. Mack (1969),
48 F.R.D. 121.
Part (c) of sub-section (3) places on the plaintiff at the outset of the
action the burden of showing that he sues in good faith and that his claim
has merit. This is a reversal of the procedure now followed in ordinary ac-
tions, including class actions under the existing Rule. Under the present
practice, if the plaintiff's claim lacks substantive foundation or is brought
frivolously or vexatiously or is oppressive, the court will not intervene unless
the defendant makes an objection. The initiative for impeaching the plaintiff's
claim before it reaches the stage of a final decision on the merits thus lies
with the defendant. The departure from normal practice which the proposal
in part (c) represents is thought to be justified by the serious consequences
that will follow for the defendant once the court makes an order under
section 3 that the action is to be maintained as a class action. The proceed-
ings will prove expensive for the defendant whatever the outcome. If the
action succeeds, the defendant will have to bear all the costs. On the other
hand, if the defendant prevails, section 11(2) denies him costs against the
plaintiff.
Soon after the introduction of the new F.R.C.P. 23 in the United
States a practice developed through judicial decision which subjected the
class claim to a preliminary scrutiny by the court to determine whether it
had merit. See Dolgow v. Anderson (1960), 43 F.R.D. 472 at 501-03. The
practice was later criticized (Miller v. Mackey International, Inc., (1971),
425 F. 2d 424), and finally the Supreme Court held that it was not authorized
by the Federal Rules (Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, (1974), 94 S. Ct. 2140).
Nevertheless, the principle of some form of preliminary hearing on the merits
has received the support of at least one American commentator. See, e.g.,
M. Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? Plaintiff's Viewpoint
(1973), 55 F.R.D. 365 at 370.
In satisfying the court that the action is brought in good faith it should
be sufficient for the plaintiff to show that he is genuinely concerned to
secure redress for the class, and that the class claim is not made for the
purpose of vexing the defendant or to coerce him into making a settlement.
With regard to the requirement of showing merit, it is appropriate to
analogize from the test applied in Canadian jurisdictions which allow a
plaintiff to obtain a speedy judgment without a full hearing. The defendant
can avoid summary judgment by showing that he has an arguable defence.
See Holmested & Gale, Judicature Act of Ontario and Rules of Practice,
vol. 1, 602-622 (1968). Applying this test to the question of apparent
merit, the plaintiff need not demonstrate conclusively that on both the law
and the facts the claim will succeed. These are matters for the judge at
trial to determine. It should be sufficient for the plaintiff to show that on
contentious points of law the claim is reasonably arguable and, if the facts
are in dispute, that there is a reasonable prospect that the trial court will
find them for him. For questions of law, the test is essentially the same as
that applied when the defendant moves to strike out a statement of claim
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for not disclosing a cause of action. The court will not grant the motion
unless the pleading is bad beyond argument.
Sub-section (8) is based on F.R.C.P. 23(c) (1). It allows the court
to alter or amend the order that the action is to be maintained as a class
action if, upon fuller development of the facts, the original determination
appears unsound (Advisory Note (1966), 39 F.R.D. 69 at 104).
4. Adequacy of Representation
(1) In determining whether the plaintiff will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class for the purpose of section
2(4), the court may consider:-
(a) if the plaintiff is not represented by counsel, whether the
plaintiff is competent to adequately present the claim
made on behalf of the class;
(b) if the plaintiff is represented by counsel, whether such
counsel has sufficient skill and experience to adequately
present the claim made on behalf of the class.
(2) If at any time after the court has determined that the action
is to be maintained as a class action and prior to judgment it
appears to the court that the plaintiff will not fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class the court shall:-
(a) set aside the order that the action is to be maintained as
a class action and make all such amendments to the pro-
ceedings as will eliminate therefrom all reference to repre-
sentation of absent persons, or
(b) substitute for the plaintiff any member of the class who
consents to be so substituted and who in the opinion of
the court will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
This section has to be read with section 2(4), which stipulates that
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class. The court cannot make an order under section 3 that the action
be maintained as a class action unless this condition is satisfied.
Section 2(4) is taken from F.R.C.P. 23(a). It is a critical provision
on account of the potentially serious consequences of a class action for mem-
bers of the class. If the action fails, the members will be bound by the
judgment and thus precluded from bringing separate proceedings themselves.
In some situations class members may be prejudiced even though the action
has succeeded. (See Note 77, supra.) The risk of prejudice would be only
slight if all class members were aware of the action and those who wished
to do so could take steps to exclude themselves from the operation of the
eventual judgment. However, notice to all the class can never be assured,
especially when the membership is large. Section 5(1) authorizes the court
to direct notice to the class, but it is envisaged that notice will be the excep-
tion rather than the rule, and that even when notice is ordered, it will not
be expected to reach the entire class.
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The subject of prejudice from an adverse judgment for class members
who had no notice of the proceedings was examined earlier (see text at
B3 supra). The conclusion was that class members who never intended to
sue for themselves could not show they had been prejudiced. Members of
the class in this category would include individuals who originally had con-
sidered their claim too small or the proof too difficult to warrant the trouble
and expense of litigation. The class member liable to be prejudiced by the
absence of notice was the person who had seriously thought of bringing
an action himself. Assuming that the member would have retained com-
petent counsel had he brought proceedings, and that the prospects of success
on the claim were reasonable, he will have suffered prejudice if the adverse
judgment that in fact eventuates is the result of the ineptitude of the plaintiff
or his counsel in managing the class claim. For a class member in this
situation, the risk of prejudice following the lack of notice will be minimized,
if not eliminated altogether, if the representative parties and their lawyers
exercise the same vigour and competence in presenting his claim as could
be expected if he were to sue himself. Hence the requirement that the court
be satisfied that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
class interests.
Section 4(1) specifically directs the court's attention to the question
of the legal representation of the plaintiff. Where the representative plaintiff
has not engaged counsel (s.4(l) (a)), it is expected that the court could
rarely be satisfied that the interests of the class were "fairly and adequately
protected." Sub-section (b) presents a more difficult question. It calls for
an inquiry that for Canadian courts is quite novel, and for obvious reasons
there will be some reluctance to make it. It is predicted, however, that the
question will need to be seriously considered on very few occasions. A
defendant will likely never object that the opposing lawyer is not competent
to present the claims of the class, and if the plaintiff himself is not satisfied
with the performance of his lawyer he is free to dismiss him. The provision
has been inserted for the protection of the class members and it is expected
that only after objection made by a class member will the courts ever have
to decide whether the lawyer for the class has "sufficient skill and experience
to adequately present" their claim.
United States courts have considered the competency of the lawyer
representing the class under the corresponding provision in F.R.C.P. 23.
The court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1963), 391 F. 2d 555 at 562,
held: "[A]n essential concomitant of adequate representation is that the
party's attorney be qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the
proposed litigation." This included diligent and vigorous prosecution of the
claim (Herbstv. Able (1969), 47 F.R.D. 11 at 15). In Dolgow v. Anderson,
(1968), 43 F.R.D. 472, the question of the competence of counsel for the
class was raised by the defendant, who argued that the representation might
be so poor that on constitutional grounds judgment in the action would not
have any res judicata effect. The statement of the court in dismissing the
objection indicates that the hearing of the motion which is required by sec-
tion 3 of the new procedure will give plaintiff's counsel an opportunity to
demonstrate his ability to conduct the litigation. Judge Weinstein said:
"Plaintiffs' counsel is admitted to practice in both state and federal courts.
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Until the contrary is demonstrated, courts will assume that members of the
bar are skilled in their profession. In point of fact, irrefutable evidence of
his competence and fervor is reflected in the papers and arguments thus
far submitted by the plaintiffs' attorney. He has demonstrated that he is
both willing and competent to undertake the responsibilities which this
litigation entails."
The competency of counsel is one aspect of the concept of the adequacy
of the class representation. Another aspect is the matter of the coincidence
of the interests of the representative party with those of the class. There
must be no conflict between their respective interests (Herbst v. Able,
(1969), 47 F.R.D. 11 at 15; C. Wright, Class Actions (1970), 47 F.R.D.
169 at 172). The same concern to avoid a conflict that might prejudice the
class underlies the requirement of section 8 that a class action is not to be
dismissed or compromised without court approval.
Sub-section (2) empowers the court to reconsider its determination that
the action is to be maintained as a class action if it appears that the repre-
sentative parties are no longer fairly and adequately protecting the class
interests. It is anticipated that the court would normally make such a finding
after objection by a class member, but it would be open to the court to act
of its own motion. Having found that the representative parties were not
qualified to represent the class, the court may either set aside the section 3
order and strike out the representative claim, the action then proceeding
as a claim by the plaintiff in his personal capacity, or substitute a class
member for the representative party.
The attention to the adequacy of the class representation that is de-
manded by section 2(4) reflects the concern that some class members may
be prejudiced if the action fails. Prejudice caused by a successful outcome
is another problem. It was mentioned earlier and will be examined more
fully in relation to section 7.
5. Notice to class
(1) If the court makes an order under section 3 that an action is
to be maintained as a class action, the court may order that
notice be given to members of the class on whose behalf the
action is brought advising them of the pendency of the action
and that the court will exclude them from the class if they so
request by a specified date and that judgment in the action,
whether favourable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion.
(2) If the court makes an order that notice be given to members of
the class, the court may in its discretion
(a) give directions as to:-
(i) the members of the class to whom the notice is to
be given,
(ii) the terms of the notice,
(iii) the mode of giving notice, including notice by
advertisement;
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(b) order that the defendant give the notice or pay the cost
of giving the notice.
(3) The court shall take the following matters into account when
determining whether to order that notice be given to members
of the class or in considering what directions to give under
sub-section (2):--
(a) the cost of giving notice in relation to the amount of any
sums claimed in the action on behalf of individual members
of the class;
(b) whether members of the class are likely to suffer sub-
stantial prejudice if they do not receive notice of the
pendency of the action.
This section authorises the court to direct notice to the class of the
pendency of the action once it is determined that the action is to be main-
tained as a class action. It differs from the Federal rule in several respects.
The most important point of departure is that the section gives the court a
discretion as to notice whereas the Federal provision makes notice mandatory
(F.R.C.P. 23 (c) (2)). Even in the United States the notion of a discretion
in the court as to notice is not entirely novel for at least one State, Mas-
sachusetts, though modelling its class action provision on Rule 23, has not
incorporated the compulsory notice stipulation (Rules of Civil Procedure
1974, Rule 23).
Notice to the class has proved the most controversial feature of class
action procedure in the United States under Rule 23. Rule 23(c) (2) pro-
vides that each class member shall be advised that he has the right to
exclude himself from the action or to enter an appearance through counsel,
and further, that the judgment, whether favourable or not, will bind all
class members not requesting exclusion. The court is required to direct to
class members "the best notice practicable under the circumstances, in-
cluding individual notice to all members who can be identified through rea-
sonable effort." The notice "is designed to fulfill requirements of due process
to which the class action procedure is of course subject" (Advisory Com-
mittee Note (1966), 39 F.R.D. 98 at 106-107). From the time the Rule
was introduced it was debated whether the words "all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort" were to be read literally or whether
notice to a sample of such members selected at random was sufficient. The
question seems now to have been finally determined by the Supreme Court
in the recent Eisen decision (1974), 94 S.Ct. 2140. The Court said: "We
think the import of this language is unmistakable. Individual notice must be
sent to all class members whose names and addresses may be ascertained
through reasonable effort.... In the present case, the names and addresses of
2,250,000 class members are easily ascertainable, and there is nothing to
show that individual notice cannot be mailed to each. For these class mem-
bers, individual notice is clearly the 'best notice practicable' within the
meaning of Rule 23 (c) (2) and our prior decisions."
The Supreme Court decision in Eisen also resolved another contentious
point of practice under Rule 23, the question of which party was to bear
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the initial cost of giving notice. It was held that the Rule gave no authority
to a court to order the defendant to pay the cost. "The usual rule is that the
plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to the class.. . as part of the
ordinary burden of financing his own suit." At the date of the appeal the
cost to the plaintiff of giving individual notice to the two million members of
the class was $315,000.
Under the present class action rule in Canadian jurisdictions there is no
requirement of notice to the class and in practice notice is not given. In con-
sidering whether some requirement of notice should be incorporated in a
new class action provision it is essential to remember that the rather strict
notice rules that obtain in the United States reflect the need to observe the
constitutional mandate of due process, and that no similar compulsion exists
in Canada. There is thus no danger that any new class action procedure will
be set aside for failing to prescribe standards for notice to the class that
United States courts would regard as minimal in order to secure the ob-
servance of due process. In a word, the United States experience with regard
to the necessity for notice is largely irrelevant in the Canadian context.
In giving the court a discretion to direct notice, section 5 contemplates
that in some situations no notice will be required at all and that in others
notice will be only minimal. The object of notice is to avoid prejudice to
class members caused by the binding nature of the judgment that ultimately
may be pronounced in the action. The notice gives them the opportunity to
exclude themselves from the class. Yet widespread notice to the class may
prove so costly as to be prohibitive. Sub-section (3) endeavours to strike a
balance between these conflicting considerations. The court is required to
take the matters mentioned in sub-section 3 into account in exercising the
discretion as to notice. Part (a), for instance, might justify the court dis-
pensing with notice altogether in a situation such as Chastain where the class
numbered thousands and the individual sums at stake were not large. Part
(b) deals with the risk of prejudice to class members who do not get notice.
Prejudice in this sense was examined earlier (see text at B3 supra), and it
was concluded that the risk was not very great, particularly if the claims of
class members were so small that they probably would not have sued them-
selves, or if the class was adequately represented by the plaintiff and his
lawyer.
The new procedure emphasizes the adequacy of class representation
rather than notice to the membership as the measure for safeguarding the
interests of class members in the event of an adverse judgment. The court
must be satisfied that the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class before it can allow the action to be main-
tained as a class action (s.s.2(4), 3(3), 4(1)(b)) and in reaching its deci-
sion the court may take into account the skill and experience of counsel re-
tained by the representative parties. It is submitted that when this requirement
is satisfied notice to the class becomes of secondary importance.
Notice given to a class member under the statute will inform him of the
pendency of the action and afford him an opportunity of either excluding
himself from the class or challenging the adequacy of the representation. The
opting-out function of the notice could not be fully served unless it was
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communicated to every member of the class, but this is hardly practicable.
Comprehensive service, however, is unnecessary if the notice is viewed
primarily as a means of allowing the class to test the quality of the class
representation. This purpose will be adequately carried out if notice is sent to
a sufficient number of randomly-selected class members. It is probable that
their response will be representative of the class as a whole. (B. Kaplan,
Federal Rules Amendments (1967), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356 at 396; R. Dole,
Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
(1968), Duke L. J. 1101 at 1126).
Two further comments are appropriate in relation to the discretion of
the court under section 5 to order notice and to direct how the notice is to
be given. First, if experience in the United States is any guide, notice will
ordinarily evoke little response from class members. Even where notice is
mailed to each member less that 1% of the class has requested exclusion in
most cases (A. Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their
Death Knell Been Sounded? (1970), 25 Business Lawyer 1259 at 1266;
Report of Special Committee of American College of Trial Lawyers, 11
(March 15, 1972); W. Simon, Class Actions - Useful Tool or Engine of
Destruction (1972), 55 F.R.D. 375 at 379; Hohmann v. Packard Instrument
Co. (1968), 399 F. 2d 714). Second, though section 5 authorizes service by
advertisement, such service may in fact prove illusory. "It would be idle to
pretend that publication alone . . . is a reliable means of acquainting W-
terested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts .... Chance
alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in
small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his
home outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that
the information will never reach him are large indeed" (Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306 at 315.) In the words
of two commentators, the Supreme Court in Mullane "recognized what many
judges and lawyers long had felt - notice by publication generally is equiva-
lent to no notice at all" (Maraist and Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled
Marriage: Due Process and the Class Action (1970), 49 Tex. L. Rev. 1 at 8.)
Section 5 (2) (b) authorizes the court to order the defendant to bear
the cost of notice to the class. The defendant has an interest in the question
of notice as he will normally have to pay the cost if the action eventually
succeeds. Except in this limited sense, whether notice is given to the class
or not does not really concern the defendant as judgment in the action will
bind members of the class whether they received notice or not. This provision
should help discourage a defendant from pressing the court to direct elaborate
notice when the motive is not to protect class members but to embarrass the
plaintiff with the expense of the notice. If the defendant insists on notice, the
court may make him pay the price.
6. Judgment after proceedings amended to exclude
representative claim
Whenever pursuant to this Act the court amends proceedings so
as to eliminate therefrom all reference to representation of absent per-
sons the court at the trial of the action shall give judgment in such form
as to affect only the parties to the action.
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This provision is adapted from Rule 23 of the Massachusetts Rules of
Civil Procedure 1974. It has been examined in relation to section 3.
7. Binding effect of class action judgment
Judgment in a class action shall not affect:-
(1) a member of the class on whose behalf the action is brought
who has excluded himself from the class;
(2) a member of the class who has not so excluded himself except
to the extent that the judgment determines the questions com-
mon to the class which are defined in the order that the action
is to be maintained as a class action and which relate to the
claim described and the relief specified in the order.
This must be read together with section 3(6) and (7). The foundation
for the three provisions is the common law rule that judgment in a class
action binds both the immediate parties and members of the class. In view of
some of the special features of the new procedure proposed in the draft it is
appropriate to prescribe the extent to which a judgment in an action brought
under the statute will have res judicata effect. The provisions deal with the
res judicata question from two aspects, namely, what members of the class
does the judgment bind, and to what extent are those members bound.
The risk of prejudice to class members resulting from an adverse judg-
ment was examined under section 5. The statute seeks to minimize this risk
by requiring the court to be satisfied that the class is adequately represented.
This will give some assurance that at the eventual trial the claim of a class
member will be presented no less effectively than if he had brought a separate
proceeding. In addition, class members may exclude themselves from the
class. A person who has opted-out of the class is not affected by judgment
in the class action (s.7(1)), whether favourable or not, and he may sue the
defendant in his own action, provided the claim is not statute barred.
A class action judgment can prejudice the position of some class mem-
bers even though the judgment is favourable. For instance, if the class re-
covers a damages judgment for breach of the condition of merchantable
quality which is implied in the sale of a product by The Sale of Goods Act, a
class member would probably be barred by the judgment from suing sep-
arately in respect of personal injuries sustained by reason of the defect in
the product. See Spencer-Bower and Turner, Res Judicata, 378-382 (2d,
1969); 50 Corpus Juris Secundum, 121, §676. This aspect of res judicata
was examined in Note 77, supra. The statute attempts to prevent prejudice
of this kind in consequence of a judgment for the class. The situations in
which judgment in a class action on one cause of action might bar a second
action for different relief on another cause of action arising from the same
factual situation are too varied to be enumerated, even assuming they could
be stated with any precision, which is far from clear. (Indeed, the concept
of a cause of action is itself so elusive that the use of the term has been
avoided.) Instead, the approach has been to restrict the binding effect of the
judgment within the narrowest definable limits.
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This objective is sought to be accomplished by section 3(6) and 3(7)
and section 7 in the following ways:-
1. As to what persons are bound:-
(a) by defining the class on whose behalf the action is brought in the
order that the action is to be maintained as a class action
(s.3 (6) (a));
(b) by allowing members of the class so defined to exclude themselves
from the class (s.3(6) (d));
(c) by removing class members so excluded from the effect of the
judgment (s.7(1)).
2. As to the extent a person is bound by the judgment:-
(a) the order that the action is to be maintained as a class action shall
describe the nature of the claim made on behalf of the class and
specify the relief claimed and define the common questions
(s.3(6)(b) and (c));
(b) such relief shall not include damages for the death of or bodily
injury to any person (s.3(7));
(c) judgment in the action shall affect the class members bound
(s.7 (1)) to the extent only that the judgment determines the claim
described and the relief specified in the order and insofar as the
claim and the relief relate to the common questions defined in the
order (s.7(2)).
Claims for damages for death or bodily injury are excluded from the
scope of the class action procedure for two reasons. First, the procedure
is not really appropriate to claims of this nature. It is designed for consumers
who have been economically disadvantaged in the acquisition of goods and
services. Also, there is not the same need for a class action in death or injury
cases since the amount at stake will warrant an individual action. Second,
the exclusion of death or injury claims helps to reinforce section 7(2) in the
case where some members of the class have such a claim. In this situation
the object of section 7(2) is to ensure that the death or injury claim is pre-
served notwithstanding that the class action judgment, whether favourable
or not, has determined questions of fact on which the tort claim also rests.
In a word, the class action judgment binds neither the defendant nor the
class member.
8. No discontinuance, etc., without leave
A class action shall not be discontinued or dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court and the court may order
notice of such proposed discontinuance, dismissal or compromise to be
given in such manner as the court directs.
This provision follows F.R.C.P. 23 (e).
Under existing practice, a representative plaintiff is free to reach a
settlement of his claim with the defendant and the leave of the court is not
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required. Also, the plaintiff can discontinue the action without leave pro-
vided he acts within the time specified by the Rules (Rule 320 in Ontario
and see Note 50, supra). Neither settlement nor discontinuance will ex-
tinguish the cause of action of the class members and they are entitled to
commence separate proceedings. The plaintiff's actions, however, might pro-
duce a complication. If time has expired under the relevant limitation period
when the plaintiff terminates the action, it will be too late for class members
to sue individually. In addition, if the action raises a novel question that
affects the interests of consumers generally, the settlement will destroy the
opportunity of establishing a useful precedent (see R. Dole, Consumer Class
Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1968), Duke L.J. 1101
at 1103).
The difficulty caused by the running of time under the limitations statute
can be overcome by substituting a class member for the original plaintiff
and allowing him to carry on with the action. This can certainly be done in
the case of discontinuance (see Note 50, supra), and there is no reason why
the same course could not be followed where the plaintiff's claim has been
satisfied pursuant to a compromise (see La Sala v. American Savings & Loan
Association (1971), 98 Cal. Reptr. 849, 489 P. 2d 1113). The problem
is really one of notification for it is possible under present practice that
members of the class will not learn what has happened to the action until
some time after it has been brought to an end. Though the court probably
has the power to reinstate the action with a class member substituted for the
plaintiff, the power is discretionary and the court might refuse to assist the
class if an appreciable period has elapsed since the plaintiff terminated
the action.
Section 8 provides that a class action shall not be discontinued or dis-
missed or compromised without the leave of the court, and gives the court
power to direct notice of the proposed termination. If the plaintiff is pro-
posing simply to dispose of his own claim, the purpose of the notice will be
to inform the class of that fact and give members the opportunity to be sub-
stituted in order to carry on the action. Under the new procedure, the court's
jurisdiction to order the substitution is derived from section 2(4) since by
discontinuing or settling the claim the plaintiff will have ceased to "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."
On the other hand, if the plaintiff is purporting to settle the claim on
behalf of the entire class as, for instance, by accepting a sum of money to
be subsequently distributed to the class, the purpose of notice will be to
give class members an opportunity to object to the settlement. The com-
promise of the personal claim of a representative does not bind the class,
but the compromise of the class claim is another matter. If a party can carry
a representative claim to the point of a judgment which will bind the class,
there seems to be no reason in principle why he should not be able to com-
promise the claim for the class provided there is a suitable safeguard. The
requirement of court approval should provide the necessary protection.
The extent of distribution of notice to the class is left to the discretion
of the court. Consistent with the approach taken by the statute towards
notice of the pendency of the action under section 5, it is contemplated that
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only limited notice will normally be given. In devising settlement procedures
under the new provision the courts should take care to avoid the problem
adverted to by Professor Richard F. Dole, Jr. in the latter part of this com-
ment:- "A major issue concerning the practicability of class actions for
damages is whether enlightened settlement procedures can lessen the ad-
ministrative burdens inherent in these actions. An important sub-issue is
whether the representative nature of class suits requires such safeguards
against collective settlements as will themselves burden the courts" (The
Settlement of Class Actions for Damages (1971), 71 Col. L. Rev. 971
at 976).
9. Notice to class after judgment on common questions
Where at the trial of a class action the court gives judgment for
the plaintiff and the judgment does not determine a question or questions
of law or fact that affect only individual members of the class on whose
behalf the action is brought, the following provisions shall apply:-
(1) The court shall order that notice be given in such manner as it
may direct to members of the class.
(2) The notice shall:-
(a) inform members of the class of the proceedings;
(b) direct them to file within a time to be specified in the
notice such particulars of the claim against the defendant
for the relief specified in the order that the action be
maintained as a class action as the court shall require;
(c) state that in default of the filing of a claim a class member
shall not recover against the defendant the relief specified
in the order that the action be maintained as a class action
except by separate action brought by the class member
against the defendant.
(3) In default of the filing of a claim as provided by sub-section
(2), a class member shall not recover against the defendant
the relief specified in the order that the action be maintained
as a class action except by separate action brought by the
class member against the defendant.
(4) The court shall determine the claim of a class member filed in
accordance with sub-section (2) and may pronounce such
judgment on the claim as the court thinks fit.
(5) In such proceedings to determine the claim of a class member
the class member and the defendant shall have the same rights
of discovery against each other and be subject to the same
liability for costs as the parties in an ordinary action in the
court and the defendant shall have the same right to pay
money into court as the defendant in an ordinary action.
This section establishes the procedural machinery for disposing of the
claims of individual class members in the event that the court gives judgment
for the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff's claim will be typical of the claims of the
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class the judgment will dispose of the questions of law or fact that are
common to the plaintiff and the claim and leave only questions that affect
individual class members to be determined.
Sections 2(2) and 3(3) (a) ensure that the court cannot deny class
action status to a suit on the ground that the claim raises questions that affect
only individual class members. The suit can be maintained as a class action
provided the common questions predominate. To a limited extent even the
existing rule allows a class action that involves individual questions. Whether
or not a person is actually a member of the class is such a question, and so
is the calculation of the separate entitlement of class members in an award
of money other than damages. The statute expands the range of situations
that raise both common and individual questions for which the class remedy
is available. Claims for damages that require separate assessment and claims
arising out of separate contracts are now specifically included (s.3 (4)), and
it is hoped that by applying the "predominance of common questions" test
the courts will authorize class action treatment for claims based on war-
ranties given or representations made in identical terms to a class of consumers.
After the court has found the common questions against the defendant,
the members of the class will need the opportunity to establish their in-
dividual claims by obtaining a favourable finding on the questions that affect
only them. This may call for notice to the class, and the particular circum-
stances will dictate the form of notice that is appropriate. Whether the court
will order that individual notice be attempted on all the members or merely
on a random sample or whether it will regard notice by advertisement in the
media as sufficient, or perhaps order a combination of individual notice and
advertisement, should be governed by the size of the class, the amounts of
individual claims, and the cost of notice. The fact that the class members
can be identified is an important factor. For instance, if the defendant has a
record of the names and addresses of class members and is in regular cor-
respondence with them, the court might order it to enclose a notice in the
next communication to the members. A department store sending monthly
accounts to its charge customers is a good example. See the opinion of
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
(1974), 94 S. Ct. 2140; H. Kalven & M. Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Func-
tion of the Class Suit (1941), 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684 at 693; Comment,
Recovery of Damages in Class Actions (1965), 32 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 758.
Sub-section (2) and (3) will not necessarily bar the rights of class
members if they do not file notice of claim within the time specified by the
court. The class members lose the right to participate in the judgment, but
they are free to bring a separate action against the defendant provided the
relevant limitation period has not expired. Few separate actions are likely to
be brought if the individual claims of class members are only small. In any
subsequent action, questions between the plaintiff and the defendant that
were common questions in the class action will have been determined by the
class action judgment, and only questions that affect just the plaintiff will
remain to be decided. In view of the possible serious consequences of default
in filing a claim, the court is likely to require more extensive service and
publication of notice of the judgment than in the case of the earlier notice
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of the pendency of the action provided by section 5, particularly if the in-
dividual amounts at stake are substantial.
Finally, sub-section (4) and (5) deal with the actual determination of
individual claims if they are contested by the defendant. It is felt that plead-
ings will not be necessary as once the common questions have been disposed
of there should be no more than one or two issues between individual class
members and the defendant and these can be easily defined in an informal
way. The ordinary rules as to discovery and costs will apply as between the
defendant and each claimant (subject to section 11, infra). This should over-
come the objection to class actions for damages requiring separate assessment
that was raised in the Markt decision ([1910] 2 K.B. 1021) and Farnham v.
Fingold, [19731 2 O.R. 132. See text at C.3 supra. In addition, the payment
into court procedure applying in an ordinary action is made available to the
defendant.
The procedure for disposing of the individual questions in a class action
that section 9 sets up may appear somewhat complicated. It is considered,
however, that the section does no more than establish the minimum require-
ments for securing the maximum benefit for the class from the favourable
judgment without sacrificing procedural fairness for the defendant. It might
be appropriate to echo the thought of Benjamin Kaplan, one of the authors
of F.R.C.P. 23, when contemplating how courts in the United States would
handle individual claims under the new procedure. "These procedures can
have a nightmarish look when the members are very many and their stakes
are very modest.... I expect the problems will appear less formidable when
they actually arise than they do now in anticipation. Yet imagination and
even daring may be required of counsel in devising abbreviated but fair pro-
cedures leading to hand-tailored relief which may well be quite novel in
form." (B. Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to "The Class Action - A Symposium"
(1968), 10 Boston College Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 497 at 499.)
10. Assessment of total pecuniary liability
(1) When the question or questions affecting only individual mem-
bers of the class and not determined by the judgment for the
plaintiff is or include the amount of the pecuniary liability of
the defendant to each member of the class, and the total
amount of the liability to all members of the class can be cal-
culated with reasonable accuracy without individual proof by
the members, the court may determine the total amount of the
liability and order the defendant to pay the amount into court.
(2) Proceedings after the defendant has paid money into court
pursuant to an order made under sub-section (1) shall be
conducted in accordance with section 9.
(3) If within such time as the court by order directs, the entire
amount paid by the defendant into court has not been paid or
applied in satisfaction of the claims of members of the class
or the costs and expenses of the action, the court may dispose
of the balance of the amount as it thinks fit.
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The intended operation of section 10 is explained supra, text at El.
11. Costs of class action
(1) Subject to sub-section (2) of this section, the costs of a class
action are in the discretion of the court and the court has full
power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs
shall be paid.
(2) No costs shall be awarded to the defendant to a class action
at any stage of the action, including appeal, except that the
court may award costs to the defendant on--
(a) a motion under section 3;
(b) the determination of the claim of a class member under
section 9(4);
(c) an interlocutory motion.
(3) Where the court awards costs to the plaintiff at the trial of a
class action or to a class member on the determination of a
claim under section 9(4),
(a) such costs shall be awarded on the basis of solicitor and
own client unless the court otherwise directs;
(b) if a defendant has paid money into court pursuant to
section 10, the court may order that the whole or part
of the costs be paid out of the money in court, and to
the extent that the costs are not ordered to be paid or
are not paid out of the money in court, the court shall
order the defendant to pay the balance of the costs.
This section deals with the costs of proceedings brought under the
statute. Where the court has made an order that an action is to be main-
tained as a class action the section varies the ordinary rule that costs follow
the event. The court may order the defendant to pay costs if the action suc-
ceeds but it cannot order the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs in the
event that it fails. The defendant can be awarded costs in only three situa-
tions. First, if the plaintiff fails to obtain an order under section 3 that the
action is to be maintained as a class action (s.ll (2) (a) ), or does not move
to obtain the order in time and the representative claim is struck out on
the motion of the defendant. Second, if the defendant defeats a claim made
by an individual class member on a determination made under section 9(4)
(s.l 1(2) (b) ). The defendant could also be awarded costs if on the deter-
mination he successfully invoked the payment into court procedure as per-
mitted by section 9(3). Third, the defendant can recover costs on an inter-
locutory motion, for example, a motion that the plaintiff produce documents
on discovery (s.ll (2) (a)).
Sub-section (3) (a) contemplates that when costs are awarded against
the defendant, either on the trial of the action that determines the common
questions or on a claim made subsequently by an individual class member,
the costs will normally be allowed on a solicitor and client basis. The inten-
tion is that the plaintiff or class member, as the case may be, should receive
a full indemnity for his costs of recovery.
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Solicitor and own client costs will be paid by the defendant, but where
the defendant has paid money into court to meet the total liability to the
class pursuant to section 10, the court is given a discretion by section
11(3) (b) to determine whether the costs will be borne wholly by the
money in court or wholly by the defendant in addition to the payment in
court or partly by the money in court and partly by an additional payment.
The court, for instance, could direct the defendant to pay costs on a party
and party basis independent of the amount in court and allow the plaintiff
to receive out of court the sum needed to meet the solicitor and own client
costs. Sub-section 3(b) removes any uncertainty that might exist at present
concerning the power of the court to allow the plaintiff's costs to be paid out
of any fund recovered for the class (see Note 143, supra).
The costs provisions of the statute undoubtedly represent a striking
departure from the rules that traditionally apply. However, it is considered
that there is a special justification for a different approach to costs in the
case of an action for a consumer class. The reasons have been examined
earlier (supra, text at D7). Also, it has to be remembered that the statute
establishes safeguards against the abuse of the procedure. Within a short
time after the commencement of the action the plaintiff must obtain the
order that the action is to be maintained as a class action. The order will be
refused and the representative claim struck out unless the plaintiff can estab-
lish (inter alia) that the action is brought in good faith and the claim has
merit (s.3(3) (c)).
12. Appeal from class action order
For the purpose of any statute or rule of law or practice which
regulates appeals in the court
(1) an order that the action is to be maintained as a class action
shall be deemed to be an interlocutory order of the court;
(2) an order that an action is not to be maintained as a class action,
whether made pursuant to section 3 or section 4(2) (a), shall
be deemed to be a final order of the court.
The section is concerned with the procedure for appealing a decision
of the court on the question whether an action can be maintained as a
class action. Court rules ordinarily provide that a final order can be appealed
as of right and an interlocutory order only by leave. (See, for instance, in
Ontario:- The Judicature Act, R.S.O., c.228, s.29 (1) (a); Rules of Prac-
tice, r.499(1)). However, the rules do not indicate whether an order is final
or interlocutory in the particular case. The usual test is that an order is
final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties (Holmested and Gale,
Ontario Practice Year Book, 231 (1974)), but the test is sometimes difficult
to apply. With class actions, there is the added complication that members
of the class are not ordinarily treated as parties. Section 12 removes any
possible ambiguity by making it clear that for the purpose of appeal an
order allowing an action to be maintained as a class action is interlocutory
while an order that an action cannot be so maintained is final.
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The refusal of the court to allow the plaintiff to maintain an action as a
class action will mean that class members lose the opportunity to recover
relief in the action. In this sense it is fair to treat the court's order as finalk
though strictly the refusal does not finally dispose of the class claims unless
the limitation period has expired. However, the practical effect of an order
denying leave to maintain the action as a class action will be that few mem-
bers of the former class will recover, and for this reason the conferring of an
appeal as of right is appropriate.
The grant of leave to maintain an action as a class action, though it
might lead ultimately to the defendant being found liable to the class, does
not finally dispose of any rights. The order is therefore properly characterized
as interlocutory. The defendant can appeal the order, but only by leave.
In Ontario, for instance, the defendant can obtain leave from a judge (other
than the judge appealed from) to appeal to the Court of Appeal if there
are conflicting decisions on the question and the judge considers it desirable
that an appeal be allowed or if there appears to the judge to be good reason
to doubt the correctness of the order and the appeal involves matters of such
importance that in the opinion of the judge leave should be given (Rules of
Practice (Ont.) r. 499 (3)).
13. Applications to be heard by judge
Without affecting the generality of any statute or rule of law or
practice, the following matters shall be disposed of by a judge of the
court:-
(1) a motion that an action is to be maintained as a class action;
(2) a motion by the defendant under section 3(2);
(3) a motion under section 3(8) to alter or amend an order that
an action is to be maintained as a class action;
(4) an application for an order or directions under section 5;
(5) a motion under section 8 for the approval of the discontinuance
or dismissal or compromise of a class action.
This section is designed to ensure that the applications specified are
disposed of by a judge rather than a master of the court. It is felt that the
particular matters are of such importance that a judge should have exclusive
jurisdiction to deal with them.
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